University of Arizona
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1992
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics
Normative Ethics
  •  1304
    Moral realism: a defence
    Oxford University Press. 2003.
    Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.
  •  1015
    The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
    Philosophical Studies 171 (3): 399-443. 2014.
    Our project in this essay is to showcase nonnaturalistic moral realism’s resources for responding to metaphysical and epistemological objections by taking the view in some new directions. The central thesis we will argue for is that there is a battery of substantive moral propositions that are also nonnaturalistic conceptual truths. We call these propositions the moral fixed points. We will argue that they must find a place in any system of moral norms that applies to beings like us, in worlds s…Read more
  •  631
    Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1): 1-38. 2012.
    This paper reconstructs what I take to be the central evolutionary debunking argument that underlies recent critiques of moral realism. The argument claims that given the extent of evolutionary influence on our moral faculties, and assuming the truth of moral realism, it would be a massive coincidence were our moral faculties reliable ones. Given this coincidence, any presumptive warrant enjoyed by our moral beliefs is defeated. So if moral realism is true, then we can have no warranted moral be…Read more
  •  620
    Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2006.
    A substantial collection of seminal articles, Foundations of Ethics covers all of the major issues in metaethics. Covers all of the major issues in metaethics including moral metaphysics, epistemology, moral psychology, and philosophy of language. Provides an unparalleled offering of primary sources and expert commentary for students of ethical theory. Includes seminal essays by ethicists such as G.E. Moore, Simon Blackburn, Gilbert Harman, Christine Korsgaard, Michael Smith, Bernard Williams, J…Read more
  •  484
    Trusting Moral Intuitions
    Noûs (4): 956-984. 2019.
    Noûs, EarlyView.
  •  461
    A defence of categorical reasons
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2): 189-206. 2009.
    In this paper I offer two arguments designed to defend the existence of categorical reasons, which I define as those justifying considerations that obtain independently of their relation to an agent's commitments. The first argument is based on certain paradigm cases meant to reveal difficulties for practical instrumentalism—the view, as I define it here, that categorical reasons do not exist, because all reasons must serve the commitments of the agents to whom they apply. The second argument re…Read more
  •  323
    The Source of Normativity
    with John Bengson and Terence Cuneo
    Mind 132 (527): 706-729. 2023.
    This paper seeks to clarify one of the deepest questions about the source or ground of normativity, while also presenting an essence-based approach to answering it. We call it the ‘Arché Question.’ Though all metanormative theories must address this question, very few realists have explicitly grappled with the challenge it poses; those who have appear to deny any need to give an answer. After critically discussing extant realist responses, this paper outlines an essence-based approach to answeri…Read more
  •  323
    Ethical disagreement, ethical objectivism and moral indeterminacy
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2): 331-344. 1994.
  •  297
    Ethical Theory: An Anthology (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2007.
    _Ethical Theory: An Anthology_ is an authoritative collection of key essays by top scholars in the field, addressing core issues including consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, as well as traditionally underrepresented topics such as moral knowledge and moral responsibility. Brings together seventy-six classic and contemporary pieces by renowned philosophers, from classic writing by Hume and Kant to contemporary writing by Derek Parfit, Susan Wolf, and Judith Jarvis Thomson Guides stu…Read more
  •  270
    Moral and theological realism: The explanatory argument
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3): 311-329. 2007.
    There are striking parallels, largely unexplored in the literature, between skeptical arguments against theism and against moral realism. After sketching four arguments meant to do this double duty, I restrict my attention to an explanatory argument that claims that we have most reason to deny the existence of moral facts (and so, by extrapolation, theistic ones), because such putative facts have no causal-explanatory power. I reject the proposed parity, and offer reasons to think that the poten…Read more
  •  241
    The fundamentals of ethics
    Oxford University Press. 2010.
    Introduction -- Part I: The good life -- Hedonism : its powerful appeal -- Is happiness all that matters? -- Getting what you want -- Problems for the desire theory -- Part II: Doing the right thing -- Morality and religion -- Natural law theory -- Psychological egoism -- Ethical egoism -- Consequentialism : its nature and attractions -- Consequentialism : its difficulties -- The kantian perspective : fairness and justice -- The kantian perspective : autonomy and respect -- The social contract t…Read more
  •  214
    Retributivism and desert
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2). 2000.
  •  185
    A defense of motivational externalism
    Philosophical Studies 97 (3): 267-291. 2000.
  •  181
    Vagueness, Borderline Cases and Moral Realism
    American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1). 1995.
  •  176
    Moral rules
    Ethics 107 (4): 584-611. 1997.
    The traditional conception of ethical theory sees it as the project of developing a coherent set of rules from which one can infer all determinate moral verdicts. I am not optimistic about the prospects for constructing such a theory. To explain this pessimism, we need to understand what moral rules are and what roles they might play in ethical theory
  •  175
    Moral judgement and normative reasons
    Analysis 59 (1): 33-40. 1999.
  •  168
    Method in the Service of Progress
    Analytic Philosophy 60 (3): 179-205. 2019.
    Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
  •  156
    Three problems for Schroeder’s hypotheticalism (review)
    Philosophical Studies 157 (3): 435-443. 2012.
    Three problems for Schroeder’s Humean theory of reasons.
  •  147
  •  146
    Can punishment morally educate?
    Law and Philosophy 10 (2). 1991.
    Over the past ten years or so, there has been a renewed interest in the moral education theory of punishment. The attractions of the theory are numerous, not least of which is that it offers hopes for a breakthrough in the apparently intractable debate between deterrence theorists and retributivists. Nevertheless, I believe there are severe problems with recent formulations of the theory. First, contemporary educationists all place great emphasis on autonomy, yet fail to show how continued respe…Read more
  •  140
    Vegetarianism, causation and ethical theory
    Public Affairs Quarterly 8 (1): 85-100. 1994.
  •  134
    Moral judgement and moral motivation
    Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192): 353-358. 1998.
    I criticize an important argument of Michael Smith, from his recent book The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Smith's argument, if sound, would undermine one form of moral externalism 2013 that which insists that moral judgements only contingently motivate their authors. Smith claims that externalists must view good agents as always prompted by the motive of duty, and that possession of such a motive impugns the goodness of the agent. I argue (i) that externalists do not (ordinarily) nee…Read more
  •  123
    The ethical life: fundamental readings in ethics and moral problems (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2010.
    Introduction -- Value theory : the nature of the good life -- Epicurus letter to Menoeceus -- John Stuart Mill, Hedonism -- Aldous Huxley, Brave new world -- Robert Nozick, The experience machine -- Richard Taylor, The meaning of life -- Jean Kazez, Necessities -- Normative ethics : theories of right conduct -- J.J.C. Smart, Eextreme and restricted utilitarianism -- Immanuel Kant the good will & the categorical imperative -- Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan -- Philippa Foot, Natural goodness -- Aristotl…Read more
  •  120
    The meaning of moral disagreements
    The Philosophers' Magazine 59 (59): 83-89. 2012.
  •  119
    Supervenience and moral realism
    Ratio 7 (2): 145-152. 1994.
    Simon Blackburn has developed an interesting challenge to moral realism based on its alleged inability to account for supervenience relations between the moral and nonmoral. If supervenience holds, then any base property once giving rise to a supervening one must always do so. The realist accepts supervenience, but also (according to Blackburn) accepts the claim that nonmoral base properties do not necessitate the moral ones that supervene on them. This combination is thought deadly, because it …Read more
  •  117
    Whatever happened to good and evil?
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    Since September 11, 2001, many people in the United States have been more inclined to use the language of good and evil, and to be more comfortable with the idea that certain moral standards are objective (true independently of what anyone happens to think of them). Some people, especially those who are not religious, are not sure how to substantiate this view. Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? provides a basis for exploring these doubts and ultimately defends the objectivity of ethics. Engagi…Read more
  •  107
    Replies to Critics
    Philosophical Studies 126 (2): 313-329. 2005.