Russell Meyer

Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy
  •  219
    Minimal model explanations of cognition
    European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (41): 1-25. 2023.
    Active materials are self-propelled non-living entities which, in some circumstances, exhibit a number of cognitively interesting behaviors such as gradient-following, avoiding obstacles, signaling and group coordination. This has led to scientific and philosophical discussion of whether this may make them useful as minimal models of cognition (Hanczyc, 2014; McGivern, 2019). Batterman and Rice (2014) have argued that what makes a minimal model explanatory is that the model is ultimately in the …Read more
  •  184
    Dynamical causes
    Biology and Philosophy 35 (5): 1-21. 2020.
    Mechanistic explanations are often said to explain because they reveal the causal structure of the world. Conversely, dynamical models supposedly lack explanatory power because they do not describe causal structure. The only way for dynamical models to produce causal explanations is via the 3M criterion: the model must be mapped onto a mechanism. This framing of the situation has become the received view around the viability of dynamical explanation. In this paper, I argue against this position …Read more
  •  156
    Enactivists frequently argue their account heralds a revolution in cognitive science: enactivism will unseat cognitivism as the dominant paradigm. We examine the lines of reasoning enactivists employ in stirring revolt, but show that none of these prove compelling reasons for cognitivism to be replaced by enactivism. First, we examine the hard sell of enactivism: enactivism reveals a critical explanatory gap at the heart of cognitivism. We show that enactivism does not meet the requirements to i…Read more
  •  100
    The Non-mechanistic Option: Defending Dynamical Explanations
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3): 959-985. 2018.
    This article demonstrates that non-mechanistic, dynamical explanations are a viable approach to explanation in the special sciences. The claim that dynamical models can be explanatory without reference to mechanisms has previously been met with three lines of criticism from mechanists: the causal relevance concern, the genuine laws concern, and the charge of predictivism. I argue, however, that these mechanist criticisms fail to defeat non-mechanistic, dynamical explanation. Using the examples o…Read more
  •  18
    Embracing the Meta-Copernican Turn: Non-decomposition and Mechanistic Explanations
    Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2): 214-218. 2018.
    In line with proponents of 4E cognition, Gallagher [2019] is concerned that many cognitive phenomena are not amenable to decomposition strategies since their very nature is to be constituted extensively. By contrast the received view on causal explanation—the mechanistic account [Craver 2007]—emphasises the necessity for decomposition in explaining natural phenomena and insists on a sharp distinction between causal versus constitutive relations. I propose that removing the requirement that const…Read more
  •  10
    An explanatory taste for mechanisms
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 22 (4): 821-840. 2023.
    Mechanistic explanations, according to one prominent account, are derived from objective explanations (Craver 2007, 2014 ). Mechanistic standards of explanation are in turn pulled from nature, and are thereby insulated from the values of investigators, since explanation is an objectively defined achievement grounded in the causal structure of the world (Craver 2014 ). This results in the closure of mechanism’s explanatory standards—it is insulated from the values, norms and goals of investigator…Read more
  •  8
    Enactivism: Utopian & Scientific
    Constructivist Foundations 19 (1): 1-11. 2023.
    Our target article concerns the direction and growth of enactivism, a framework portrayed as a revolutionary shift in understanding cognition. While enactivism continues to be a lively position, it is unclear how its contributions relate to the cognitive sciences. Despite some empirical successes, enactivism remains somewhat insulated as a theoretical position and as a research program. There exists a discrepancy between enactivist aims and delivery. The basis of this problem, we argue, is that …Read more
  •  7
    The Routledge handbook of mechanisms and mechanical philosophy (review)
    Philosophical Psychology 32 (8): 1268-1271. 2019.
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