• College of DuPage
    Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
    Post-doctoral fellow
Glen Ellyn, Illinois, United States of America
  •  1336
    Vagueness and the Philosophy of Perception
    Dissertation, University of Oxford. 2012.
    This dissertation explores several illuminating points of intersection between the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of vagueness. Among other things, I argue: (i) that it is entirely unhelpful to theorize about perception or consciousness using Nagelian "what it's like" talk; (ii) that a popular recent account of perceptual phenomenology (representationalism) conflicts with our best theory of vagueness (supervaluationism); (iii) that there are no vague properties, for Evans-esque reas…Read more
  •  814
    Representationalism and the problem of vagueness
    with Tim Bayne
    Philosophical Studies 162 (1): 71-86. 2013.
    This paper develops a novel problem for representationalism (also known as "intentionalism"), a popular contemporary account of perception. We argue that representationalism is incompatible with supervaluationism, the leading contemporary account of vagueness. The problem generalizes to naive realism and related views, which are also incompatible with supervaluationism