•  3065
    What good are our intuitions: Philosophical analysis and social kinds
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1): 89-118. 2006.
    Across the humanities and social sciences it has become commonplace for scholars to argue that categories once assumed to be “natural” are in fact “social” or, in the familiar lingo, “socially constructed”. Two common examples of such categories are race and gender, but there many others. One interpretation of this claim is that although it is typically thought that what unifies the instances of such categories is some set of natural or physical properties, instead their unity rests on social fe…Read more
  •  1660
    It is always awkward when someone asks me informally what I’m working on and I answer that I’m trying to figure out what gender is. For outside a rather narrow segment of the academic world, the term ‘gender’ has come to function as the polite way to talk about the sexes. And one thing people feel pretty confident about is their knowledge of the difference between males and females. Males are those human beings with a range of familiar primary and secondary sex characteristics, most important be…Read more
  •  1252
    Ontology and Social Construction
    Philosophical Topics 23 (2): 95-125. 1995.
  •  966
    Feminism in metaphysics: Negotiating the natural
    In Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. pp. 107--126. 2000.
  •  873
    Persistence through time
    In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford University Press. pp. 315--354. 2003.
  •  624
  •  496
    What is a (social) structural explanation?
    Philosophical Studies 173 (1): 113-130. 2016.
    A philosophically useful account of social structure must accommodate the fact that social structures play an important role in structural explanation. But what is a structural explanation? How do structural explanations function in the social sciences? This paper offers a way of thinking about structural explanation and sketches an account of social structure that connects social structures with structural explanation
  •  412
    Humean supervenience and enduring things
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (3). 1994.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  398
    Philosophical analysis and social kinds
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1): 89-118. 2006.
    [Sally Haslanger] In debates over the existence and nature of social kinds such as 'race' and 'gender', philosophers often rely heavily on our intuitions about the nature of the kind. Following this strategy, philosophers often reject social constructionist analyses, suggesting that they change rather than capture the meaning of the kind terms. However, given that social constructionists are often trying to debunk our ordinary (and ideology-ridden?) understandings of social kinds, it is not surp…Read more
  •  363
    In this collection of previously published essays, Sally Haslanger draws on insights from feminist and critical race theory and on the resources of contemporary analytic philosophy to develop the idea that gender and race are positions ...
  •  359
  •  358
    Ideology, Generics, and Common Ground
    In Charlotte Witt (ed.), Feminist Metaphysics, Springer Verlag. pp. 179--207. 2011.
    Are sagging pants cool? Are cows food? Are women more submissive than men? Are blacks more criminal than whites? Taking the social world at face value, many people would be tempted to answer these questions in the affirmative. And if challenged, they can point to facts that support their answers. But there is something wrong about the affirmative answers. In this chapter, I draw on recent ideas in the philosophy of language and metaphysics to show how the assertion of a generic claim of the sort…Read more
  •  317
    Why I Don’t Believe in Patriarchy: Comments on Kate Manne’s Down Girl
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1): 220-229. 2020.
  •  304
    Contemporary discussions of race and racism devote considerable effort to giving conceptual analyses of these notions. Much of the work is concerned to investigate a priori what we mean by the terms ‘ race ’ and ‘racism’ ; more recent work has started to employ empirical methods to determine the content of our “folk concepts,” or “folk theory” of race and racism. In contrast to both of these projects, I have argued elsewhere that in considering what we mean by these terms we should treat them on…Read more
  •  218
    Racism, Ideology, and Social Movements
    Res Philosophica 94 (1): 1-22. 2017.
    Racism, sexism, and other forms of injustice are more than just bad attitudes; after all, such injustice involves unfair distributions of goods and resources. But attitudes play a role. How central is that role? Tommie Shelby, among others, argues that racism is an ideology and takes a cognitivist approach suggesting that ideologies consist in false beliefs that arise out of and serve pernicious social conditions. In this paper I argue that racism is better understood as a set of practices, atti…Read more
  •  215
    Feminism and Metaphysics: Unmasking Hidden Ontologies
    Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 99 (2): 192--196. 2000.
    Unlike feminist ethics, or feminist political philosophy, or even feminist epistemology and philosophy of science, feminist metaphysics cannot be said (yet!) to have standing as a full-fledged sub-discipline of either philosophy or feminist theory. Although one can find both undergraduate and graduate courses devoted to the other sub-fields just mentioned, a course in feminist metaphysics is a rare find; and there are few professional philosophers who would consider listing in their areas of spe…Read more
  •  210
    Distinguished Lecture: Social structure, narrative and explanation
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1): 1-15. 2015.
    Recent work on social injustice has focused on implicit bias as an important factor in explaining persistent injustice in spite of achievements on civil rights. In this paper, I argue that because of its individualism, implicit bias explanation, taken alone, is inadequate to explain ongoing injustice; and, more importantly, it fails to call attention to what is morally at stake. An adequate account of how implicit bias functions must situate it within a broader theory of social structures and st…Read more
  •  207
    Feminist metaphysics
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008;2011.
  •  176
    Race, intersectionality, and method: a reply to critics
    Philosophical Studies 171 (1): 109-119. 2014.
    It is a great honor to have such excellent commentary on my book, and I am happy to have the opportunity to discuss these issues with others who have done such important work on the topics. I will reply to the commentaries separately, beginning with the critique by Charles Mills (2013) and moving on to Karen Jones’s (2013). Reply to MillsRevisiting my projectMills considers four views that pose challenges to my account of race as a hierarchical social category.(1) Kitcher (2007) and Andreasen (1…Read more
  •  176
    I—Culture and Critique
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1): 149-173. 2017.
    How do we achieve social justice? How do we change society for the better? Some would argue that we must do it by changing the laws or state institutions. Others that we must do it by changing individual attitudes. I argue that although both of these factors are important and relevant, we must also change culture. What does this mean? Culture, I argue, is a set of social meanings that shapes and filters how we think and act. Problematic networks of social meanings constitute an ideology. Entrenc…Read more
  •  173
    The framing question of Mills' important and thought-provoking paper is whether there is reason for political progressives and radicals to employ the notion of a social contract for either descriptive or normative purposes. In contrast to the common response that the social contract is a piece of "bourgeois mystification" he argues instead that a reformulated conception of the contract, one which he calls the.
  •  139
    What is a Social Practice?
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 231-247. 2018.
    This paper provides an account of social practices that reveals how they are constitutive of social agency, enable coordination around things of value, and are a site for social intervention. The social world, on this account, does not begin when psychologically sophisticated individuals interact to share knowledge or make plans. Instead, culture shapes agents to interpret and respond both to each other and the physical world around us. Practices shape us as we shape them. This provides resource…Read more
  •  136
    Studying While Black: Trust, Opportunity and Disrespect
    du Bois Review 11 (1): 109-136. 2014.
    How should we explore the relationship between race and educational opportunity? One approach to the Black-White achievement gap explores how race and class cause disparities in access and opportunity. In this paper, I consider how education contributes to the creation of race. Considering examples of classroom micropolitics, I argue that breakdowns of trust and trustworthiness between teachers and students can cause substantial disadvantages and, in the contemporary United States, this happens …Read more
  •  118
    I’ll start by giving a very brief summary of Sider’s position and will identify some points on which my own position differs from his. I’ll then raise four issues, viz., how to articulate the 3-dimensionalist view, the trade-offs between Ted’s stage view of persistence and endurance with respect to intrinsic properties, the endurantist’s response to the argument from vagueness, and finally more general questions about what’s at stake in the debate. I don’t believe that anything I say raises insu…Read more
  •  90
    Defining Knowledge
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000 41-55. 2000.
    With some notable exceptions, feminist epistemologists have not focused (like many contemporary analytic epistemologists) on the the semantics of claims to know: What are the truth conditions of claims of the form S knows that p? My goal in this paper is to suggest a way of approaching the task of specifying the truth conditions for knowledge while (hopefully) making clear how a broad range of feminist work that is often deemed irrelevant to the philosophical inquiry into knowledge is, in fact, …Read more
  •  90
    Persistence: Contemporary Readings (edited book)
    with Roxanne Marie Kurtz
    Bradford. 2006.
    How does an object persist through change? How can a book, for example, open in the morning and shut in the afternoon, persist through a change that involves the incompatible properties of being open and being shut? The goal of this reader is to inform and reframe the philosophical debate around persistence; it presents influential accounts of the problem that range from classic papers by W. V. O. Quine, David Lewis, and Judith Jarvis Thomson to recent work by contemporary philosophers. The auth…Read more