| Question |
Answer |
Comments |
| A priori knowledge: yes and no |
Accept: no |
|
| Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism |
Accept another alternative |
|
| Aesthetic value: objective and subjective |
Accept: objective |
|
| Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no |
Accept: no |
|
| Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism |
Accept: externalism |
|
| External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism |
Accept: non-skeptical realism |
|
| Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will |
Accept: compatibilism |
|
| God: theism and atheism |
Accept: atheism |
|
| Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism |
The question is too unclear to answer |
|
| Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism |
Lean toward: relativism |
|
| Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean |
Accept: non-Humean |
|
| Logic: classical and non-classical |
Accept: classical |
|
| Mental content: internalism and externalism |
Accept: externalism |
|
| Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism |
Accept: moral realism |
|
| Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism |
Accept: naturalism |
|
| Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism |
Lean toward: physicalism |
Of course it depends on what you mean by physicalism... |
| Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism |
Accept: cognitivism |
|
| Moral motivation: internalism and externalism |
Accept: externalism |
|
| Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes |
Accept: two boxes |
|
| Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics |
Accept an intermediate view |
|
| Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory |
Lean toward: disjunctivism |
|
| Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view |
Accept: biological view |
|
| Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism |
Accept: egalitarianism |
To be more specific, a kind of liberal egalitarianism. |
| Proper names: Fregean and Millian |
Accept: Millian |
|
| Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism |
Accept: scientific realism |
|
| Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death |
Accept: death |
|
| Time: A-theory and B-theory |
Accept: B-theory |
|
| Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch |
Accept: switch |
I always thought that the Trolley problem included the comparison with the fat man on the bridge. Isn't the problem how we explain both sets of intuitions? |
| Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic |
Accept: deflationary |
|
| Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible |
Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible |
|
