University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2011
Granville, Ohio, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
General Philosophy of Science
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
  •  54
    Naturalism and Non-Qualitative Properties
    In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin J. Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker, Routledge. pp. 209-238. 2021.
    Lynne Baker’s case for the incompatibility of naturalism with the first-person perspective raises a range of questions about the relationship between naturalism and the various properties involved in first-person perspectives. After arguing that non-qualitative properties—most notably, haecceities like being Lynne Baker—are ineliminably tied to first-person perspectives, this paper considers whether naturalism and non-qualitative properties are, in fact, compatible. In doing so, the discussion f…Read more
  •  29
    Ontology without Borders, by AzzouniJody. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. xxv + 279.
  •  50
    Recombining non-qualitative reality
    Synthese 198 (3): 2273-2295. 2021.
    Haecceitism and Hume’s Dictum are each controversial theses about necessity and possibility. According to haecceitism, there are qualitatively indiscernible possible worlds that differ only with respect to which individuals occupy which qualitative roles. According to Hume’s Dictum, there are no necessary connections between distinct entities or, as Humeans sometimes put it, reality admits of “free recombination” so any entities can co-exist or fail to co-exist. This paper introduces a puzzle th…Read more
  •  5
    God and Necessity by Brian Leftow: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 592, £60.00 (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3): 610-613. 2013.
  •  34
    Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics
    Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271): 403-406. 2018.
    Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics. By Hofweber Thomas.
  •  47
    Intrinsic Properties of Properties
    Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267): 241-262. 2016.
    Do properties have intrinsic properties of their own? If so, which second-order properties are intrinsic? This paper introduces two competing views about second-order intrinsicality: generalism, according to which the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction cuts across all orders of properties and applies to the properties of properties as well as the properties of objects, and objectualism, according to which intrinsicality is a feature exclusive to the properties of objects. The case for generalism is…Read more
  •  63
    Resemblance
    Philosophy Compass 12 (4). 2017.
    Our ordinary judgments and our metaphysical theories share a common commitment to facts about resemblance. The nature of resemblance is, however, a matter of no small controversy. This essay examines some of the pressing questions that arise regarding the status and structure of resemblance. Among those to be discussed in what follows: what kinds of resemblance relations are there? Can resemblance be analyzed in terms of the sharing of properties? Is resemblance an objective or subjective matter…Read more
  •  22
  •  375
    Prioritizing platonism
    Philosophical Studies 176 (8): 2029-2042. 2019.
    Discussion of atomistic and monistic theses about abstract reality.
  •  407
    Ideological parsimony
    Synthese 190 (17): 3889-3908. 2013.
    The theoretical virtue of parsimony values the minimizing of theoretical commitments, but theoretical commitments come in two kinds : ontological and ideological. While the ontological commitments of a theory are the entities it posits, a theory’s ideological commitments are the primitive concepts it employs. Here, I show how we can extend the distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony, commonly drawn regarding ontological commitments, to the domain of ideological commitments. I …Read more
  •  129
    Instantiation as location
    Philosophical Studies 167 (3): 667-682. 2014.
    Many familiar forms of property realism identify properties with sui generis ontological categories like universals or tropes and posit a fundamental instantiation relation that unifies objects with their properties. In this paper, I develop and defend locationism, which identifies properties with locations and holds that the occupation relation that unifies objects with their locations also unifies objects with their properties. Along with the theoretical parsimony that locationism enjoys, I ar…Read more
  •  81
    Abstract Entities
    Routledge. 2017.
    Think of a number, any number, or properties like fragility and humanity. These and other abstract entities are radically different from concrete entities like electrons and elbows. While concrete entities are located in space and time, have causes and effects, and are known through empirical means, abstract entities like meanings and possibilities are remarkably different. They seem to be immutable and imperceptible and to exist "outside" of space and time. This book provides a comprehensive cr…Read more
  •  40
    God and Necessity by Brian Leftow
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3): 1-3. 2013.
    No abstract
  •  229
    Non-qualitative Properties
    Erkenntnis 80 (2): 275-301. 2015.
    The distinction between qualitative properties like mass and shape and non-qualitative properties like being Napoleon and being next to Obama is important, but remains largely unexamined. After discussing its theoretical significance and cataloguing various kinds of non-qualitative properties, I survey several views about the nature of this distinction and argue that all proposed reductive analyses of this distinction are unsatisfactory. I then defend primitivism, according to which the distinct…Read more
  •  35
  •  197
    Eleaticism ties ontology to causality by denying the impossibility of causally inert entities. This paper examines some challenges regarding the proper formulation and general plausibility of Eleaticism. After suggesting how Eleatics ought to respond to these challenges, I consider the prospects for extending Eleaticism from ontology to ideology by requiring all primitive ideology to be causal in nature. Surprisingly enough, the resulting view delivers an eternalist and possibilist metaphysical …Read more
  •  142
    The limits of modality
    Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244): 473-495. 2011.
    It is commonly assumed that all propositions have modal profiles and therefore bear their truth-values either contingently or necessarily. I argue against this commonly assumed view and in defence of amodalism, according to which certain true propositions are neither necessarily nor contingently true, but only true simpliciter. I consider three arguments against ‘possible-worlds theories’, which hold that modal concepts are to be analysed in terms of possible worlds. Although each of these argum…Read more
  •  168
    Haecceitism for Modal Realists
    Erkenntnis 77 (3): 399-417. 2012.
    In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re possibilities they include; (2) Modal correspondence, according to which each maximal possibility is identical with a unique possible world; (3) Counterpart theory, according to which de re modality is analyzed in terms of counterpart relations between individuals. After showing how the modal realism defended …Read more
  •  788
    No Simples, No Gunk, No Nothing
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1): 246-260. 2014.
    Mereological realism holds that the world has a mereological structure – i.e. a distribution of mereological properties and relations. In this article, I defend Eleaticism about properties, according to which there are no causally inert non-logical properties. I then present an Eleatic argument for mereological anti-realism, which denies the existence of both mereological composites and mereological simples. After defending Eleaticism and mereological anti-realism, I argue that mereological anti…Read more
  •  84
    Conceivability arguments for haecceitism
    Synthese 194 (10): 4171-4190. 2017.
    According to haecceitism, some maximal possibilities differ even while they are qualitatively indiscernible. Since haecceitism is a modal thesis, it is typically defended by appeal to conceivability arguments. These arguments require us to conceive of qualitatively indiscernible possibilities that differ only with respect to the identity of the individuals involved. This paper examines a series of conceivability arguments for haecceitism and a variety of anti-haecceitist responses. It concludes …Read more
  •  153
  •  222
    The modal view of essence
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2): 248-266. 2013.
    According to the modal view, essence admits of reductive analysis in exclusively modal terms. Fine (1994) argues that modal view delivers an inadequate analysis of essence. This paper defends the modal view from Fine's challenge. This defense proceeds by examining the disagreement between Finean primitivists and Quinean eliminativists about essence. In order to model this disagreement, a distinction between essence and a separable concept, nature, is required. This distinction is then used to sh…Read more
  •  228
    How to Be Omnipresent
    American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3): 223-234. 2017.
    Attributions of omnipresence, most familiar within the philosophy of religion, typically take the omnipresence of an entity to either consist in that entity's occupation of certain regions or be dependent upon other of that entity's attributes, such as omnipotence or omniscience. This paper defends an alternative conception of omnipresence that is independent of other purported divine attributes and dispenses with occupation. The resulting view repurposes the metaphysics of necessitism and perma…Read more
  •  326
    The Way of Actuality
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2): 231-247. 2014.
    In this paper, I defend an indexical analysis of the abstract-concrete distinction within the framework of modal realism. This analysis holds the abstract-concrete distinction to be conceptually inseparable from the distinction between the actual and the merely possible, which is assumed to be indexical in nature. The resulting view contributes to the case for modal realism by demonstrating how its distinctive resources provide a reductive analysis of the abstract-concrete distinction. This inde…Read more