Sam Wren-Lewis

What is it to be mentally healthy? In the ongoing movement to promote mental health, to reduce stigma, and to establish parity between mental and physical health, there is a clear enthusiasm about this concept and a recognition of its value in human life. However, it is often unclear what mental health means in all these efforts and whether there is a single concept underlying them. Sometimes, the initiatives for the sake of mental health are aimed just at reducing mental illness, thus implicitly identifying mental health with the absence of diagnosable psychiatric disease. More ambitiously, there are high-profile proposals to adopt a positive definition, identifying mental health with psychic or even overall well-being. We argue against both: a definition of mental health as mere absence of mental illness is too thin, too undemanding, and too closely linked to psychiatric value judgments, while the definition in terms of well-being is too demanding and potentially oppressive. As a compromise, we sketch out a middle position. On this view, mental health is a primary good, that is, the psychological preconditions of pursuing any conception of the good life, including well-being, without being identical to well-being.

Psychological happiness can be defined as a profound state of mind which figures strongly in our prudential evaluations and deliberations. I believe that current theories of happiness describe a state of mind that is either ubiquitous, but not as profound as we take happiness to be, or profound, but not as ubiquitous as we take happiness to be. The most plausible theory of psychological happiness currently on offer – the affective state theory – is inadequate in that it fails to make the right distinction between those affects that contribute towards happiness and those that do not contribute towards happiness. I believe that the correct distinction between happiness-constituting affects and non-happiness-constituting affects is that only affects based on a person’s values are happiness-constituting; it is the relationship between happiness and our values that makes happiness so prudentially valuable. A complete theory of happiness must provide an account of how psychological happiness relates to our prudential values. In this paper I begin to develop the sentiment satisfaction theory of psychological happiness, which is the view that happiness is constituted by affects based on our values, and that our values are constituted by our sentiments. Sentiments are dispositions to experience various emotions and moods; the emotions and moods that are caused by our sentiments can be viewed as expressions of our sentiments. Positive emotions and moods constitute sentiment satisfaction; negative emotions and moods constitute sentiment frustration. I suggest, then, that we can view happiness as consisting in the positive emotions and moods that constitute sentiment satisfaction. Furthermore, instances of sentiment satisfaction are tied together by our underlying emotional dispositions and the effect that emotions have on our motivation towards further instances of sentiment satisfaction.

Happiness is currently the topic of a wide range of empirical research, and is increasingly becoming the focus of public policy. The interest in happiness largely stems from its connection with well-being. We care about well-being – how well our lives are going for us. If we are happy it seems that, to some extent, we must be doing well. This suggests that we may be able to successfully measure well-being through measuring happiness. The problem is that both happiness and well-being are elusive and their measurement is far from uncontroversial. What exactly does information about happiness tell us about well-being? Is there more to well-being than happiness? If so, to what extent is happiness connected to well-being? These are controversial questions, but answers to them must be given if we are to make progress in the measurement of well-being. I argue that we should view happiness as an indicator of changes in well-being. I call this the Indicator View. According to this view, someone can be doing badly yet be happy insofar as their well-being is improving (and vice versa). More precisely, the Indicator View is the view that happiness is a defeasible indicator of local changes in well-being. Thus, we can successfully measure an important aspect of well-being through measuring happiness. I argue in favour of this view on the basis of an understanding of well-being that is widely acceptable. The Indicator View, therefore, has the potential to unite divided opinion over what happiness research can tell us about well-being.