• New York City, Autumn 1966
    In Henry Hardy (ed.), The book of Isaiah: personal impressions of Isaiah Berlin, In Association With Wolfson College. pp. 95-102. 2009.
  • Derived from the Greek word ‘telos’ meaning purpose or goal, ‘teleology’, as it is most often used in the philosophy of mind, is thought of as the study of the purposes, goals or, more broadly, biological functions of various elements of the mental realm. For example, it has been suggested that we can better understand the propositional attitudes when we have discerned their evolutionary function. It has even been suggested that one can begin to understand specific propositional attitude content…Read more
  • The notion of weakness of will or ‘akrasia’(to use its Greek name) figures importantly in moral philosophy. Agents are said to be weak‐willed when they have reached conclusions about their moral duties, but then fail to act on these conclusions. Since it is often difficult to be moral – to live up to one's moral principles – there would seem to be nothing particularly surprising or troubling about this notion, and certainly nothing especially pressing for the philosophy of mind. But this appeara…Read more
  •  1
    Though not meant as a practical procedure, it can help our thinking about language and the mind if we ask what would be involved in interpreting someone's words and actions. Moreover, if we imagine ourselves beginning this interpretative process without any prior knowledge of what the person means by her words or what propositional attitudes she has, then we are engaged in what is called ‘radical interpretation’, quine originally discussed the idea of radical translation in respect of another's …Read more
  •  2
    Ontology is the branch of metaphysics centrally concerned with determining what there is. (The name comes from the present participle of the Greek verb corresponding to the English verb ‘to be’.) Thus, if one asks whether there are numbers and other abstract objects, or whether there are PROPERTIES, one is asking ontological questions. Given the fundamental nature of these questions, ontology plays a part in virtually all areas of philosophical investigation, but it has a specific importance to …Read more
  • Descartes (1596–1650) insisted that the mind was as a special kind of substance, one which contrasts sharply with material substance (see history). Hence, the label ‘Cartesian’ tends to be applied to any view that is DUALIST in thinking of the mind as fundamentally different from matter. Accompanying this Cartesian dualism of substances is a dualism of ways of knowing about minds and about matter. The Cartesian conception has it that we have access to the contents of our own minds in a way denie…Read more
  • Eliminativists believe there to be something fundamentally mistaken about the common‐sense (sometimes called ‘folk psychological’) conception of the mind, and they suggest that the way forward is to drop part or all of this conception in favour of one which does not use notions such as belief, experience, sensation and the like. The rationale for this suggestion is, in the main, because these notions are fraught with conceptual difficulties as well as being recalcitrant to any REDUCTION to natur…Read more
  •  3
    Truth, Meaning and Contextualism
    In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 143-170. 2012.
  •  6
    Language and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language
    Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150): 127-130. 1988.
  •  24
    Reading Philosophy: Selected Texts with a Method for Beginners, Second Edition, provides a unique approach to reading philosophy, requiring students to engage with material as they read. It contains carefully selected texts, commentaries on those texts, and questions for the reader to think about as she reads. It serves as starting points for both classroom discussion and independent study. The texts cover a wide range of topics drawn from diverse areas of philosophical investigation, ranging ov…Read more
  •  4
    The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics (review)
    Philosophy 70 (272): 293-298. 1995.
  •  1
    No Title available: New Books (review)
    Philosophy 56 (218): 587-589. 1981.
  • Notebook
    Philosophy 58 (226): 568-568. 1983.
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  •  1
    Booknotes: Booknotes
    Philosophy 58 (226): 559-562. 1983.
  •  1
    No Title available: New Books (review)
    Philosophy 58 (226): 557-558. 1983.
  •  5
    The Languages of Logic
    Philosophical Quarterly 37 (149): 466-468. 1987.
  •  1
    Mind and Language. Wolfson College Lectures, 1974
    Mind 86 (344): 609-611. 1977.
  •  10
    Unready Reckoners
    Philosophy 59 (227): 1-1. 1984.
  • Books Received: Books Received (review)
    Philosophy 58 (226): 563-567. 1983.
  • Zenon W. Pylyshyn, "Computation and Cognition"
    Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153). 1988.
  • M. Devitt and K. Sterelny, "Language and Reality" (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 38 (50): 127. 1988.
  • W.G. Lycan, "Logical Form" (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 38 (53): 538. 1988.
  •  28
    Logical Form in Natural Language
    Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153): 538. 1988.
  •  107
  •  8
    Philosophy and Psychology
    with M. K. Davies
    Mind and Language 1 (1): 3-4. 1986.