•  55
    Kantian Ethics and our Duties to Nonhuman Animals
    Between the Species 27 (1): 82-107. 2024.
    Many take Kantian ethics to founder when it comes to our duties to animals. In this paper, I advocate a novel approach to this problem. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first, I canvass various passages from Kant in order to set up the problem. In the second, I introduce a novel approach to this problem. In the third, I defend my approach from various objections. By way of preview: I advocate rejecting the premise that nonhuman animals are nonrational.
  •  102
    Frankfurt Cases and Alternate Deontic Categories
    Dialogue 62 (3): 539-552. 2023.
    In Harry Frankfurt’s seminal “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” he advances an argument against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: if an agent is responsible for performing some action, then she is able to do otherwise. However, almost all of the Frankfurt cases in this literature involve impermissible actions. In this article, I argue that the failure to consider other deontic categories exposes a deep problem, one that threatens either to upend much current moral theori…Read more
  •  79
    Prenatal Injury
    Res Philosophica. forthcoming.
    In this article, I confront Flanigan’s recent attempt to show, not merely that women have a right to commit prenatal injury, but also that women who act on this right are praiseworthy and should not be criticized for this injury. I show that Flanigan’s arguments do not work, and I establish presumptive grounds against any such right, namely: prenatal injury, by definition, involves intentional or negligent harm and, as such, may be subsumed under a wider class of actions that are presumptively w…Read more
  •  1
    The purpose of this paper is to show that, if Kant’s universalization formulations of the Categorical Imperative are our only standards for judging right from wrong and permissible from impermissible, then we have no obligations. I shall do this by examining five different views of how obligations can be derived from the universalization formulations and arguing that each one fails. I shall argue that the first view rests on a misunderstanding of the universalization formulations; the second on …Read more
  •  225
    Chess and Antirealism
    Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (76): 1-20. 2023.
    In this article, I make a novel argument for scientific antirealism. My argument is as follows: (1) the best human chess players would lose to the best computer chess programs; (2) if the best human chess players would lose to the best computer chess programs, then there is good reason to think that the best human chess players do not understand how to make winning moves; (3) if there is good reason to think that the best human chess players do not understand how to make winning moves, then ther…Read more
  •  147
    Plasticity, Numerical Identity,and Transitivity
    International Philosophical Quarterly 62 (3): 289-299. 2022.
    In a recent paper, Chunghyoung Lee argues that, because zygotes are developmentally plastic, they cannot be numerically identical to the singletons into which they develop, thereby undermining conceptionism. In this short paper, I respond to Lee. I argue, first, that, on the most popular theories of personal identity, zygotic plasticity does not undermine conceptionism, and, second, that, even overlooking this first issue, Lee’s plasticity argument is problematic. My goal in all of this is not t…Read more
  •  83
    Nonaccidental Rightness and the Guise of the Objectively Good
    Journal of Early Modern Studies. forthcoming.
    My goal in this paper is to show that two theses that are widely adopted among Kantian ethicists are irreconcilable. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I briefly sketch the contours of my own positive view of Kantian ethics, concentrating on the issues relevant to the two theses to be discussed: I argue that agents can perform actions from but not in conformity with duty, and I argue that agents intentionally can perform actions they take to be contrary to duty. In the second…Read more
  • Most philosophers agree that Kant was committed to the principle 'ought implies can' (OIC). However, few agree on how to understand the meaning of OIC. Outside of Kant scholarship, there are debates about the meaning of 'ought', the meaning of 'implies', and the meaning of 'can' in this principle. Inside Kant scholarship, there is no consensus about where Kant stood on these terms. The present paper tries to go some way toward rectifying this situation. In section I, I review the secondary lit…Read more
  •  555
    The Apple of Kant's Ethics: i‐Maxims as the Locus of Assessment
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (3): 559-577. 2022.
    I want to distinguish between maxims at three levels of abstraction. At the first level are what I shall call individual maxims, or i‐maxims: maxim tokens as adopted by particular rational beings. At the second level are abstract maxims, or a‐maxims: abstract principles distinct from any individual who adopts them. At the third level are maxim kinds, or k‐maxims: sets of various action‐guiding principles that are grouped on the basis of their content. In this paper, I argue for the thesis that i…Read more
  •  238
    Korsgaard's Expanded Regress Argument
    Manuscrito 46 (2): 40-65. 2023.
    In this discussion note, I aim to reconstruct and assess Korsgaard's recent attempt to extend her regress argument. I begin, in section 1, with a brief recapitulation of the regress argument. Then, in section 2, I turn to the extension. I argue that the extension does not work because Korsgaard cannot rule out the possibility--a possibility for which there is both empirical evidence and argumentative pressure coming directly from the original regress--that we value animality in ourselves qua ani…Read more
  •  672
    Positive Duties, Kant’s Universalizability Tests, and Contradictions
    Southwest Philosophy Review 36 (1): 113-120. 2020.
    In this paper I am going to raise a problem for recent attempts to derive positive duties from Kant’s universalizability tests. In particular, I argue that these recent attempts are subject to reductio and that the most obvious way of patching them renders them impracticable. I begin by explaining the motivation for these attempts. Then I describe how they work and begin my attack. I conclude by considering some patches.
  •  272
    An Identity Crisis in Philosophy
    Argumenta. forthcoming.
    The following seems to be a truism in modern day philosophy: No agent can have had other parents (IDENTITY). IDENTITY shows up in discussions of moral luck, parenting, gene editing, and population ethics. In this paper, I challenge IDENTITY. I do so by showing that the most plausible arguments that can be made in favor of IDENTITY do not withstand critical scrutiny. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I document the prevalence of IDENTITY. In the second, I examine a defense of…Read more
  •  415
    Ever since Hegel famously objected to Kant’s universalization formulations of the Categorical Imperative on the grounds that they are nothing but an empty formalism, there has been continual debate about whether he was right. In this paper I argue that Hegel got things at least half-right: I argue that even if negative duties (duties to omit actions or not to adopt maxims) can be derived from the universalization formulations, positive duties (duties to commit actions or to adopt maxims) cannot.…Read more
  •  511
    Consent and the Mere Means Principle
    Journal of Value Inquiry 1-19. 2022.
    Kant’s Formula of Humanity can be analyzed into two parts. One is an injunction to treat humanity always as an end. The other is a prohibition on using humanity as a mere means. The second is often referred to as the FH prohibition or the mere means prohibition. It has become popular to interpret this prohibition in terms of consent. The idea is that, if X uses Y's humanity as a means and Y does not consent to it, then X uses Y's humanity as a mere means. There is then debate about the kind of c…Read more
  •  95
    Nary an Obligatory Maxim from Kant’s Universalizability Tests
    Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 5 (1): 15-35. 2022.
    In this paper I argue that there would be no obligatory maxims if the only standards for assessing maxims were Kant’s universalizability tests. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first, I clarify my thesis: I define my terms and disambiguate my thesis from other related theses for which one might argue. In the second, I confront the view that says that if a maxim passes the universalizability tests, then there is a positive duty to adopt that maxim; I also confront a close relative …Read more
  •  345
    Laura Papish, Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform (review)
    Ethics 132 (1): 266-269. 2021.
    Laura Papish’s Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform is an ambitious attempt to breath new life into old debates and a welcome contribution to a recent renaissance of interest in Kant’s theory of evil. ​The book has eight chapters, and these chapters fall into three main divisions. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the psychology of nonmoral and immoral action. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 focus on self-deception, evil, and dissimulation. And chapters 6, 7, and 8 focus on self-cognition, moral reform, …Read more
  •  621
    Kant and the trolley
    Journal of Value Inquiry (3): 1-11. 2021.
    Thomson's goal in presenting her famous Trolley problem is to evince an explanatory weakness in the principle that killing is worse than letting die. Along the way, she tries to evince a similar weakness in the Kantian principle forbidding the use of people as mere means (henceforth: the Kantian prohibition). However, Thomson's negative assessment of the Kantian prohibition is unwarranted, and that is what this paper aims to show. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first, I introdu…Read more
  •  659
    A Dilemma for Mathematical Constructivism
    Axiomathes 31 (1): 63-72. 2021.
    In this paper I argue that constructivism in mathematics faces a dilemma. In particular, I maintain that constructivism is unable to explain (i) the application of mathematics to nature and (ii) the intersubjectivity of mathematics unless (iii) it is conjoined with two theses that reduce it to a form of mathematical Platonism. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first section of the paper, I explain the difference between mathematical constructivism and mathematical Platonism and I o…Read more
  •  335
    On the Expressive Limits of Kant’s Universalizability Tests
    Kant Studien 112 (2): 299-304. 2021.
    My goal in this piece is to show that there is a problem lurking in the shadows of recent attempts to derive positive duties from Kant’s so-called universalizability tests and, further, to show that the most obvious way of fixing these attempts renders them unable to fulfill their function. I shall begin by motivating and explaining such an attempt.
  •  545
    Kant’s Philosophy of Moral Luck
    Sophia 60 (2): 365-387. 2021.
    In the modern moral luck debate, Kant is standardly taken to be the enemy of moral luck. My goal in this paper is to show that this is mistaken. The paper is divided into six sections. In the first, I show that participants in the moral luck literature take moral luck to be anathema to Kantian ethics. In the second, I explain the kind of luck I am going to focus on here: consequence luck, a species of resultant luck. In the third, I explain why philosophers have taken Kantian ethics to reject mo…Read more
  •  183
    Kant's Theory of Conscience
    Cambridge University Press. 2021.
    Compared to other aspects of Kant’s practical philosophy, Kant’s theory of conscience remains relatively unexplored in the secondary literature on his work. This is no doubt due, at least in part, to the fact that in the Groundwork to a Metaphysics of Morals (henceforth: Groundwork) and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant's two most widely read works on ethics, conscience plays very little role. However, Kant has extended discussions of conscience in three of his lesser read works: On the Mi…Read more
  •  535
    Obligatory Actions, Obligatory Maxims
    Kantian Review 26 (1): 1-25. 2021.
    In this paper, I confront Parfit’s Mixed Maxims Objection. I argue that recent attempts to respond to this objection fail, and I argue that their failure is compounded by the failure of recent attempts to show how the Formula of Universal Law can be used to demarcate the category of obligatory maxims. I then set out my own response to the objection, drawing on remarks from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals for inspiration and developing a novel account of how the Formula of Universal Law can be emplo…Read more
  •  387
    A Problem for Frankfurt Examples
    Southwest Philosophy Review 37 (1): 159-167. 2021.
    In this paper I intend to raise a problem for so-called Frankfurt examples. I begin by describing the examples and what they are used for. Then I describe the problem.
  •  535
    Rethinking Kant on Duty
    Review of Metaphysics 74 (296): 497-526. 2021.
    According to a common caricature of Kant’s ethics, it is synonymous with the Categorical Imperative (CI) and with the sublime and clarion call of duty. But in this paper, I argue that the conjunction of Kant’s concept of duty and his idea of morality as a system of imperatives is unsustainable on the grounds that it commits him to the following two theses: (I) If an agent has a duty to D, then she must be constrained to D, and (II) the Supreme Law of Morality always manifests in the form of duty…Read more
  •  445
    In this paper I provide a novel argument for scientific realism. In contrast to most recent defenses of SR, my defense of SR does not rely on the no-miracles argument. Instead, I take a more unconventional approach: I focus on the different kinds of justification available to different individuals in relation to different kinds of propositions. I maintain that this alternative focus shows that most people are warranted in believing many propositions about unobservables. The paper is divided into…Read more
  •  1399
    Veganism, Animal Welfare, and Causal Impotence
    Journal of Animal Ethics 10 (2): 161-176. 2020.
    Proponents of the utilitarian animal welfare argument (AWA) for veganism maintain that it is reasonable to expect that adopting a vegan diet will decrease animal suffering. In this paper I argue otherwise. I maintain that (i) there are plausible scenarios in which refraining from meat-consumption will not decrease animal suffering; (ii) the utilitarian AWA rests on a false dilemma; and (iii) there are no reasonable grounds for the expectation that adopting a vegan diet will decrease animal suffe…Read more
  •  1568
    Kant, the Practical Postulates, and Clifford’s Principle
    Contemporary Pragmatism 17 (1): 21-47. 2020.
    In this paper I argue that Kant would have endorsed Clifford’s principle. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I review Kant’s argument for the practical postulates. In the second, I discuss a traditional objection to the style of argument Kant employs. In the third, I explain how Kant would respond to this objection and how this renders the practical postulates consistent with Clifford’s principle. In the fourth, I introduce positive grounds for thinking that Kant would have e…Read more
  •  489
    Samuel J. Kerstein, How to Treat Persons (review)
    Kantian Review 19 (2): 319-323. 2014.
    Samuel Kerstein’s recent (2013) How To Treat Persons is an ambitious attempt to develop a new, broadly Kantian account of what it is to treat others as mere means and what it means to act in accordance with others’ dignity. His project is explicitly nonfoundationalist: his interpretation stands or falls on its ability to accommodate our pretheoretic intuitions, and he does an admirable job of handling carefully a range of well fleshed out and sometimes subtle examples. In what follows, I shall g…Read more