•  10
    Semantics for Nominalists
    ProtoSociology 31 38-42. 2014.
    Nominalists should give up on one of Frege’s semantic tenets, and adopt an account on which the truth-value of a sentence depends on the senses, rather than the referents, of its syntactic constituents. That way, sentences like ‘2+2=4’ and ‘Hamlet did not exist’ might be true, without components like ‘2’ and ‘Hamlet’ having a referent.
  •  70
    Creatures of Darkness
    Analytic Philosophy 54 (4): 379-400. 2013.
  •  139
    Names
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2009.
  •  36
    Context, by Robert Stalnaker
    Mind 125 (497): 260-264. 2016.
  •  87
    Indefinites and intentional identity
    Philosophical Studies 168 (2): 371-395. 2014.
    This paper investigates the truth conditions of sentences containing indefinite noun phrases, focusing on occurrences in attitude reports, and, in particular, a puzzle case due to Walter Edelberg. It is argued that indefinites semantically contribute the (thought-)object they denote, in a manner analogous to attributive definite descriptions. While there is an existential reading of attitude reports containing indefinites, it is argued that the existential quantifier is contributed by the de re …Read more
  •  23
    This dissertation is an experiment: what happens if we treat proper names as anaphoric expressions on a par with pronouns? The first thing to notice is that a name's `antecedent' can occur in a discourse prior to the one containing the name. An individual may be introduced and tagged with a name in one context, and then retrieved using the name in a later context. To allow for discourse-crossing anaphora, in addition to the usual cross-sentential anaphora, a revision of discourse semantics is in…Read more