Samuel Kerstein

This paper concerns Kant's view of the relations between an actions's moral permissibility and its moral worth. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant holds that only morally permissible actions can have moral worth. By restricting moral worth to morally permissible actions, Kant generates an asymmetrical account of how two kinds of failure affect an actions's moral worth. While failure to judge correctly whether one's action is morally permissible precludes it from having moral worth failure to attain the end of one's action does not. I argue that this asymmetrical account is implausible. Kant, I claim, should acknowledge that morally permissible actions can have moral worth. After addressing objections to this claim, I consider Kant's position in a later work: the Metaphysics of Moreals. I argue that though he does not go far enough, Kant moves toward recognizing that some morally impermissible actions can have moral worth

This article probes the voucher program from an ethical perspective. It focuses mainly on an issue of inequity. A disparity exists in US kidney transplantation. Although African-Americans suffer far higher rates of ESRD than whites, African-Americans are much less likely than whites to get a transplant. The article explores the voucher program in light of this disparity. It motivates the view that, at least in the short term, more whites than African-Americans are likely to take advantage of the voucher program. The program is, thus, likely to increase the gap in transplantation rates between the two groups. If this is correct, what impact does it have on the moral acceptability of the program?

In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard affirms that Enlightenment morality is true: humanity is valuable. To many of us few claims seem more obvious. Yet Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant do not limit themselves to affirming that humanity is valuable. They appeal to reason in an effort to establish it. They try to show that, in some sense, we are rationally compelled to recognize the value of humanity. Korsgaard joins in this effort. She champions the claim that unless we take humanity to be valuable, we condemn ourselves to complete practical skepticism, i.e., to the view that we have no reason to do anything at all.Korsgaard discusses two arguments that, she believes, support this claim. The first she attributes directly to Kant in a series of influential papers on his ethics. The second argument, which she calls a ‘fancy new model’ of the first, she constructs under her own name in The Sources of Normativity. I will defend the view that neither of these arguments succeeds. In doing so, I will not be trying to show that we are mistaken in believing humanity to be valuable.

In the distribution of resources, persons must be respected, or so many philosophers contend. Unfortunately, they often leave it unclear why a certain allocation would respect persons, while another would not. In this paper, we explore what it means to respect persons in the distribution of scarce, life-saving resources. We begin by presenting two kinds of cases. In different age cases, we have a drug that we must use either to save a young person who would live for many more years or an old person who would only live for a few. In different numbers cases, we must save either one person or many persons from certain death. We argue that two familiar accounts of respect for persons―an equal worth account, suggested by Jeff McMahan, and a Kantian account, inspired by the Formula of Humanity―have implausible implications in such cases. We develop a new, “three-tiered” account: one that, we claim, generates results in such cases that accord better with many people’s considered judgments than those produced by its rivals

This book explores the metaphysical writings Nietzsche produced in his "mature" period, that is, after 1882. As its title hints, however, it does not focus exclusively on Nietzsche's own metaphysics. Poellner brings philosophical learning of an impressive scope to bear on his reading of Nietzsche, situating his views in relation to those of his intellectual forbears and testing them against those of contemporary analytic philosophers. Relying heavily on Nietzsche's notes, he addresses some key aspects of his metaphysics, including his skepticism and his treatments of "the will to power" and "the will to truth." A central line of argument concerns Nietzsche's antiessentialism: the view that it is incoherent to hold anything to have an essential nature and thus incoherent to hold any proposition to correspond to this nature, that is, to be "metaphysically true."

According to Kant’s ethics, at least on one common interpretation, persons have a special worth or dignity that demands respect. But personhood is not coextensive with human life; for example, individuals can live in severe dementia after losing the capacities constitutive of personhood. Some philosophers, including David Velleman and Dennis Cooley, have suggested that individuals living after the loss of their personhood might offend against the Kantian dignity the individuals once possessed. Cooley has even argued that it is morally required on Kantian grounds for those who realize that they will lose their personhood as a result of dementia (e.g. Alzheimer’s) to hasten their deaths (e.g. commit suicide). This article specifies circumstances in which post-personhood living might indeed involve an affront to the Kantian dignity of a person who once was. However, the article contends, Kant implies that it is neither morally required nor even morally permissible for someone in an early stage of Alzheimer’s to hasten their death to avoid such an affront, even if they have autonomously chosen to do so. The article adds an ethical perspective to debate on physician-assisted dying, in particular on the moral permissibility of the soon-to-be-demented ending their lives.

Suppose that a young athlete has just become quadriplegic. He expects to live several more decades, but out of self‐interest he autonomously chooses to engage in physician‐assisted suicide (PAS) or voluntary active euthanasia (VAE). Some of us are unsure whether he or his physician would be acting rightly in ending his life. One basis for such doubt is the notion that persons have dignity in a Kantian sense. This paper probes responses that David Velleman and Frances Kamm have suggested to the question of whether participating in PAS or VAE to benefit oneself, as the young man might, respects the dignity of persons, specified in an orthodox Kantian way. Velleman claims that it does not, while Kamm insists that, in certain circumstances, it does. I argue against Kamm's position. I go on to contend that while orthodox Kantianism might provide a basis for moral concern regarding the case of the young quadriplegic, it suffers from two serious shortcomings. First, it implies that terminally ill patients are wrong to request VAE or engage in PAS to avoid intense suffering, at least when this suffering has not yet overwhelmed their reason. Second, orthodox Kantianism implies that it is wrong for physicians to withdraw such patients from life‐sustaining treatments, even if they request it. To remedy these shortcomings, I sketch an unorthodox Kantian account of respect for the dignity of persons. This account promises to capture the idea that it would be morally problematic for doctors to help the young quadriplegic to die, but to avoid the shortcomings of an orthodox Kantian account.

Life-saving health resources like organs for transplant and experimental medications are persistently scarce. How ought we, morally speaking, to ration these resources? Many hold that, in any morally acceptable allocation scheme, the young should to some extent be prioritized over the old. Govind Persad, Alan Wertheimer and Ezekiel Emanuel propose a multi-principle allocation scheme called the Complete Lives System, according to which persons roughly between 15 and 40 years old get priority over younger children and older adults, other things being equal. They defend this ‘modified youngest first’ principle in part by appealing to the greater social investment that has been made in 15-year-olds than in younger children. Ruth Tallman has proposed a distinctive defense of modified youngest first, one that appeals not at all to social investment. We find this defense wanting. Tallman’s argument depends on the idea, which we try to show to be implausible, that allocations should maximize the number of people in the midst of a possibly complete life who actually complete their lives. Moreover, Tallman does not justify the priority modified youngest first gives 15-year-olds over, for example, 5-year-olds. Tallman fails to dispel a serious shortcoming with modified youngest first: its fundamental unfairness to pre-adolescents.

At the core of Kant's ethics lies the claim that if there is a supreme principle of morality then it cannot be a principle based on utilitarianism or Aristotelian perfectionism or the Ten Commandments. The only viable candidate for such a principle is the categorical imperative. This book is the most detailed investigation of this claim. It constructs a new, criterial reading of Kant's derivation of one version of the categorical imperative: the Formula of Universal Law. This reading shows this derivation to be far more compelling than contemporary philosophers tend to believe. It also reveals a novel approach to deriving another version of the categorical imperative, the Formula of Humanity, a principle widely considered to be the most attractive Kantian candidate for the supreme principle of morality. This book will be important not just for Kant scholars but for a broad swathe of students of philosophy.

In the Paraplegia Case, we must choose either to preserve the life of a paraplegic for 10 years or that of someone in full health for the same duration. Non-consequentialists reject a benefit-maximising view, which holds that since the person in full health will have a higher quality of life, we ought to save him straightaway. In the Unequal Lifespan Case, we face a choice between saving one person for 5 years in full health and another for 25 years in full health. Frances Kamm has recently unfurled an Equal Respect Argument in an effort to support the position that while we ought to give each person a 50% chance of being saved in the Paraplegia Case, we are morally permitted to save straightaway the person who would live longer in the Unequal Lifespan case. The article tries to show that a Kant-inspired account of the dignity of persons is far more successful than Kamm's argument in supporting this position. The Kant-inspired account owes this success to its conceiving of respect for persons not primarily as respect for their pursuit of what is of value for them, but rather as respect for the value in them.

This study explores Kant's accounts of acting from inclination and pursuing happiness. It culminates in two findings. First, Kant fails in his attempt to prove a central tenet of his ethics, namely that there can be no practical law of happiness. Second, Kant's critics have unfairly condemned his account of the role pleasure plays in acting from inclination. Chapter I, devoted to Kant's theory of agency, offers readings of his notions of willing, acting, and acting on a maxim. The chapter rejects the orthodox interpretation of the will as the capacity for choice, arguing that Willkur is actually the capacity to act-on-choice. Chapter II focuses on Kant's account of the role pleasure plays in actions performed from inclination. According to the traditional interpretation, defended by T. H. Green and others, Kant holds that whenever an agent acts from inclination, she has pleasure as her only ultimate end. The chapter offers an alternative to this radically hedonistic reading, arguing that, with equal plausibility but more charity, we may interpret Kant to hold the following: whenever an agent acts from inclination, she has pleasure or the avoidance of displeasure as an ultimate end, but not necessarily as her only one. Chapter III offers a reading of Kant's views on happiness. It argues that his two main conceptions, i.e., his hedonistic and his inclination-based one, are not equivalent. Chapter IV shows that not one of Kant's six arguments for the claim that there can be no practical law of happiness succeeds. Chapter V also begins on a critical note, questioning the plausibility of Kant's conceptions of happiness. It ends by arguing that Kant's account of the role pleasure plays in acting from inclination stands up well to criticisms, including those advanced by Bernard Williams and Phillips Griffiths. With the help of this account, Kant is able to rebut the serious charge that his practical philosophy does not allow for the possibility of genuine friendship

At the core of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals lies his ‘derivation’ of the categorical imperative: his attempt to establish that, if there is a supreme principle of morality, then it is this imperative. Kant's argument for this claim is one of the most puzzling in his corpus. The received view, championed by Aune and Allison, is that there is a fundamental gap in the argument, which Kant elides by means of a simple but deadly confusion, thus robbing the argument of all validity. We will here contest the received view, as well as Korsgaard's alternative interpretation of the argument. In place of these positions we will offer a reconstruction of the derivation which reveals its coherence and force. We will show that it illuminates some interesting grounds for rejecting certain candidates, including a utilitarian principle, for status as the supreme principle of morality. While certainly not free of all defects, the argument will be shown to be far more powerful and interesting than it has commonly been held to be

The allocation of scarce health care resources such as flu treatment or organs for transplant presents stark problems of distributive justice. Persad, Wertheimer, and Emanuel have recently proposed a novel system for such allocation. Their “complete lives system” incorporates several principles, including ones that prescribe saving the most lives, preserving the most life-years, and giving priority to persons between 15 and 40 years old. This paper argues that the system lacks adequate moral foundations. Persad and colleagues' defense of giving priority to those between 15 and 40 leaves them open to the charge that they discriminate unfairly against children. Second, the paper contends that the complete lives system fails to provide meaningful practical guidance in central cases, since it contains no method for balancing its principles when they conflict. Finally, the paper proposes a new method for balancing principles of saving the most lives and maximizing life-years.

The allocation of scarce health care resources such as flu treatment or organs for transplant presents stark problems of distributive justice. Persad, Wertheimer, and Emanuel have recently proposed a novel system for such allocation. Their “complete lives system” incorporates several principles, including ones that prescribe saving the most lives, preserving the most life-years, and giving priority to persons between 15 and 40 years old. This paper argues that the system lacks adequate moral foundations. Persad and colleagues' defense of giving priority to those between 15 and 40 leaves them open to the charge that they discriminate unfairly against children. Second, the paper contends that the complete lives system fails to provide meaningful practical guidance in central cases, since it contains no method for balancing its principles when they conflict. Finally, the paper proposes a new method for balancing principles of saving the most lives and maximizing life-years.

This article concerns the morality of establishing regulated kidney markets in an effort to reduce the chronic shortage of kidneys for transplant. The article tries to rebut the view, recently defended by James Taylor, that if we hold autonomy to be intrinsically valuable, then we should be in favor of such markets. The article then argues that, under current conditions, the buying and selling of organs in regulated markets would sometimes violate two Kantian principles that are seen as moral constraints. One principle forbids expressing disrespect for the dignity of humanity; the other forbids treating others merely as means. In light of the moral danger posed by regulated markets, the article advocates an alternative way of diminishing the current organ shortage, namely opt-out systems of cadaveric organ donation

In Kant and Modern Political Philosophy, Katrin Flikschuh pursues two main aims. She tries to show that Kant’s theory of Right [Recht] is grounded in Kantian metaphysics. For example, we do not really understand Kant’s thought on property rights and cosmopolitanism unless we have in view its metaphysical underpinnings. Second, Flikschuh attempts to demonstrate the relevance of Kant’s theory of Right, especially as it is presented in Kant’s notoriously difficult Rechtslehre, to contemporary political concerns. In pursuing these aims she brings to bear wide-ranging knowledge of scholarly work on Kant’s political and legal thought.