Sandra Irene Tomsons

The progress of history rests on the battle for supremacy of competing ideas.... The power and wealth of western countries give them a dominant role in shaping the international public discourse. This is a privileged position... [an] imbalance of voice in the international discourse [that] has built up a dangerous sense of resentment by the silent majority of the world’s people. The dominant bioethical paradigm that provides the context for research ethics discourse has evolved within western philosophy’s powerful normative framework and is built on a relationship model that explains and underpins the obligations doctors have to their patients. In this one-to-one relationship, the doctor is...

Taking the standpoint of a human rights doctrine, this thesis identifies principal beliefs about property, and determines the property arrangements which ought to give shape to the right to property. ;Because the prevailing consensus regarding human rights does not characterize philosophical discussion, I defend a human rights doctrine from metaphysical and epistemological attacks. I argue that human rights are not chimera, and the notion of human rights is not a pseudo-concept. The value and essential equality of human beings provide the basis for a justificatory argument for this indispensable part of our moral experience and our moral reasoning. ;Philosophical discussion about property, in particular the debate between proponents of private property and social property, shows concern with, and confusion about, the notion of property. I argue that a concept-theory mix-up is pervasive in moral reasoning about property, perpetuating unwarranted conclusions about the human right to private property, and impeding discovery of morally acceptable property arrangements. Also, I argue that the notion of property is normative, and ordinary usage implies either a conventional or moral framework. ;Identifying principal beliefs about property, and determining the property arrangements which ought to shape the right to property, both presuppose a context--a moral landscape--in which moral reasoning about property takes place. The moral landscapes explicit and implicit in arguments supporting private property and social property are examined in order to identify predominant moral considerations in their debate and to assess the priorities assigned to moral considerations. I structure the moral landscape presupposed by a doctrine of human rights, and this moral landscape provides the backdrop within which a hypothetical Royal Commission compiles a series of recommendations relating to the acquisition, accumulation, and management, use and disposal of property in Canada. ;I argue that the paradigm of acquisition which typically provides the picture used in building up explanatory and justificatory accounts of property is inappropriate to Canada's acquisition chain. A new paradigm is provided, and the moral landscape of human rights is applied to this explanatory account. This moral reasoning generates the recommendations of the Royal Commission regarding Canada's property arrangements