Sandro Mancini

O artigo versa sobre duas passagens cruciais em que toma forma o tema da comunicação entre vida humana e vida não humana: o século XVI, com Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) e Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), e o século XVIII, com Jean-Jacques Rous-seau (1712-1778), o qual se inspira directamente nos Essais. O artigo mostra até que ponto a ética de Montaigne se concentra sobre a escuta da natureza imanente a cada indivíduo, comportando em si a ideia da solidariedade que une todos os seres vivos, reconhecendo na comunicação entre a subjectividade humana e a natureza animal a primeira modalidade de identificação com a vida débil, oprimida e sofredora, a qual é condição de explicação de uma ideia de justiça "natural e universal". A piedade constitui já uma disposição para a alteridade que brota do sentimento de identificação com a vida, na sua contingência e capacidade de sofrer. O artigo mostra também até que ponto a reflexão moral de Bruno chega a uma conclusão similar, na medida em que se afasta de uma antropologia que se recusa a conceber o ser humano como centro privilegiado de sentido no universo, antes colocando o homem e o animal numa relação de reciprocidade e de copertença. Será precisamente na medida em que retoma esta elaboração antidualista que Rousseau transformará a piedade no principal eixo da moral. /// The article focuses on the two crucial moments in which the theme of communication between human life and non-human life takes form: the XVI century, with Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) and Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), and the XVIII century, with Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), who directly takes inspiration from the Essais. The article shows how the ethics of Montaigne is centred upon the auscultation of the nature immanent to each individual, and at the same time embraces the idea of the solidarity which connects all living beings, acknowledging in the communication between human subjectivity and the animal nature the first modality of an identification with forms of life which are weak, oppressed and suffering, as condition of explanation for an idea of justice that is both natural and universal Piety constitutes thus a disposition for the alterity which grows from the feeling of identification with life in its contingency and capacity for suffering. The article also shows to what extent Bruno's moral reflexion comes to a similar conclusion, to the extent that it distances itself from an anthropology that refuses to take the human being as a privileged centre of meaning in the universe, placing rather the human being and the animal in a relation of reciprocity and mutual belonging. It shall precisely be to the degree that he takes up this antidualistic formulation that Rousseau will transform piety into the main axis of the moral life.

This article analyses how the philosopher Piero Martinetti conceptualizes the survival of a person’s soul after death. Martinetti’s stance is strongly influenced by the philosophy of Plotinus. Martinetti shows that the relation between singularity and multiplicity is expressed in human beings as two different and complimentary perspectives: a fundamental identity in the atemporal dimension of the intelligible life of the spirit and a dynamic tension in the empiric order of the spatio-temporal becoming. Both dimensions express themselves in a finalistic way, attracted from the One who operates in them as a force of harmonization and concentration. The One as Omnitudo realitatis is the cornerstone of Martinetti’s position in regards to the survival of the individual soul after death: a concentration that happens mysteriously, because it transcends the ability of the human mind to understand it – yet, it certainly happens. ≪One thing only we know: what is worth living will live.≫