• Some Notes on the Possibility of Foundationalist Justification
    In Cherie Braden, Rodrigo Borges & Branden Fitelson (eds.), Themes From Klein, Springer Verlag. 2019.
  •  13
    Anti‐reductionism and Expected Trust
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. forthcoming.
  • The Oxford Handbook of Assertion (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  19
    The aim of this paper is to articulate and defend a particular role for ethico-political values in social epistemology research. I begin by describing a research programme in social epistemology—one which I have introduced and defended elsewhere. I go on to argue that by the lights of this research programme, there is an important role to be played by ethico-political values in knowledge communities, and an important role in social epistemological research in describing the values inhering in pa…Read more
  •  23
    In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections.
  •  68
    Against epistemic partiality in friendship: value-reflecting reasons
    Philosophical Studies 176 (8): 2221-2242. 2019.
    It has been alleged that the demands of friendship conflict with the norms of epistemology—in particular, that there are cases in which the moral demands of friendship would require one to give a friend the benefit of the doubt, and thereby come to believe something in violation of ordinary epistemic standards on justified or responsible belief :329–351, 2004; Stroud in Ethics 116:498–524, 2006; Hazlett in A luxury of the understanding: on the value of true belief, Oxford University Press, Oxfor…Read more
  •  22
    Recent Work on Assertion
    American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4): 365-380. 2015.
    This paper reviews recent philosophical work on assertion, with a special focus on work exploring the theme of assertion's norm. It concludes with a brief section characterizing several open questions that might profitably be explored from this perspective.
  •  10
    The epistemic costs of politeness
    with Guiming Yang
    Think 16 (46): 19-23. 2017.
  • Sandford C. Goldberg puts forward a theory of epistemic normativity that is grounded in the things we properly expect of one another as epistemic subjects. This theory has far-reaching implications not only for the theory of epistemic normativity, but also for the nature of epistemic assessment itself.
  •  3
    The Oxford Handbook of Assertion (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  19
    The Asymmetry Thesis and the Doctrine of Normative Defeat
    American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4): 339-352. 2017.
    It is widely considered a truism that the only evidence that can provide justification for one's belief that p is evidence in one's possession. At the same time, a good many epistemologists accept another claim seemingly in tension with this "truism," to the effect that evidence not in one's possession can defeat or undermine the justification for one's belief that p. Anyone who accepts both of these claims accepts what I will call the asymmetry thesis: while evidence in one's possession can eit…Read more
  •  20
    II- Arrogance, Silence, and Silencing
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1): 93-112. 2016.
    Alessandra Tanesini’s insightful paper explores the moral and epistemic harms of arrogance, particularly in conversation. Of special interest to her is the phenomenon of arrogance-induced silencing, whereby one speaker’s arrogance either prevents another from speaking altogether or else undermines her capacity to produce certain speech acts such as assertions. I am broadly sympathetic to many of Tanesini’s claims about the harms associated with this sort of silencing. In this paper I propose to …Read more
  •  1
    Defending Philosophy in the Face of Systematic Disagreement
    In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism, Routledge. pp. 277-294. 2013.
    I believe that the sort of disagreements we encounter in philosophy—disagreements that often take the form that I have elsewhere called system- atic peer disagreements—make it unreasonable to think that there is any knowledge, or even justified belief, when the disagreements themselves are systematic. I readily acknowledge that this skeptical view is quite controversial; I suspect many are unconvinced. However, I will not be defending it here. Rather, I will be exploring a worry, or set of worri…Read more
  •  24
    Epistemically engineered environments
    Synthese 1-20. forthcoming.
    In other work I have defended the claim that, when we rely on other speakers by accepting what they tell us, our reliance on them differs in epistemically relevant ways from our reliance on instruments, when we rely on them by accepting what they “tell” us. However, where I have explored the former sort of reliance at great length, I have not done so with the latter. In this paper my aim is to do so. My key notions will be those of our social practices, the normative expectations that are sancti…Read more
  •  8
    Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification (review)
    Analysis 69 (3): 582-585. 2009.
    Reflection on testimony provides novel arguments for anti-individualism. What is anti-individualism? Sanford Goldberg's book defends three main claims under this heading: first, facts about the contents of beliefs do not supervene on individualistic facts about the believers ; second, an individual's epistemic entitlement to accept a piece of testimony depends on facts about her peers ; third, processes by which some humans acquire knowledge from testimony includes activities performed for them …Read more
  •  13
    Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited1
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1): 1-36. 2008.
    Many epistemologists agree that even very young children sometimes acquire knowledge through testimony. In this paper I address two challenges facing this view. The first ) is the defeater challenge, which is to square the hypothesis that very young children acquire testimonial knowledge with the fact that children cannot be said to satisfy the No‐Defeaters condition on knowledge. The second is the extension challenge, which is to give a motivated, extensionally‐adequate account of the condition…Read more
  •  6
    Anti‐Individualism and Knowledge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2): 515-518. 2007.
  •  1
    Oxford Handbook on Assertion (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  1
    Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology (edited book)
    Oxford University Press UK. 2007.
    To what extent are meaning, on the one hand, and knowledge, on the other, determined by aspects of the 'outside world'? Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology presents twelve specially written essays exploring these debates in metaphysics and epistemology and the connections between them. In so doing, it examines how issues connected with the nature of mind and language bear on issues about the nature of knowledge and justification. Topics discussed include the compatibility o…Read more
  • My dissertation presents an argument for and defense of the doctrine of transparency about mental content. This doctrine holds that for any thought a thinker knows the content of her thought in an immediate and non-inferential way; and that for any thoughts a thinker can discriminate between thoughts with different contents. ;In the opening chapter I give an argument in support of the doctrine of transparency. The suggestion is that Crispin Wright's argument for a "minimalist" realism about inte…Read more
  •  14
    Philosophical Studies 142 (1): 1-3. 2009.
  •  1
    Mark Sainsbury, ed., Thought and Ontology Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 19 (1): 60-62. 1999.
  •  29
    Comments on Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice
    Episteme 7 (2): 138-150. 2010.
    Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice is a wide-ranging and important book on a much-neglected topic: the injustice involved in cases in which distrust arises out of prejudice. Fricker has some important things to say about this sort of injustice: its nature, how it arises, what sustains it, and the unhappy outcomes associated with it for the victim and the society in which it takes place. In the course of developing this account, Fricker also develops an account of the epistemology of testimony…Read more
  •  83
    In this paper I argue that RadicalInterpretation (RI), taken to be a methodological doctrine regarding the conditions under which an interpretation of an utterance is both warranted and correct, has unacceptable implications for the conditions on (ascriptions of) understanding. The notion of understanding at play is that which underwrites the testimonial transmission of knowledge. After developing this notion I argue that, on the assumption of RI, hearers will fail to have such understanding in …Read more
  •  142
    A Reliabilist Foundationalist Coherentism
    Erkenntnis 77 (2): 187-196. 2012.
    While Process Reliabilism has long been regarded by many as a version of Foundationalism, this paper argues that there is a version of Process Reliabilism that can also been seen as at least a partial vindication of Coherentism as well. The significance of this result lies in what it tells us both about the prospects for a plausible Process Reliabilism, but also about the old-school debate between Foundationalists and Coherentists.