•  1
    III. Therapies of Fake News. The Virtue of Epistemic Trustworthiness and Re-Posting on Social Media
    In Sven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News, Oxford University Press. 2021.
  •  6
    The Effect of Fairness, Responsible Leadership and Worthy Work on Multiple Dimensions of Meaningful Work
    with Marjolein Lips-Wiersma and Jarrod Haar
    Journal of Business Ethics 161 (1): 35-52. 2020.
    The present study extends the meaningful work and ethics literature by comparing three ethics-related antecedents. The second contribution of this paper is that in using a multi-dimensional MFW construct we offer a more fine-tuned understanding of the impact of ethical antecedents on different dimensions of MFW, such as expressing full potential and integrity with self. Using an international data set from 879 employees and structural equation modelling, we confirmed an updated seven-dimension C…Read more
  •  8
    Virtues, social roles, and contextualism
    In Heather Battaly (ed.), Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic, Wiley-blackwell. 2010.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Virtues and Our Social Roles: Moral and Epistemic Epistemic Contextualism Attributor Contextualism Problems for Attributor Contextualism Methodological Contextualism Problems for Methodological Contextualism Virtue Contextualism: Methodological Contextualism Supplemented with Social Roles An Objection Considered Conclusion Acknowledgments References.
  •  17
    Introduction to the Special Issue
    Acta Analytica 35 (3): 315-317. 2020.
  •  24
    Introduction to the Special Issue
    Acta Analytica 33 (3): 291-294. 2018.
  •  59
    Epistemic harm and virtues of self-evaluation
    Synthese 198 (Suppl 7): 1691-1709. 2018.
    Miranda Fricker identifies a specific kind of epistemic harm that comes from assigning diminished credibility to others; when this is the result of identity prejudice it results in testimonial injustice. Fricker argues that this kind of injustice follows only from assigning diminished credibility to a person; assigning inflated credibility is never a testimonial injustice. In this paper I examine and expand arguments to the effect that assigning inflated credibility to one person can epistemical…Read more
  •  55
    Invasive Species and the Loss of Beta Diversity
    Ethics and the Environment 16 (1): 75-98. 2011.
    As I travel the highways of Georgia, I am regularly appalled by the ubiquitous presence of kudzu. It covers trees, telephone poles, open swathes of land, and old houses, making many locations indistinguishable from one another; all I can see from the road is a wave of green covering any formerly distinctive markings. Thinking back to the intentional introduction of kudzu to the American southeast, I recognize that those individuals who encouraged the planting of kudzu made a serious mistake.1 Th…Read more
  •  139
    Virtues, social roles, and contextualism
    Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2): 95-114. 2010.
    : Contextualism in epistemology has been proposed both as a way to avoid skepticism and as an explanation for the variability found in our use of "knows." When we turn to contextualism to perform these two functions, we should ensure that the version we endorse is well suited for these tasks. I compare two versions of epistemic contextualism: attributor contextualism and methodological contextualism. I argue that methodological contextualism is superior both in its response to skepticism and in …Read more
  •  48
    A neo‐stoic approach to epistemic agency
    Philosophical Issues 23 (1): 262-275. 2013.
    What is the best model of epistemic agency for virtue epistemology? Insofar as the intellectual and moral virtues are similar, it is desirable to develop models of agency that are similar across the two realms. Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics present a model of the virtues on which the moral and intellectual virtues are unified. The Stoics’ materialism and determinism also help to explain how we can be responsible for our beliefs even when we cannot believe otherwise. In this paper I show how a neo…Read more
  •  105
    Internalist virtues and knowledge
    Acta Analytica 25 (2): 119-132. 2010.
    What role can intellectual virtues play in an account of knowledge when we interpret those virtues internalistically, i.e., as depending only on internal states of the cognizer? Though it has been argued that internalist virtues are ill suited to play any role in an account of knowledge, I will show that, on the contrary, internalist virtues can play an important role in recent accounts of knowledge developed to utilize externalist virtues. The virtue account of knowledge developed by Linda Zagz…Read more
  •  61
    Knowledge and Social Roles: A Virtue Approach
    Episteme 8 (1): 99-111. 2011.
    Attributor contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism both suggest ways in which our concept of knowledge depends on a context. Both offer approaches that incorporate traditionally non-epistemic elements into our standards for knowledge. But neither can account for the fact that the social role of a subject affects the standards that the subject must meet in order to warrant a knowledge attribution. I illustrate the dependence of the standards for knowledge on the social roles of the knowe…Read more
  •  1
    The Stoic Epistemic Virtues of Groups
    In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2014.
  •  71
    How Boots Befooled the King: Wisdom, Truth, and the Stoics
    Acta Analytica 27 (2): 113-126. 2012.
    Abstract   Can the wise person be fooled? The Stoics take a very strong view on this question, holding that the wise person (or sage) is never deceived and never believes anything that is false. This seems to be an implausibly strong claim, but it follows directly from some basic tenets of the Stoic cognitive and psychological world-view. In developing an account of what wisdom really requires, I will explore the tenets of the Stoic view that lead to this infallibilism about wisdom, and show tha…Read more
  •  90
    The Proper Structure of the Intellectual Virtues
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1): 91-112. 2009.
    If we adopt a virtue approach to epistemology, what form should the intellectual virtues take? In this paper, I argue that the proper structure of the intellectual virtues should be one that follows the tradition of internalism in epistemology. I begin by giving a general characterization of virtue epistemology and then define internalism within that framework. Arguing for internalism, I first consider the thought experiment of the new evil demon and show how externalist accounts of intellectual…Read more
  •  57