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90This book collects twenty-five of the author's essays, each of which addresses a descriptive or a foundational issue that arises at the interface between linguistic semantics and pragmatics, on the one hand, and the philosophy of language, on the other. Arranged into three interconnected parts (I. Matters of Meaning and Truth; II. Matters of Meaning and Force; III. Knowledge Matters), the essays suggest that some key topics in the above-mentioned fields have often been approached in ways that co…Read more
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390Three Problems for the Knowledge Rule of AssertionPhilosophical Investigations 42 (3): 264-270. 2019.Timothy Williamson has argued that, unless the speech act of assertion were supposed to be governed by his so-called Knowledge Rule, one could not explain why sentences of the form "A and I do not know that A" are unassertable. This paper advances three objections against that argument, of which the first two aim to show that, even assuming that Williamson's explanandum has been properly circumscribed, his explanation would not be correct, and the third aims to show that his explanandum has not …Read more
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68Introduction to 'Interpreting J. L. Austin'In Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-14. 2017.
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758Performativity and the 'True/False Fetish'In Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 96-118. 2017.
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118A Purported Refutation of Some Theories of AssertionPhilosophical Forum 45 (2): 169-177. 2014.Several influential philosophical accounts of assertion have recently been claimed by Peter Pagin to commit a fundamental mistake. The present paper argues that Pagin's defence of that claim is flawed: The criterion he proposes for evaluating theories of assertion is unreliable; and even if it were supposed to be in itself reliable, it could not be used, in the way he proposes, either against the kinds of theories he intends to undermine or in favour of the kind of theory he intends to support.
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957The Distance Between “Here” and “Where I Am”Journal of Philosophical Research 40 13-21. 2015.This paper argues that Michael Dummett's proposed distinction between a declarative sentence's "assertoric content" and "ingredient sense" is not in fact supported by what Dummett presents as paradigmatic evidence in its support.
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54Emotional states and linguistic events: A study of conceptual misconnectionsPragmatics and Cognition 1 (2): 229-243. 1993.This paper intends to contribute to the evaluation of the project of analyzing speech act concepts in terms of mental state concepts, by examining Searle's and Vanderveken's proposed analyses of certain types of illocutionary acts as expressions of corresponding types of emotional states. It is argued that the proposed analyses are all defective, that the assumptions about underlying speech act/mental state parallelisms from which their initial plausibility might be taken to derive are themselve…Read more
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55A memorable thirteen-word sentenceSemiotica 2015 (204): 95-99. 2015.The most distinctive, and probably the most striking, assumption of Donald Davidson's well known ‘paratactic’ analysis of the logical form of saying ascriptions is that the “that”-clause that, in such an ascription, specifies the content of the ascribed act of saying, is neither syntactically nor semantically part of the sentence effecting the ascription. The present paper identifies a neglected problem that this assumption engenders for the Davidsonian analysis. The problem arises in connection…Read more
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40The mode of existence of illocutionary negationErkenntnis 54 (2): 205-214. 2001.This paper examines a recent attempt to provide a negative answer to the question of the existence of illocutionary negations. It argues that the attempt is unsuccessful both because it presupposes a misinterpretation of the question's theoretical import and because, even granting that misinterpretation, it bases its proposed answer on certain assumptions that can independently be shown to be untenable.
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36Addendum to “Self-Reference and the Divorce Between Meaning and Truth”Logic and Logical Philosophy 23 (1): 109-110. 2014.This paper is an addendum to [Tsohatzidis, 2013]
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55The gap between speech acts and mental statesIn Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, Routledge. pp. 220--33. 1994.
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118Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology (edited book)Springer. 2007.This book includes ten original essays that critically examine central themes of John Searle’s ontology of society, as well as a new essay by Searle that summarizes and further develops his work in that area. The critical essays are grouped into three parts. Part I (Aspects of Collective Intentionality) examines the account of collective intention and action underlying Searle’s analysis of social and institutional facts, with special emphasis on how that account relates to the dispute between in…Read more
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118Review of John R. Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (9). 2010.
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256Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives (edited book)Routledge. 1994.Foundations of Speech Act Theoryoffers a timely, thorough and, above all, compelling examination of the complexities of illocutionary acts, performatives, and their phenomenological basis. Savas Tsohatzidis has collected an impressive range of international scholars on the subject. Clearly demonstrating the relevance of speech act theory to semantic theory, the collection further interrogates the inability of pragmatic theories of illocution to properly locate such speech acts within the logic o…Read more
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24Axioms of reference and rules of quotationIn Elke Brendel (ed.), Understanding Quotation, De Gruyter Mouton. pp. 7--323. 2011.
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30Yes-no questions and the myth of content invarianceIn John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind, Cambridge University Press. pp. 244-266. 2007.
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136Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2017.In this volume, Savas L. Tsohatzidis brings together a team of leading experts to provide up-to-date perspectives on the work of J. L. Austin, a major figure in twentieth-century philosophy and an important contributor to theories of language, truth, perception, and knowledge. Focusing on aspects of Austin's writings in these four areas, the volume's ten original essays critically examine central elements of his philosophy, exploring their interrelationships, their historical context, their rece…Read more
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661Lost Hopes and Mixed QuotesIn P. De Brabander (ed.), Hybrid Quotations, Benjamins. 2005.The analysis of mixed quotation proposed in Cappelen & Lepore (1997), purportedly as a development of Davidson's accounts of direct and of indirect quotation, is critically examined. It is argued that the analysis fails to specify either necessary or sufficient conditions on mixed quotation, and that the way it has been defended by its proponents makes its alleged Davidsonian parentage questionable.
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79Four types of counterexample to the latest test for perlocutionary act namesLinguistics and Philosophy 9 (2). 1986.
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258A problem for a logic of 'because'Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 25 (1): 46-49. 2015.A problem is raised for the introduction rules proposed in Benjamin Schnieder’s ‘A logic for “because”’, arising in connection with (a) inferences that the rules should not, but do, validate and (b) inferences that the rules should, but do not, validate
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617Truth Ascriptions, Falsity Ascriptions, and the Paratactic Analysis of Indirect DiscourseLogique Et Analyse (232): 527-534. 2015.This paper argues that the obvious validity of certain inferences involving indirect speech reports as premises and truth or falsity ascriptions as conclusions is incompatible with Davidson's so-called "paratactic" analysis of the logical form of indirect discourse. Besides disqualifying that analysis, this problem is also claimed to indicate that the analysis is doubly in tension with Davidson's metasemantic views. Specifically, it can be reconciled neither with one of Davidson's key assumption…Read more
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Aristotle University of ThessalonikiRegular Faculty
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |