•  9576
    Stoicism, Feminism and Autonomy
    Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1): 9-22. 2014.
    The ancient Stoics had an uneven track record with regard to women’s standing. On the one hand, they recognized women as fully capable of rationality and virtue. On the other hand, they continued to hold that women’s roles were in the home. These views are consistent, given Stoic value theory, but are unacceptable on liberal feminist grounds. Stoic value theory, given different emphasis on the ethical role of choice, is shown to be capable of satisfying the liberal feminist requirement that auto…Read more
  •  2824
    An Atheistic Argument from Ugliness
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (1): 209-217. 2015.
    The theistic argument from beauty has what we call an 'evil twin', the argument from ugliness. The argument yields either what we call 'atheist win', or, when faced with aesthetic theodicies, 'agnostic tie' with the argument from beauty.
  •  2101
    Poe's Law is roughly that online parodies of religious extremism are indistinguishable from instances of sincere extremism. Poe's Law may be expressed in a variety of ways, each highlighting either a facet of indirect discourse generally, attitudes of online audiences, or the quality of online religious material. As a consequence of the polarization of online discussions, invocations of Poe's Law have relevance in wider circles than religion. Further, regular invocations of Poe's Law in critical…Read more
  •  1710
    We discuss the philosophical problems attendant to the justice of eternal punishments in Hell, particularly those portrayed in Dante’s Inferno. We conclude that, under Dante’s description, a unique version of the problem of Hell (and Heaven) can be posed
  •  923
    Prospects for Peircean Epistemic Infinitism
    Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2): 71-87. 2009.
    Epistemic infinitism is the view that infinite series of inferential relations are productive of epistemic justification. Peirce is explicitly infinitist in his early work, namely his 1868 series of articles. Further, Peirce's semiotic categories of firsts, seconds, and thirds favors a mixed theory of justification. The conclusion is that Peirce was an infinitist, and particularly, what I will term an impure infinitist. However, the prospects for Peirce's infinitism depend entirely on the prospe…Read more
  •  889
    Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei and the meta-exclusivism of religious pluralism
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (2): 219-235. 2013.
    In response to the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Nicholas of Cusa wrote De pace fidei defending a commitment to religious tolerance on the basis of the notion that all diverse rites are but manifestations of one true religion. Drawing on a discussion of why Nicholas of Cusa is unable to square the two objectives of arguing for pluralistic tolerance and explaining the contents of the one true faith, we outline why theological pluralism is compromised by its own meta-exclusivism
  •  761
    Still Searching for a Pragmatist Pluralism
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (1). 2005.
    Talisse and Aikin reply to Critics
  •  702
    Citizen Skeptic: Cicero’s Academic Republicanism
    Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 2 (3). 2015.
    The skeptical challenge to politics is that if knowledge is in short supply and it is a condition for the proper use of political power, then there is very little just politics. Cicero’s Republicanism is posed as a program for political legitimacy wherein both citizens and their states are far from ideal. The result is a form of what is termed negative conservatism, which shows political gridlock in a more positive light.
  •  700
    Dialecticality and Deep Disagreement
    Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2): 173-179. 2018.
    In this paper, I will argue for a complex of three theses. First, that the problem of deep disagreement is an instance of the regress problem of justification. Second, that the problem of deep disagreement, as a regress problem, depends on a dialecticality requirement for arguments. Third, that the dialecticality requirement is plausible and defensible.
  •  677
    Three objections to the epistemic theory of argument rebutted
    Argumentation and Advocacy 44 130-142. 2008.
    Three objections to the epistemic theory of argument are presented and briefly rebutted. In light of this reply, a case for argumentative eclecticism is made.
  •  611
    Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts
    with Michael Harbour and Robert B. Talisse
    Logos and Episteme 1 (2): 211-219. 2010.
    An intuitive view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement says that when epistemic peers disagree, they should suspend judgment. This abstemious view seems to embody a kind of detachment appropriate for rational beings; moreover, it seems to promote a kind of conciliatory inclination that makes for irenic and cooperative further discussion. Like many strategies for cooperation, however, the abstemious view creates opportunities for free-riding. In this essay, the authors argue that …Read more
  •  610
    The Significance of Al Gore’s Purported Hypocrisy
    Environmental Ethics 31 (1): 111-112. 2009.
    This paper is a survey of a variety of hypocrisy charges levied against Al Gore. Understood properly, these hypocrisy charges actually support Gore's case.
  •  479
    A Consistency Challenge for Moral and Religious Beliefs
    Teaching Philosophy 32 (2): 127-151. 2009.
    What should individuals do when their firmly held moral beliefs are prima facie inconsistent with their religious beliefs? In this article weoutline several ways of posing such consistency challenges and offer a detailed taxonomy of the various responses available to someone facing a consistency challenge of this sort. Throughout the paper, our concerns are primarily pedagogical: how best to pose consistency challenges in the classroom, how to stimulate discussion of the various responses to the…Read more
  •  409
    Ralph Johnson has proposed a “two tiered” conception of argument, comprising of the illative core and the dialectical tier. This paper's two-part thesis is that (i) the dialectical tier is best understood as an epistemic requirement for argument, and (ii) once understood epistemically, the dialectical tier requirement can be defended against the leading objections.
  •  378
    John Dewey's Quest for unity: The journey of a promethean mystic (review) (review)
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (4): 656-659. 2010.
    There is what should be called the Curious George Model of Analysis, wherein the internal conflicts of some protagonist or program are the most revealing and significant features of the story. Take George. He is a good little monkey, but he's curious. These are virtues of sorts, but George's curiosity drives him first to investigate a yellow hat, then to try to fly like the seagulls, to investigate the telephone, and finally to try holding a large bunch of balloons. In each case, these actions d…Read more
  •  338
    For anyone approaching the Encheiridion of Epictetus for the first time, this book provides a comprehensive guide to understanding a complex philosophical text. Including a full translation and clear explanatory commentaries, Epictetus's 'Encheiridion' introduces readers to a hugely influential work of Stoic philosophy. Scott Aikin and William O. Stephens unravel the core themes of Stoic ethics found within this ancient handbook. Focusing on the core themes of self-control, seeing things as they…Read more
  •  312
    Introduction: Skeptical Problems in Political Epistemology
    Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2): 107-112. 2018.
    Scott Aikin, Tempest Henning Download PDF.
  •  237
    Argumentative Ethics
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley. 2021.
    Entry in International Encyclopedia of Ethics on Ethical considerations bearing on Argumentation.
  •  235
    Introduction
    Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 9 (1): 7-10. 2022.
  •  235
    The Rhetorical Theory of Argument is Self-Defeating
    Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 3 (1). 2011.
    The rhetorical theory of argument, if held as a conclusion of an argument, is self-defeating. The rhetorical theory can be refined, but these refinements either make the theory subject to a second self- defeat problem or tacitly an epistemic theory of argument
  •  215
    Evidentialism and James' Argument from Friendship
    Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1): 173-180. 2008.
    William James' main argument in “The Will to Believe” against evidentialism is that there are facts that cannot come to be without a preliminary faith in their coming. James primarily makes this case with the argument from friendship. I will critically present James' argument from friendship and show that the argument does not yield a counter-example to evidentialism and is in the end unsound.
  •  211
    This essay is an introductory overview of the considerations in favor of epistemic infinitism, the view that the demands of justification are that one must have non-terminating series of reasons for one's beliefs if they are to be knowledge.
  •  211
    Tu Quoque Arguments and the Significance of Hypocrisy
    Informal Logic 28 (2): 155-169. 2008.
    Though textbook tu quoque arguments are fallacies of relevance, many versions of arguments from hypocrisy are indirectly relevant to the issue. Some arguments from hypocrisy are challenges to the authority of a speaker on the basis of either her sincerity or competency regarding the issue. Other arguments from hypocrisy purport to be evidence of the impracticability of the opponent’s proposals. Further, some versions of hypocrisy charges from impracticability are open to a counter that I will te…Read more
  •  177
    Wittgenstein, Dewey, and the possibility of religion
    Journal of Speculative Philosophy 20 (1): 1-19. 2006.
    John Dewey points out in A Common Faith (1934) that what stands in the way of religious belief for many is the apparent commitment of Western religious traditions to supernatural phenomena and questionable historical claims. We are to accept claims that in any other context we would find laughable. Are we to believe that water can be turned into wine without the benefit of the fermentation process? Are we to swallow the claim that there is such a phenomenon as the spontaneous conception of a chi…Read more
  •  156
    Straw Men, Weak Men, and Hollow Men
    with John Casey
    Argumentation 25 (1): 87-105. 2011.
    Three forms of the straw man fallacy are posed: the straw, weak, and hollow man. Additionally, there can be non-fallacious cases of any of these species of straw man arguments
  •  155
    Developing Group-Deliberative Virtues
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (4): 409-424. 2010.
    In this paper, the authors argue for two main claims: first, that the epistemic results of group deliberation can be superior to those of individual inquiry; and, second, that successful deliberative groups depend on individuals exhibiting deliberative virtues. The development of these group-deliberative virtues, the authors argue, is important not only for epistemic purposes but political purposes, as democracies require the virtuous deliberation of their citizens. Deliberative virtues contribu…Read more
  •  136
    Deep Disagreement and the Problem of the Criterion
    Topoi 40 (5): 1017-1024. 2018.
    My objective in this paper is to compare two philosophical problems, the problem of the criterion and the problem of deep disagreement, and note a core similarity which explains why many proposed solutions to these problems seem to fail along similar lines. From this observation, I propose a kind of skeptical solution to the problem of deep disagreement, and this skeptical program has consequences for the problem as it manifests in political epistemology and metaphilosophy.
  •  136
    Modest Evidentialism
    International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3): 327-343. 2006.
    Evidentialism is the view that subjects should believe neither more than nor contrary to what their current evidence supports. I will critically present two arguments for the view. A common source of resistance to evidentialism is that there are intuitive cases where subjects should believe contrary to their evidence. I will present modest evidentialism as the view that subjects should believe in accord with what their evidence supports, but that this norm may be overridden under certain conditi…Read more