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How to Be a Postmodal DirectionalistPhilosophical Studies 1-31. forthcoming.According to directionalism, non-symmetric relations are distinct from their converses. Kit Fine (2000) argues that the directionalist faces a dilemma; they must either (i) reject the principle Uniqueness, which states that no completion (fact, state of affairs, or proposition) is a completion of more than one relation, or (ii) reject the principle Identity, which states that each completion of a relation is identical to a completion of its converse (e.g., Dante’s loving Bice is identical to Bic…Read more
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356Symmetric relationsPhilosophical Studies 180 (12): 3615-3639. 2023.There are two ways to characterize symmetric relations. One is intensional: necessarily, _Rxy_ iff _Ryx_. In some discussions of relations, however, what is important is whether or not a relation gives rise to the same completion of a given type (fact, state of affairs, or proposition) for each of its possible applications to some fixed relata. Kit Fine calls relations that do ‘strictly symmetric’. Is there is a difference between the notions of necessary and strict symmetry that would prevent t…Read more
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105Metaphysical foundherentismSynthese 201 (3): 1-24. 2023.I propose a way to accommodate plausible examples of cyclic grounding chains that have been proposed in the literature while preserving a good measure of the metaphysical foundationalist’s grounding hierarchy with a foundational level. This precludes the need to adopt a strong form of coherentism, such as the view that everything grounds everything, or even the view that everything grounds everything other than itself. I do this by developing axiomatizations of grounding which allow for localize…Read more
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464Directionalism and Relations of Arbitrary SymmetryDialectica. forthcoming.Maureen Donnelly has recently argued that directionalism, the view that relations have a direction, applying to their relata in an order, is unable to properly treat certain symmetric relations. She alleges that it must count the application of such a relation to an appropriate number of objects in a given order as distinct from its application to those objects in any other ordering of them. I reply by showing how the directionalist can link the application conditions of any fixed arity relation…Read more
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89Review of Theodore Sider's The Tools of Metaphysics and the Metaphysics of Science (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2021.
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98David Lewis (1941-2001)Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2020.David Lewis David Lewis is an American philosopher and one of the last generalists, in the sense that he was one of the last philosophers who contributed to the great majority of sub-fields of the discipline. He made central contributions in metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and probabilistic and practical … Continue reading David Lewis →
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423Infinite DescentIn Michael J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, Routledge. pp. 244-58. 2020.Once one accepts that certain things metaphysically depend upon, or are metaphysically explained by, other things, it is natural to begin to wonder whether these chains of dependence or explanation must come to an end. This essay surveys the work that has been done on this issue—the issue of grounding and infinite descent. I frame the discussion around two questions: (1) What is infinite descent of ground? and (2) Is infinite descent of ground possible? In addressing the second question, I will …Read more
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618Between Atomism and SuperatomismJournal of Philosophical Logic 49 (6): 1215-1241. 2020.There are at least three vaguely atomistic principles that have come up in the literature, two explicitly and one implicitly. First, standard atomism is the claim that everything is composed of atoms, and is very often how atomism is characterized in the literature. Second, superatomism is the claim that parthood is well-founded, which implies that every proper parthood chain terminates, and has been discussed as a stronger alternative to standard atomism. Third, there is a principle that lies b…Read more
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589Relative Positionalism and Variable Arity RelationsMetaphysics 2 (1): 55-72. 2019.Maureen Donnelly’s (2016) relative positionalism correctly handles any fixed arity relation with any symmetry such a relation can have, yielding the intuitively correct way(s) in which that relation can apply. And it supplies an explanation of what is going on in the world that makes this the case. But it has at least one potential shortcoming — one that its opponents are likely to seize upon: it can only handle relations with fixed arities. It is unable to handle relations with variable arities…Read more
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468Plural Slot TheoryIn Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 11, Oxford University Press. pp. 193-223. 2018.Kit Fine (2000) breaks with tradition, arguing that, pace Russell (e.g., 1903: 228), relations have neither directions nor converses. He considers two ways to conceive of these new "neutral" relations, positionalism and anti-positionalism, and argues that the latter should be preferred to the former. Cody Gilmore (2013) argues for a generalization of positionalism, slot theory, the view that a property or relation is n-adic if and only if there are exactly n slots in it, and (very roughly) that …Read more
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1035Speaks’s Reduction of Propositions to Properties: A Benacerraf ProblemThought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3): 275-284. 2016.Speaks defends the view that propositions are properties: for example, the proposition that grass is green is the property being such that grass is green. We argue that there is no reason to prefer Speaks's theory to analogous but competing theories that identify propositions with, say, 2-adic relations. This style of argument has recently been deployed by many, including Moore and King, against the view that propositions are n-tuples, and by Caplan and Tillman against King's view that propositi…Read more
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177Upward GroundingPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1): 48-78. 2018.Realists about universals face a question about grounding. Are things how they are because they instantiate the universals they do? Or do they instantiate those universals because they are how they are? Take Ebenezer Scrooge. You can say that Scrooge is greedy because he instantiates greediness, or you can say that Scrooge instantiates greediness because he is greedy. I argue that there is reason to prefer the latter to the former. I develop two arguments for the view. I also respond to some con…Read more
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1310What Is the Well-Foundedness of Grounding?Mind 125 (498): 439-468. 2016.A number of philosophers think that grounding is, in some sense, well-founded. This thesis, however, is not always articulated precisely, nor is there a consensus in the literature as to how it should be characterized. In what follows, I consider several principles that one might have in mind when asserting that grounding is well-founded, and I argue that one of these principles, which I call ‘full foundations’, best captures the relevant claim. My argument is by the process of elimination. For …Read more
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150Grounding and SupplementationErkenntnis 81 (2): 375-389. 2016.Partial grounding is often thought to be formally analogous to proper parthood in certain ways. Both relations are typically understood to be asymmetric and transitive, and as such, are thought to be strict partial orders. But how far does this analogy extend? Proper parthood is often said to obey the weak supplementation principle. There is reason to wonder whether partial grounding, or, more precisely, proper partial grounding, obeys a ground-theoretic version of this principle. In what follow…Read more
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