•  59
    Disjunctivism
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1): 145-216. 2006.
    [John Hawthorne] We examine some well-known disjunctivist projects in the philosophy of perception, mainly in a critical vein. Our discussion is divided into four parts. Following some introductory remarks, we examine in part two the link between object-dependent contents and disjunctivism. In part three, we explore the disjunctivist's use of discriminability facts as a basis for understanding experience. In part four, we examine an interesting argument for disjunctivism that has been offered by…Read more
  •  32
    Disjunctivism
    with John Hawthorne and Karson Kovakovich
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1): 185-216. 2006.
  •  23
    Reply to Comesaña
    Philosophical Studies 180 (10): 3231-3252. 2023.
  •  45
    Rationality and Higher-order Awareness
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (1): 78-98. 2022.
    It is argued that higher-order awareness is central to one type of everyday rationality. The author starts by specifying the target notion of rationality, contrasting it with other useful notions in the neighbourhood. It is then shown that the target notion relies on first-person awareness of the unfolding of cognition. This is used to explain the kernel of truth in epistemic conservatism, the structure of defeasibility, and the root motive behind the widely accepted distinction between rational…Read more
  •  45
    The Rational Mind
    Oxford University Press. 2020.
    Scott Sturgeon presents an original account of mental states and their dynamics. He develops a detailed story of coarse- and fine-grained mental states, a novel perspective on how they fit together, an engaging theory of the rational transitions between them, and a fresh view of how formal methods can advance our understanding in this area. In doing so, he addresses a deep four-way divide in literature on epistemic rationality. Formal epistemology is done in specialized languages--often seeming …Read more
  • Confidence and Coarse-Grained Attitudes
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3. 2010.
  •  53
    The sharpest corner of the cutting edge of recent epistemology is to be found in Richard Pettigrew’s Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. In this fine book Pettigrew argues that a certain kind of accuracy-based value monism entails that rational credence manifests a host of features emphasized by anti-externalists in epistemology. Specifically, he demonstrates how a particular version of accuracy-based value monism—to be discussed at length below—when placed with some not implausible views about h…Read more
  •  69
    Pollock on defeasible reasons
    Philosophical Studies 169 (1): 105-118. 2014.
  •  436
    The epistemic basis of subjectivity
    Journal of Philosophy 91 (5): 221-35. 1994.
  •  181
    Visual experience
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1): 179-200. 1998.
    I argue against a Disjunctive approach to visual experience. I then critique three 'common-factor' views: Qualia Theory, Intentionalism and Sense-Date Theory. The latter two are combined to form Intentional Trope Theory; and that view is defended
  •  10
    Foley on causation and rationality
    Analysis 46 (4): 62-64. 1986.
  •  42
    The roots of reductionism
    In Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents, Cambridge University Press. 2001.
  •  49
    II—Scott Sturgeon: Reflective Disjunctivism
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1): 185-216. 2006.
  •  109
    Disjunctivism about visual experience
    In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 112--143. 2008.
  •  674
    This paper does four things. First it lays out an orthodox position on reasons and defeaters. Then it argues that the position just laid out is mistaken about “undercutting” defeaters. Then the paper explains an unpublished thought experiment by Dorothy Edgington. And then it uses that thought experiment to motivate a new approach to undercutting defeaters.
  •  71
    The Epistemic View of Subjectivity
    Journal of Philosophy 91 (5): 221-235. 1994.
  •  160
    Normative judgement
    Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1). 2007.
  •  107
  •  277
    Confidence and coarse-grained attitudes
    In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 3--126. 2005.
  •  25
  •  51
    Maximalism and mental processes
    Philosophical Studies 53 (2). 1988.
  •  1
    Epistemology
    In A. C. Grayling (ed.), Philosophy 1: A Guide Through the Subject, Oxford University Press. 1998.
  •  1
    Apriorism about Modality
    In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2010.
  •  169
    The Gettier Problem
    Analysis 53 (3): 156-164. 1993.
  •  285
    Physicalism and overdetermination
    Mind 107 (426): 411-432. 1998.
    I argue that our knowledge of the world's causal structure does not generate a sound argument for physicalism. This undermines the popular view that physicalism is the only scientifically respectable worldview
  •  89
    Humean chance: Five questions for David Lewis (review)
    Erkenntnis 49 (3): 321-335. 1998.
    David Lewis's approach to objective chance is doubly distinctive. On the one hand, Lewis uses an epistemic principle to disclose the nature of chance. One the other, Lewis conjoins realism about chance with a reductive Humean metaphysics. I aim to undermine both aspects of his view. Specifically, I argue that reductive Humeanism fails across the board, and I use my discussion of chance to explain why. I also argue Lewis's "best-systems" approach to chance fails his own criteria for a metaphysics…Read more
  •  42
    Conditional Belief and the Ramsey Test
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51 215-232. 2002.
    Consider the frame S believes that—. Fill it with a conditional, say If you eat an Apple, you'll drink a Coke. what makes the result true? More generally, what facts are marked by instances of S believes ? In a sense the answer is obious: beliefs are so marked. Yet that bromide leads directly to competing schools of thought. And the reason is simple. Common-sense thinks of belief two ways. Sometimes it sees it as a three-part affair. When so viewed either you believe, disbelieve, or suspend judg…Read more