Sebastián Briceño

It is commonly held that Bradley’s regress has a solution within a trope ontology. This seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by non-transferable tropes. It also seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by transferable tropes related by a relational trope of compresence whose existence specifically depends on those relata. In this article I demonstrate that these proposals fail in addressing the essential question that underlies the regress, incurring in a question-begging response already anticipated by Bradley.

According to Ladyman, the world consists of nothing more than relations that relate to no particulars. Could the world be nothing but structure? In this chapter it is argued that even though there are a number of problems with the standard view of relations accompanied by a particularist ontology, substituting for it a world of pure structure is not progress. A world of pure structure would be no more than a Platonic entity, lacking any resources for concretization. Consequently, there would be no possibility of distinguishing between a world-kind and its concrete instance or instances. It is also argued that the view has insufficient empirical motivation. The history of science does not support the claim that structure is preserved through theory change nor that the structural components of a theory are extricable from its ontological commitments.

La metafísica de la Superveniencia Humeana ha sido atacada por dos alternativas explícitamente anti-Humeanas: el Realismo Nómico y el Esencialismo Disposicional. Cada una de estas alternativas ofrece una explicación ontológica de la actual distribución de instanciaciones de primer orden. Ambas sostienen, contra el Humeano, que esta distribución no es un accidente metafísico. En este artículo argumento que las explicaciones ofrecidas por ellas son ilusorias. The metaphysics of Humean Supervenience has been attacked by two explicitly anti-Humean alternatives: Nomic Realism and Dispositional Essentialism. Each one of these alternatives offers an ontological explanation of the actual distribution of first-order instantiations. They both claim, against the Humean, that this distribution is not a metaphysical accident. In this paper, I argue that the explanations offered by them are illusory.

La metafísica de la Superveniencia Humeana ha sido atacada por dos alternativas explícitamente anti-Humeanas: el Realismo Nómico y el Esencialismo Disposicional. Cada una de estas alternativas ofrece una explicación ontológica de la actual distribución de instanciaciones de primer orden. Ambas sostienen, contra el Humeano, que esta distribución no es un accidente metafísico. En este artículo argumento que las explicaciones ofrecidas por ellas son ilusorias. The metaphysics of Humean Supervenience has been attacked by two explicitly anti-Humean alternatives: Nomic Realism and Dispositional Essentialism. Each one of these alternatives offers an ontological explanation of the actual distribution of first-order instantiations. They both claim, against the Humean, that this distribution is not a metaphysical accident. In this paper, I argue that the explanations offered by them are illusory

I show how the Cosmological Argument (CA) is undermined by one of its own premises: the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). First, I explain the type of CA that I am thinking about. Second, I explain a traditional modal objection against the PSR, which is ultimately based upon our intuitions in favor of contingency. Third, I show how this modal objection begs the question against the necessitarian, and then I reformulate the CA in more neutral terms. Fourth, using this more neutral version of the CA, I argue that the main problem with the PSR goes way beyond its apparent necessitarian consequences. As an argument used by Bradley shows, embracing the rationalist path that underlies the PSR seems to commit us to a form of Radical Monism. I conclude by showing how this result ultimately undermines the CA.

In this article I attempt to give an account of the thesis according to which composition is identity and of the criticisms that might be formulated against it. According to a weak version of the thesis, composition, in virtue of being analogous in important respects to identity, is as ontologically innocent as identity. According to the strong version of the thesis, composition is literally a species of the generic relation of identity, and is as ontologically innocent as any species of identity. As we will see, the weak version begs the question or incurs in a non sequitur ; and the strong version is incoherent and faces a dilemma. Thus, composition is not identity: one thing cannot be identical to many things.

In this article I attempt to give an account of the thesis according to which composition is identity and of the criticisms that might be formulated against it. According to a weak version of the thesis, composition, in virtue of being analogous in important respects to identity, is as ontologically innocent as identity. According to the strong version of the thesis, composition is literally a species of the generic relation of identity, and is as ontologically innocent as any species of identity. As we will see, the weak version begs the question or incurs in a non sequitur; and the strong version is incoherent and faces a dilemma. Thus, composition is not identity: one thing cannot be identical to many things.

My aim in this paper is to explore the limits of a conception of metaphysical explanation based on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). For this purpose, I will focus on one of the alleged counter-intuitive consequences of an unrestricted application of the PSR, namely: Radical Monism. First, I will articulate such a conception of metaphysical explanation. Then, I will explain how is it that from a famous argument that rests on the PSR (i.e., Bradley’s regress) Radical Monism indeed seems to follow. Right away, I will argue against the natural reaction that such argument triggers, namely: that we shall accept pluralism and relations as brute facts. Finally, I will sketch a qualified version of the PSR that allows us to avoid Radical Monism without compromising the essential content of the PSR.

How is it that someone is an agent, an active being? According to a common and dominant opinion, it is in virtue of performing actions. Within this dominant trend, some claim that actions are acts of will while others claim that actions are identical with certain basic bodily movements. First I make an assessment of these traditional accounts of action and argue that neither of them can make sense of how is it that someone is an agent. Then I offer some supplementation and argue for a better alternative.