•  8516
    Why do we Suffer? Buddhism and the Problem of Evil
    Philosophy Compass 10 (5): 345-353. 2015.
    This paper explains the Buddhist concept of suffering and its relation to the Christian problem of evil. Although there is no problem of evil in Buddhism, the Buddhist understanding of the origin and causes of suffering will help us to find new approaches to the problem of evil. More specifically, I argue that the concept of evil can be interpreted in terms of dukkha; that the existence of suffering or dukkha is necessarily inevitable for finite beings, given the metaphysical structure of the wo…Read more
  •  888
    Metaphor and Theological Realism
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (1): 79-92. 2014.
    In this paper, I argue that there are indispensable and irreducible metaphors in religious language and that this does not threaten a realist interpretation of religion. I first sketch a realist theory of religious language and argue that we cannot avoid addressing the problems metaphor poses to semantics. I then give a brief account of what it means for a metaphorical sentence to be true and how metaphors can refer to something even if what they mean is not expressible in literal terms. Finally…Read more
  •  826
    Ineffability: The very concept
    Philosophia 48 (5): 1-12. 2020.
    In this paper, I analyze the concept of ineffability: what does it mean to say that something cannot be said? I begin by distinguishing ineffability from paradox: if something cannot be said truly or without contradiction, this is not an instance of ineffability. Next, I distinguish two different meanings of ‘saying something’ which result from a fundamental ambiguity in the term ‘language’, viz. language as a system of symbols and language as a medium of communication. Accordingly, ‘ineffabilit…Read more
  •  613
    The paradox of ineffability
    International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 78 (3): 1-12. 2017.
    Saying that x is ineffable seems to be paradoxical – either I cannot say anything about x, not even that it is ineffable – or I can say that it is ineffable, but then I can say something and it is not ineffable. In this article, I discuss Alston’s version of the paradox and a solution proposed by Hick which employs the concept of formal and substantial predicates. I reject Hick’s proposal and develop a different account based on some passages from Pseudo-Dionysius’ Mystica Theologia. ‘God is ine…Read more
  •  546
    Mysticism without concepts
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 90 (3): 233-246. 2021.
    It has often been claimed, e.g. by William James or Aldous Huxley, that mystical experiences across times and cultures exhibit a striking similarity. Even though the words and images we use to describe them are different, underneath the surface we find a common experiential core. Others have rejected this claim and argued that all experiences are intrinsically shaped by the mystics’ pre-existing religious concepts. Against these constructivist objections, I defend the idea of a common core by ar…Read more
  •  430
    I present and discuss recent work in analytic philosophy of religion on apophaticism and divine ineffability. I focus on three questions: how can we call God ineffable without contradicting ourselves? How can we refer to an ineffable God? What is the point of talking about an ineffable God?
  •  414
    Realismus und unübersetzbare Sprachen
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (3): 382-409. 2018.
    This paper argues against Davidson’s claim that there is no distinction between conceptual schemes and their content and derives the implications for the debate on realism and antirealism. Starting from a semantic conception of realism, I discuss Davidson’s argument against conceptual schemes and untranslatable languages. I argue that the idea of an untranslatable language is consistent since language attribution is essentially normative. Untranslatable languages are metaphysically possibl…Read more
  •  309
    On behalf of Pascal: A Reply to Le Poidevin
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (3): 189-196. 2020.
    When we were on the subway back from his lecture, I said to Robin: “I’m not sure there actually are any religious fictionalists.” We keep talking about them in papers and lectures, acting as if fictionalism in religion is a real possibility, but to be honest, I haven’t been able to spot one in the wild so far. The only potential candidate who comes to mind is Don Cupitt, who wrote things like: “I still pray and love God, even though I fully acknowledge that no God actually exists.”[1] Perhaps th…Read more
  •  301
    This chapter argues that both Berkeley and Vasubandhu accept a kind of metaphysical idealism: while Berkeley’s theistic idealism claims that all of reality exists only in the mind of God, Vasubandhu teaches that external objects have no intrinsic existence and exist only as objects of perception; mind is the ultimate reality. This chapter explores the possibility of reading both these doctrines as a kind of idealist panentheism. Specifically, it will address two questions: (1) in what sense are …Read more
  •  273
    Non-personal immortality
    Religious Studies. 2023.
    This article explores the concept of non-personal immortality. Non-personal theories of immortality claim that even though there is no personal or individual survival of death, it is still possible to continue to exist in a non-personal state. The most important challenge for non-personal conceptions of immortality is solving the apparent contradiction between on the one hand accepting that individual existence ends with death and on the other hand maintaining that death nevertheless is not equa…Read more
  •  265
    Why you should be a religious skeptic
    Philosophical Forum (4): 303-314. 2023.
    Most philosophers of religion subscribe to some variety of religious realism: they believe that religious statements aim at capturing a mind-independent reality and are true precisely if they successfully do so. Curiously, most religious realists also believe that at least some of our religious beliefs are rationally justified. In this paper, I argue that these positions are actually at odds with each other. Religious realists should rather be religious skeptics. I first argue that realism alway…Read more
  •  180
    Presents Ricoeurs theory of metaphor as an attempt to give a conceptual analysis of metaphor and discusses various criticisms.
  •  168
    Should You Upload Your Mind?
    Think 22 (65): 33-37. 2023.
    Could you survive your bodily death by uploading your mind?
  •  126
    Mystical ineffability: a nonconceptual theory
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1-16. 2024.
    This paper discusses the nonconceptual theory of mystical ineffability which claims that mystical experiences can’t be expressed linguistically because they can’t be conceptualized. I discuss and refute two objections against it: (a) that unconceptualized experiences are impossible, and (b) that the theory is ad hoc because it provides no reason for why mystical experiences should be unconceptualizable. I argue against (a) that distinguishing different meanings of ‘object of experience’ leaves o…Read more
  •  50
    Einfachheit und Wahrscheinlichkeit: Swinburnes c-induktive Argumente für die Existenz Gottes
    Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 39 (95): 85-110. 2010.
    Summary This paper deals with the structure of the so-called c-inductive arguments in Richard Swinburne’s book The Existence of God and attempts to criticize their central concepts and assumptions. One of these concepts is simplicity: it is argued that Swinburne’s concept of simplicity is not unambiguous and that there is no reason to assume a positive correspondence between simplicity and probability. Furthermore, the theistic hypothesis cannot be said to be simple in any sense relevant to Swin…Read more
  •  23
    Religionsphilosophie
    Nomos. 2022.
    What is religion? Is it rational to have religious beliefs? Do science and religion contradict each other? Is there a god? Are we immortal? Questions like these are discussed in the philosophy of religion. This book provides provides an accesible and comprehensive introduction to philosophy of religion. In 14 chapters, it describes and discusses classical and modern approaches to core issues in philosophy of religion. This book is primarily intended as a textbook for students of philosophy, theo…Read more
  •  17
    Two theses are defended: First, that realism is a semantic thesis; second, that religious language ought to be interpreted realistically. The first part from chapter 1 to 4 is concerned with the first thesis, the second part from chapter 5 to 6 with the second. I first give an overview on the subject of realism and antirealism explaining the core problem of the debate that any satisfying interpretation of realism should be able to solve. Then I develop a solution based on Dummetts theory of sema…Read more
  •  15
    Philosophie der Unsterblichkeit (edited book)
    with Georg Gasser
    Kohlhammer. 2023.
    Der Glaube an Unsterblichkeit ist Bestandteil praktisch aller Religionen und seit ihren Anfängen ein zentrales Thema der Philosophie. Dieser Sammelband bietet einen Überblick zum aktuellen Stand klassischer Debatten über Unsterblichkeit (Unsterblichkeit der Seele, Wiedergeburt, Auferstehung), bringt aber auch neue und bisher vernachlässigte Aspekte mit in die Diskussion (z.B. digitale Unsterblichkeit, Unsterblichkeit und Gender, Unsterblichkeit der Tiere). Die Beiträge skizzieren den Stand der p…Read more
  •  14
    What's Belief Got to Do With It? A Response to Crane
    Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 64 (4): 430-437. 2023.
    This paper argues that even Crane’s modified account of belief doesn’t do justice to all varieties of religious belief. Particularly beliefs associated with ritual behavior don’t seem to match the criteria of Crane’s alternative account. So, the question remains whether these beliefs should still be called beliefs, or whether the standard model of belief is even more false than Crane suspects.