My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept another alternative
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Skip
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Skip
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept an intermediate view
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Skip
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept another alternative
God: theism and atheism Skip
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept another alternative
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Accept: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Skip
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept another alternative
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept another alternative
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Skip
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: non-cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept an intermediate view
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Skip
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept: virtue ethics
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Skip
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Accept another alternative
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Accept another alternative
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Accept another alternative
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept another alternative
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Skip
Time: A-theory and B-theory Skip
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Skip
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Skip
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Skip