Can Constancy Mechanisms Draw the Limits of Intentionality?Disputatio 14 (65): 133-156. 2022.What are the minimal conditions for intentionality that a sensory state should satisfy for it to constitute a representational state? That is, what are the limits of intentionality? This is the problem of demarcation. The goal of this paper is to assess a specific demarcation proposal for the minimal conditions of intentionality—the constancy mechanism proposal. Accordingly, it is a minimal condition for the intentionality of a given state that the sensory system should employ a constancy mechan…Read more
The constancy mechanism proposal for the limits of intentionalityContributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 25 38-40. 2017.
O Grundgedanke e o sentido proposicional no Tractatus de WittgensteinIn Gerson Francisco Arruda Júnior & José Marcos Gomes Luna (eds.), Pensar o problema': (Meta)Física, Matemática, Linguagem e Intenção. Festschrift de ex-alunos em homenagem ao Professor Fernando Raul Neto por ocasião dos seus 50 anos de docência. pp. 133-153. 2019.
Filosofia da BiologiaIn Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid & Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo (eds.), Problemas Filosóficos. pp. 420-452. 2020.
325A Dual Proposal Of Minimal Conditions For IntentionalitySynthese 200 (115): 1-22. 2022.Naturalist theories of representation have been attacked on the grounds of being too liberal on the minimal conditions for intentionality: they treat several states that are not representational as genuine representations. Behind this attack lies the problem of demarcation: what are the minimal conditions for intentionality that a state should satisfy to be genuinely representational? What are the limits of intentionality? This paper develops a dual proposal to solve this problem. First, I defen…Read more
8Por que somos o nosso cérebro: O Enativismo Posto em QuestãoTrans/Form/Ação. forthcoming.In this essay we will argue for the following theses: 1- know-how is not a form of practical knowledge devoid of propositional sense; 2- the relationship between each perception and the body itself is metaphysically contingent (organisms and bodies can vary, as can even the spaces they occupy in the same experience vary), 3- it is up to the brain to configure or to shape a physical body (Körper) into a living body (Leib) and not the other way around; 4- phenomenal externalism of enactivist natur…Read more
94Consciência e Evolução: Uma Análise do Naturalismo Biológico a partir do Debate AdaptacionistaRevista Reflexões 18 (10): 183-200. 2021.The goal of this paper is to assess biological naturalism in light of the adaptationist debate. Searle is famous for explicity pursuing a biological foundation for his theory of consciousness. However, evolutionary biology receives little attention in his work, which results in crucial theoretical confusions over adaptationism. In this paper, we will propose two theses concerning Searle's approach to consciousness in the context of the adaptationist debate. First, Searle's attack on adaptationis…Read more
134The open-endedness objection against sophisticated dispositionalismPerspectiva Filosófica 41 (1): 49-56. 2014.Sophisticated dispositionalism proposes a naturalist reduction of mental content by claiming that the semantic content of a mental symbol is determined by the causes of the occurrence of this symbol under ideal conditions, i.e., conditions under which only the referent of a symbol can cause its tokening. However, Paul Boghossian developed the open-endedness objection in order to show that it is not possible to specify these ideal conditions in non-semantic terms, entailing that the naturalist re…Read more
Federal Rural University of PernambucoProfessor
King's College London
Department of Philosophy
Areas of Specialization
|Philosophy of Mind|
|Philosophy of Language|
|Philosophy of Cognitive Science|
|Philosophy of Biology|
Areas of Interest
|General Philosophy of Science|
|20th Century Analytic Philosophy|