•  3
    Book Review (review)
    Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (2-4): 353-357. 2007.
  •  54
    Review of Peter van Inwagen's Thinking about Free Will (review)
    Philosophical Review 127 (4): 554-557. 2018.
  •  86
    Flickers of freedom and modes of action: A reply to Timpe
    Philosophia 35 (1): 63-74. 2007.
    In recent years, many incompatibilists have come to reject the traditional association of moral responsibility with alternative possibilities. Kevin Timpe argues that one such incompatibilist, Eleonore Stump, ultimately fails in her bid to sever this link. While she may have succeeded in dissociating responsibility from the freedom to perform a different action, he argues, she ends up reinforcing a related link, between responsibility and the freedom to act under a different mode. In this paper,…Read more
  • Holding Responsible Without Ultimate Responsibility
    Dissertation, Syracuse University. 2004.
    My dissertation defends a non-standard compatibilist position that begins with the rarely asked question, "What does it take to have a claim to exemption against other members of the moral community?". Emphasizing this question allows me to acknowledge that "true" moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism, while denying that determinism therefore undermines the legitimacy of holding people morally responsible. ;What motivates this position, in part, is the failure of leading compatib…Read more
  •  432
    More Trouble with Tracing
    Erkenntnis 80 (5): 987-1011. 2015.
    Theories of moral responsibility rely on tracing principles to account for derivative moral responsibility. Manuel Vargas has argued that such principles are problematic. To show this, he presents cases where individuals are derivatively blameworthy for their conduct, but where there is no suitable earlier time to which their blameworthiness can be traced back. John Martin Fischer and Neal Tognazzini have sought to resolve this problem by arguing that blameworthiness in these scenarios can be tr…Read more
  •  1022
    In this paper, I examine a new line of response to Frankfurt’s challenge to the traditional association of moral responsibility with the ability to do otherwise. According to this response, Frankfurt’s counterexample strategy fails, not in light of the conditions for moral responsibility per se, but in view of the conditions for action. Specifically, it is claimed, a piece of behavior counts as an action only if it is within the agent’s power to avoid performing it. In so far as Frankfurt’s chal…Read more
  •  181
    Uncompromising source incompatibilism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2): 349-383. 2010.