Shanna Slank

In this paper, we aim to provide an adequate normative analysis of the phenomenon of Covid-19 vaccine refusal. We argue that all vaccine-refusers make a moral mistake on the double grounds that the act of refusing to get vaccinated is a free-riding action and a negligent one. We then introduce four archetypes of vaccine refusers in order to further explore under what conditions this moral mistake makes one blameworthy. We maintain that there are both epistemic and motivational considerations that make a difference to one’s blameworthiness for their vaccine refusal and offer some preliminary claims about which epistemic errors and which motivational errors can, in fact, ground blameworthiness. We conclude the paper with some remarks on the complicated connection between blameworthiness and blame, and on why we think the aim of normative analysis should not be to dole out blame.

The notions of “ideal theory” and “nonideal theory” have become widely accepted in political philosophy. Recently, several philosophers’ have urged that ideal theory systematically produces practically irrelevant theories. Such philosophers argue that political philosophy ought move away from ideal theory in order to make the discipline more germane to the unjust real world. Call this tactic of eliminating ideal theory “Strategy.” In this paper, I argue that political philosophy would do well to abandon the ideal/nonideal distinction. Though the use of INID is widespread, philosophers do not have one uniform way of drawing the distinction; of the several common ways of drawing the distinction, none is categorical. As a consequence of this ambiguity, the role that INID plays in our political philosophical theorizing has become pernicious.