•  571
    In Defense of Moral Evidentialism
    Logos and Episteme 6 (4): 405-427. 2015.
    This paper is a defense of moral evidentialism, the view that we have a moral obligation to form the doxastic attitude that is best supported by our evidence. I will argue that two popular arguments against moral evidentialism are weak. I will also argue that our commitments to the moral evaluation of actions require us to take doxastic obligations seriously.
  •  257
    What is wisdom?
    Philosophical Studies 93 (2): 119-139. 1999.
  •  133
    The preface paradox
    Philosophical Studies 64 (3): 293-307. 1991.
  •  122
    The logic of rationality
    Philosophia 27 (1-2): 287-299. 1999.
  •  116
    The epistemic virtues of consistency
    Synthese 109 (2): 121-141. 1996.
    The lottery paradox has been discussed widely. The standard solution to the lottery paradox is that a ticket holder is justified in believing each ticket will lose but the ticket holder is also justified in believing not all of the tickets will lose. If the standard solution is true, then we get the paradoxical result that it is possible for a person to have a justified set of beliefs that she knows is inconsistent. In this paper, I argue that the best solution to the paradox is that a ticket ho…Read more
  •  106
    Wisdom
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
  •  94
    Does warrant entail truth?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1): 183-192. 1996.
    Although ‘warrant’ has been used to mean something like ‘justified to the degree required for knowledge’, it has recently come to mean something else. Alvin Plantinga has recently used the word ‘warrant’ to mean “that, whatever precisely it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief.” So, in Plantinga’s sense of the word, warrant is the justification condition plus some other condition designed to rule out Gettier examples. In almost all cases, reliabilists, foundation…Read more
  •  68
    The logic of rationality
    Philosophia 26 (3-4): 525-528. 1998.
  •  4
    Epistemic Humility, Defeat, and a Defense of Moderate Skepticism
    In Cherie Braden, Rodrigo Borges & Branden Fitelson (eds.), Themes From Klein, Springer Verlag. 2019.
  • Wisdom and The Good Life
    with Shane Ryan
    In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. forthcoming.
  • Rational Belief in the Impossible
    Dissertation, The University of Rochester. 1991.
    It is commonly assumed that if one's beliefs are epistemically rational, then those beliefs must at least be consistent with one another. I argue that this assumption is false. I argue that it can be epistemically rational for a person to believe an inconsistent set of statements. I argue further that while one can rationally believe an inconsistent set of statements, one cannot rationally believe a set of statements that she or he knows to be inconsistent. ;In opposition, versions of the "Prefa…Read more