New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
  •  1330
    The limits of morality
    Oxford University Press. 1989.
    Most people believe that there are limits to the sacrifices that morality can demand. Although it would often be meritorious, we are not, in fact, morally required to do all that we can to promote overall good. What's more, most people also believe that certain types of acts are simply forbidden, morally off limits, even when necessary for promoting the overall good. In this provocative analysis Kagan maintains that despite the intuitive appeal of these views, they cannot be adequately defended.…Read more
  •  1216
    Do I Make a Difference?
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (2): 105-141. 2011.
  •  813
    What’s Wrong with Speciesism
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1): 1-21. 2015.
    Peter Singer famously argued in Animal Liberation that almost all of us are speciesists, unjustifiably favoring the interests of humans over the similar interests of other animals. Although I long found that charge compelling, I now find myself having doubts. This article starts by trying to get clear about the nature of speciesism, and then argues that Singer's attempt to show that speciesism is a mere prejudice is unsuccessful. I also argue that most of us are not actually speciesists at all, …Read more
  •  618
  •  613
    For Hierarchy in Animal Ethics
    Journal of Practical Ethics 6 (1): 1-18. 2018.
    In my forthcoming book, How to Count Animals, More or Less (based on my 2016 Uehiro Lectures in Practical Ethics), I argue for a hierarchical approach to animal ethics according to which animals have moral standing but nonetheless have a lower moral status than people have. This essay is an overview of that book, drawing primarily from selections from its beginning and end, aiming both to give a feel for the overall project and to indicate the general shape of the hierarchical position that I de…Read more
  •  560
    Rethinking intrinsic value
    The Journal of Ethics 2 (4): 277-297. 1998.
    According to the dominant philosophical tradition, intrinsic value must depend solely upon intrinsic properties. By appealing to various examples, however, I argue that we should at least leave open the possibility that in some cases intrinsic value may be based in part on relational properties. Indeed, I argue that we should even be open to the possibility that an object''s intrinsic value may sometimes depend (in part) on its instrumental value. If this is right, of course, then the traditiona…Read more
  •  468
    Infinite value and finitely additive value theory
    Journal of Philosophy 94 (1): 5-26. 1997.
    000000001. Introduction Call a theory of the good—be it moral or prudential—aggregative just in case (1) it recognizes local (or location-relative) goodness, and (2) the goodness of states of affairs is based on some aggregation of local goodness. The locations for local goodness might be points or regions in time, space, or space-time; or they might be people, or states of nature.1 Any method of aggregation is allowed: totaling, averaging, measuring the equality of the distribution, measuring t…Read more
  •  444
    The Limits of Well-Being
    Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (2): 169-189. 1992.
    What are the limits of well-being? This question nicely captures one of the central debates concerning the nature of the individual human good. For rival theories differ as to what sort of facts directly constitute a person's being well-off. On some views, well-being is limited to the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. But other views push the boundaries of well-being beyond this, so that it encompasses a variety of mental states, not merely pleasure alone. Some theories then draw the…Read more
  •  396
    Me and My Life
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 309-324. 1994.
    In this paper I take some initial steps toward exploring and motivating the suggestion that quality of life and level of well-being do not come to the same thing.
  •  383
    Thinking about Cases
    Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2): 44. 2001.
    Anyone who reflects on the way we go about arguing for or against moral claims is likely to be struck by the central importance we give to thinking about cases. Intuitive reactions to cases—real or imagined—are carefully noted, and then appealed to as providing reason to accept various claims. When trying on a general moral theory for size, for example, we typically get a feel for its overall plausibility by considering its implications in a range of cases. Similarly, when we try to refine the s…Read more
  •  371
    Death
    Yale University Press. 2012.
    There is one thing we can be sure of: we are all going to die. But once we accept that fact, the questions begin. In this thought-provoking book, philosophy professor Shelly Kagan examines the myriad questions that arise when we confront the meaning of mortality. Do we have reason to believe in the existence of immortal souls? Or should we accept an account according to which people are just material objects, nothing more? Can we make sense of the idea of surviving the death of one’s body? If I …Read more
  •  301
    The structure of normative ethics
    Philosophical Perspectives 6 223-242. 1992.
  •  192
    Defending options
    Ethics 104 (2): 333-351. 1994.
  •  150
    Shelly Kagan's The Limits of MoralityThe Limits of Morality (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4): 903. 1991.
  •  138
    10. The Badness of Death
    In Death, Yale University Press. pp. 205-233. 2012.
  •  137
    Why Study Philosophy?
    Frontiers of Philosophy in China 8 (2): 258-265. 2013.
  •  101
    The Geometry of Desert
    Oxford University Press. 2005.
    Moral desert -- Fault forfeits first -- Desert graphs -- Skylines -- Other shapes -- Placing peaks -- The ratio view -- Similar offense -- Graphing comparative desert -- Variation -- Groups -- Desert taken as a whole -- Reservations.
  •  96
    Thinking by Drawing
    Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 11 (2): 245-283. 2018.
    The Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics interviewed Kagan about his formative years; his work on death, the moral status of animals, and desert; his views on changing one’s mind and convergence in philosophy; and his advice for graduate students in moral philosophy.
  •  88
    Causation, liability, and internalism
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (1): 41-59. 1986.
  •  86
    11. Immortality
    In Death, Yale University Press. pp. 234-246. 2012.
  •  83
    Replies to My Critics (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4): 919-928. 1991.
  •  80
    Precis of The Limits of MoralityThe Limits of Morality (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4): 897. 1991.
  •  80
    Causation and Responsibility
    American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (4). 1988.
  •  79
    The paradox of methods
    Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (2): 148-168. 2018.
    Many proposed moral principles are such that it would be difficult or impossible to always correctly identify which act is required by that principle in a given situation. To deal with this problem, theorists typically offer various methods of determining what to do in the face of epistemic limitations, and we are then told that the right thing to do – given these limitations – is to perform the act identified by the given method. But since the method and the underlying principle can diverge, it…Read more
  •  68
    3. Arguments for the Existence of the Soul
    In Death, Yale University Press. pp. 24-56. 2012.
  •  66
    Deontological Desert
    Philosophies 7 (1): 8. 2022.
    Although the nature of moral desert has sometimes been examined in axiological terms—focusing on the thought that it is a good thing if people get what they deserve—deontologists typically think desert is more appropriately treated in terms of duties and obligations. They may, for example, prefer to talk in terms of there being a moral duty to give people what they deserve. This essay distinguishes a number of forms such a duty might take, and examines four of them more closely. (In particular, …Read more
  •  65
    The Costs of Transitivity: Thoughts on Larry Temkin’s Rethinking the Good
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (4): 462-478. 2015.
    In Rethinking the Good, Larry Temkin argues that the common belief in the transitivity of better than is incompatible with various other value judgments to which many of us are deeply committed; accordingly, we should take seriously the possibility that the better than relation is not, in fact, a transitive one. However, although Temkin is right, I think, about the mutual incompatibility of the beliefs in question, for the most part his examples don’t leave me inclined to deny transitivity. None…Read more