Shlomit C. Schuster

In this paper I describe and analyze the need for an alternative, non-clinical approach to counseling, i.e., philosophical counseling. Throughout the first part of this paper. I aim to prove pragmatically the truth or validity of this new non-clinical approach to counseling by describing its effectiveness in a case-study. In the second part, I suggest that many philosophers have made use of philosophical self-diagnosis and self-help to improve their own well-being, although for their private practice of philosophy they did not use the words I have chosen here. I exemplify this by analyzing the representative life narrative of Jean-Jacques Rousseau as a case study.

At the close of this psychotherapeutic century, an alternative to psychotherapy has begun to emerge: the use of philosophy as guidance in order to ameliorate everyday life situations. This new approach to so?called psychological problems, consisting of various forms of open?ended dialogue and reflection on life, may prevent or resolve many of the ?illnesses? for which people seek psychiatric or psychological treatment. If successful, philosophical counseling would mark not only a radical shift in the direction of psychological care, but a radical return to the original, practical purposes of philosophy.

This essence is the philosophy of knowledge for personal and social well-being aspects of the contribution. In the Introduction to "What is philosophical counseling practice or philosophy?", I described the ancient philosophy has been caring for the soul and tradition of self, in the last twenty-five years has been the revitalization of philosophers and others up. "Philosophy of psychological analysis," "philosophical counseling hotline", and "personal well-being and Philosophy Cafe" is a contemporary German philosopher Gerd B. Achenbach, British theologian Chad Varah, and the French philosopher Marc Sautet these ideas for specific application situation. In the "philosophy of charity", I argue, the possibility for all practical philosophy, the charity as a necessary test of suspicion

ABSTRACT A new phenomenon in the philosophical discipline, philosophical practice—or counselling—is introduced to the reader through the description of three different approaches to philosophical practice. What is common to these approaches is that an academically trained philosopher philosophises together with a ‘sane’person—the visitor—on questions and problems relevant to the visitor. The essential difference between this and psychological counselling is that philosophers do not use therapeutic methods or make diagnoses. The philosophical practitioner triggers in his dialogue partner a didactic philosophical process, which enables the visitor to become an authentic thinker and eventually to arrive at philosophical answers by her/himself. The effectiveness of the language used in philosophical practice is not so much in applying philosophical ideas or theories as in the philosophical knowledge, skills and attitudes attained by the visitor.

Outlined are several ways in which philosophical knowledge can contribute to personal and social well-being. In the introduction, "What is Philosophical Practice, Counseling, and Psychoanalysis" I describe how the ancient philosophical tradition of care for the soul or self has been revived among philosophers and others in the last twenty-five years. The sections "The Philosophical Counseling Hotline" and "Personal Well-being and the Philosophical Café '" are accounts of specific applications of ideas of the contemporary German philosopher Gerd B. Achenbach, the founder of the international philosophical practice movement. In the conclusion "Philosophical Benevolence" I argue for benevolence as a skeptical touchstone for philosophy in practice

In this paper I describe and analyze the need for an alternative, non-clinical approach to counseling, i.e., philosophical counseling. Throughout the first part of this paper. I aim to prove pragmatically the truth or validity of this new non-clinical approach to counseling by describing its effectiveness in a case-study. In the second part, I suggest that many philosophers have made use of philosophical self-diagnosis and self-help to improve their own well-being, although for their private practice of philosophy they did not use the words I have chosen here. I exemplify this by analyzing the representative life narrative of Jean-Jacques Rousseau as a case study.