My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: compatibilism
God: theism and atheism Lean toward: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept an intermediate view
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Agnostic/undecided
Logic: classical and non-classical Lean toward: classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Lean toward: internalism interested in Husserl's phenomenological reduction as an explanation of our thoughts 'reaching' the external world.
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Agnostic/undecided
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Lean toward: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Agnostic/undecided
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Accept: two boxes
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept: deontology
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Lean toward: representationalism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Skip
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: libertarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Skip
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Skip
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Lean toward: survival
Time: A-theory and B-theory Lean toward: A-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Accept: don't switch In accord with Judith Jarvis Thomson, I maintain that I do not have the moral right to sacrifice the one for the five (so long as I am merely a bystander)
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept more than one
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible