My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes Don't believe there is/can be a clear-cut division between the a priori and the a posteriori.
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept an intermediate view Externalism is unhelpful.
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: compatibilism
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Lean toward: rationalism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: invariantism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Logic: classical and non-classical Agnostic/undecided
Mental content: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: non-physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Lean toward: internalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept: deontology
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Accept more than one
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: communitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific anti-realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Lean toward: death
Time: A-theory and B-theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Accept: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: deflationary
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible