•  174
    Religious Democracy and the Liberal Principle of Legitimacy
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2): 135-68. 2009.
    I argue against Rawls's claim that the liberal principle of legitimacy would be selected in the original position in addition to a democratic principle. Since a religious democracy could satisfy the democratic principle, the parties in the original position would not exclude it as illegitimate.
  •  165
    Directed Duties
    Philosophy Compass 10 (8): 523-532. 2015.
    Directed duties are duties that an agent owes to some party – a party who would be wronged if the duty were violated. A ‘direction problem’ asks what it is about a duty in virtue of which it is directed towards one party, if any, rather than another. I discuss three theories of moral direction: control, demand and interest theories. Although none of these theories can be rejected out of hand, all three face serious difficulties
  •  139
    Moral Status and the Direction of Duties
    Ethics 123 (1): 113-128. 2012.
    Gopal Sreenivasan’s “hybrid theory” states that a moral duty is directed toward an individual because her interests justify the assignment of control over the duty. An alternative “plain theory” states that the individual’s interests justify the duty itself. I argue that a strong moral status constraint explains Sreenivasan’s instrumentalization objection to a Razian plain theory but that his own model violates this constraint. I suggest how both approaches can be reformulated to satisfy the con…Read more
  •  133
    Moral Compromise, Civic Friendship, and Political Reconciliation
    Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14 (5): 581-602. 2011.
    Instrumentalism about moral compromise in politics appears inconsistent with accepting both the existence of non-instrumental or principled reasons for moral compromise in close personal friendships and a rich ideal of civic friendship. Using a robust conception of political reconciliation during democratic transitions as an example of civic friendship, I argue that all three claims are compatible. Spouses have principled reasons for compromise because they commit to sharing responsibility for t…Read more
  •  133
    Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (4): 317-348. 2005.
    I argue against the claim that there are principled as well as pragmatic reasons for compromise in politics, even within the context of reasonable moral disagreements such as the abortion controversy.
  •  122
    What We May Demand of Each Other
    Analysis 73 (3): 554-563. 2013.
    In this critical notice of Gerald Gaus's The Order of Public Reason, I reject two arguments Gaus advances for the claim that social moral rules must be publicly justified.
  •  89
    Liberal Feminism and the Ethics of Polygamy
    In Daniela Cutas & Sarah Chan (eds.), Families - Beyond the Nuclear Ideal, Bloomsbury Academic. 2012.
    I distinguish two ways that a cultural practice may be inherently objectionable. I reject the claim that polygamy is inherently "vicious" because asymmetric marriages are inevitably inegalitarian. I argue that there is good reason to think polygamy is inherently "bankrupt" insofar as a cultural ideal of asymmetric marriage presupposes stereotypical gender roles.
  •  79
    Democratic Legitimacy, Legal Expressivism, and Religious Establishment
    Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (2): 219-238. 2012.
    I argue that some instances of constitutional religious establishment can be consistent with an expressivist interpretation of democratic legitimacy. Whether official religious endorsements disparage or exclude religious minorities depends on a number of contextual considerations, including the philosophical content of the religion in question, the attitudes of the majority, and the underlying purpose of the official status of the religious doctrine.
  •  41
    Address, Interests, and Directed Duties
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 39 (2): 194-201. 2021.
    Rowan Cruft offers an addressive account of directed duties and claim-rights. He claims that the direction of a duty is constituted by two requirements of address between the parties: the right holder must conceive of the action as `to be done to me’ and the duty bearer must conceive of it as to be ‘done to you’. Cruft also argues against accounts of direction and claim-rights that reduce the relation between the parties to nonrelational facts. One such reductive account is the justificatory int…Read more
  •  38
    The Two Faces of Justice (review)
    Philosophical Review 117 (3): 448-451. 2008.
  •  33
    Interactive Justice and Democratic Authority
    Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22 (4): 459-465. 2019.
    I raise two critical points about Emanuela Ceva’s theory of interactive justice. First, I argue the value of individual dignity is insufficient in itself to establish principles of interactive justice, but that the lacuna can be filled by an account of democratic authority. Second, I argue that realising interactive justice in political conflict management is better understood as a form of quasi-pure proceduralism rather than intrinsic proceduralism. This is because the moral quality of a decisi…Read more
  •  30
    Why Strict Compliance?
    In David Sobel, Steven Wall & Peter Vallentyne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Volume 7, Oxford University Press. pp. 227-264. 2021.
    I present an interpretation of ideal theory that is grounded in the idea of society as a fair scheme of cooperation, which Rawls describes as the most fundamental idea of justice as fairness. A key element of the Rawlsian idea of cooperation, I claim, is that the individual participants of a genuinely cooperative scheme—whatever its scale—are morally accountable to each other for complying with the scheme’s rules. This means that each participant has the moral standing to demand of the others th…Read more
  •  24
    Utilitarianism: Restorations, Repairs, Renovations (review)
    Philosophical Review 116 (1): 121-124. 2007.
  •  13
    Bohman on Domination and Epistemic Injustice
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (1): 7-12. 2012.
    James Bohman proposes a republican conception of epistemic injustice as an alternative to Miranda Fricker’s virtue theoretical account. The key element in Bohman’s approach is the concept of domination, one of the central concepts in republican political theory more generally. He claims that all cases of epistemic injustice involve forms of domination, and that institutional mechanisms of non-domination are accordingly necessary to remedy epistemic injustice. I agree with Bohman that there are i…Read more
  •  13
    Desires, Interests, and Claim-Rights
    In Mark McBride (ed.), New Essays on the Nature of Rights, Hart. pp. 85-98. 2017.
    Leif Wenar’s kind-desire theory states that an individual holds a claim-right against an agent only because she has reason to desire, as a member of a particular social or natural kind, that the agent fulfil his duty. He argues that the kind-desire theory is superior to the interest theory of claim-rights, which states that an individual holds a claim-right against an agent only because his duty is in some manner beneficial to her. I compare the merits of the kind-desire theory and a justificator…Read more
  •  11
    No Compromise on Racial Equality
    In Christian F. Rostbøll & Theresa Scavenius (eds.), Compromise and Disagreement in Contemporary Political Theory, Routledge. pp. 34-49. 2017.
    I use the example of racial equality to examine the relationship between the ideal of political legitimacy and the idea that there are some moral limits to political compromise. I defend a principle that rules out certain compromises of racial equality as impermissible violations of legitimacy, but that also provides democratic activists with significant moral latitude in undemocratic contexts. Legitimacy sets these limits on compromise, I argue, because of its role in creating a moral framework…Read more
  •  11
    A powerful objection to civil marriage claims that it violates the principle of liberal neutrality because the institution implies state endorsement of matrimony as an ideal type of personal relationship. The chapter argues that this neutrality objection is cogent only if certain empirical conditions fail to be met. These conditions concern both the nature and the effects of the social norms that stipulate the intentions and beliefs necessary for good faith entrance into marriage. In certain cir…Read more
  •  11
    Exemptions for Conscience
    In Cécile Laborde and Aurélia Bardon (ed.), Religion in Liberal Political Philosophy. pp. 191-203. 2017.
    The Moral Conscience principle claims that a conflict between the demands of a law and the demands of an individual’s sincere moral conscience provides her with a defeasible moral entitlement to an exemption. This chapter argues that this principle is vulnerable to an unfairness objection. There is nothing special about moral conscience that would justify granting an exemption, it claims, that is not shared by a variety of non-moral projects. Thus, there is no principled moral reason for a defea…Read more
  •  9
    Contempt, Futility, and Exemption
    In Kevin Vallier & Michael Weber (eds.), Religious Exemptions, . pp. 59-73. 2018.
    Exemptions from laws of general application are sometimes granted on the basis of an individual’s unwillingness to comply with the law. Most such volitional exemptions involve a conflict between the law and the demands of an individual’s religious or secular moral convictions. I argue here that a limited number of volitional exemptions can be justified on the basis of a futility principle. When otherwise morally permissible penalties for violating the law cannot be expected to induce the complia…Read more
  •  8
    Compromise in Negotiation
    In Jack Knight (ed.), Compromise: NOMOS LIX, Nyu Press. pp. 150-166. 2018.
    Since compromise is the paradigmatic feature of negotiation, we should expect contemporary negotiation theory to be able to explain its place in dispute resolution. In her contribution to this volume, Amy Cohen argues that orthodox accounts of negotiation—in particular, the model of "principled negotiation" developed by Roger Fisher and William Ury—fail in this task. I argue that the principled negotiation model can accommodate the forms of compromise Cohen identifies. However, two types of erro…Read more
  •  2
    Compromise
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley. 2022.
    Compromise is an inescapable part of human coexistence, from the mundane choices of domestic life to the grand stage of world politics. Notwithstanding its ubiquity, compromise raises a number of philosophical puzzles. One kind of problem is conceptual: what is compromise, and how might it differ from similar social phenomena, such as consensus and bargaining? A second kind of problem concerns the murky ethics of compromise, particularly on matters of moral significance. Compromise may have a sa…Read more
  •  1
    The Significance of Moral Disagreement
    Dissertation, Stanford University. 2004.
    The dissertation concerns the significance moral disagreement has for liberal democratic political philosophy. A distinction is drawn between intrinsic and extrinsic appeals to moral disagreement. An intrinsic appeal assumes that moral disagreement is in itself a reason against a political position, whereas an extrinsic appeal only assumes that moral disagreement is contingently connected to independent considerations against it. The thesis of the dissertation is that we have no good reason to t…Read more