I work on the problem of free will, more specifically on whether doubting free will might be incompatible with different things: rationality, good deliberation, moral obligations, etc.
In general, I am interested in the intersection of ethics and philosophy of action (e.g. moral responsibility, double effect, consent, praiseworthiness vs blameworthiness); the intersection of ethics and epistemology (e.g. ignorance, epistemic duties, conflict between theoretical and practical reasons, different forms of scepticism and debunking arguments), and of epistemology and philosophy of action (e.g. intending to do the impossible, prediction and delibe…
I work on the problem of free will, more specifically on whether doubting free will might be incompatible with different things: rationality, good deliberation, moral obligations, etc.
In general, I am interested in the intersection of ethics and philosophy of action (e.g. moral responsibility, double effect, consent, praiseworthiness vs blameworthiness); the intersection of ethics and epistemology (e.g. ignorance, epistemic duties, conflict between theoretical and practical reasons, different forms of scepticism and debunking arguments), and of epistemology and philosophy of action (e.g. intending to do the impossible, prediction and deliberation, self-defeating attitudes).
