Siraprapa Chavanayarn

This article undertakes an epistemological analysis to explore the ethical complexities of ChatGPT, an AI system. While ethical concerns regarding AI have received considerable attention, the epistemological dimension has been largely neglected. By integrating epistemology, the study aims to deepen our understanding of the ethical issues associated with ChatGPT. Four specific issues are examined: ChatGPT's role in testimony, its potential designation as an expert, the influence of user epistemic limitations and vices, and the impact of algorithmic bias on ChatGPT. The study's findings contribute to an inclusive comprehension of the ethical implications arising from the epistemological complexities of ChatGPT. They reveal the limitations of ChatGPT as a trustworthy source of testimony, attributable to its lack of genuine understanding. The blurring of boundaries between AI-generated information and authentic expertise is identified as a significant concern. Furthermore, the study underscores the necessity of addressing the epistemic limitations and biases of users to foster responsible decision-making and prevent the perpetuation of flawed knowledge. Finally, the ethical ramifications of algorithmic bias in ChatGPT are explored, emphasizing its impact on societal fairness and justice.

This article defends Digital Humanities (DH) against important epistemological challenges questioning its place within the humanities. It emphasizes that while DH incorporates digital technologies, notably AI technologies, it remains fundamentally aligned with the humanities through its focus on understanding and appreciating the creation of human-made things such as literature, philosophy, and culture. Addressing epistemic critiques of DH’s knowledge characteristics, its supportive roles in research, and the efficacy of its tools, the article advocates an anti-essentialist viewpoint. This approach proposes that DH’s diverse methodologies enrich rather than dilute the humanities. By applying the idea of anti-essentialism, especially Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance, to understanding the concept of humanities, the article argues for a broader, more inclusive understanding of the humanities, underscoring DH’s legitimate role in this evolving field.

The pervasive issue of fake news poses a formidable challenge to knowledge acquisition, further complicated by the difficulty in distinguishing it from legitimate information due to human epistemic limitations. This article argues for the necessity of adopting contextual strategies to effectively combat the spread of fake news. Through a focused examination of COVID-19-related fake news in Thailand, it explores how unique national characteristics can shape tailored approaches to mitigate this problem. The analysis draws on the theoretical insights of David Coady and Regina Rini, advocating for the integration of an open science framework to enhance transparency and public access to information. Despite the potential benefits of an open science culture, the persistence of epistemic vices among the populace may limit its effectiveness in reducing the acceptance of fake news. This article proposes that, instead of using law enforcement or fact-checking organizations, the Thai government and media entities play a critical role in addressing epistemic shortcomings and fostering epistemic virtues. However, it emphasizes that the effectiveness of these approaches is contingent upon their adaptability to the socio-cultural and epistemological context of Thailand. The discussion highlights the importance of recognizing and accommodating these contextual differences in devising strategies against the dissemination of fake news.

This article examines the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within the global social media landscape, using Southeast Asia as a case study. It explores how X (formerly known as Twitter) holds the potential to cultivate a digital public sphere that embodies justice and equitable dialogue, compared with major platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok. Beginning with an introduction to epistemic injustice, the article contextualizes its significance in Southeast Asia, highlighting the region’s digital challenges and opportunities. It then proposes characteristics necessary for ideal social media platforms, drawing on Habermas’s public sphere and Rawls’s justice principles to advocate for spaces that promote inclusive and rational discourse. The core analysis centers on X, suggesting that its features could make it a superior choice for fostering a just digital environment globally. The article recommends specific improvements for X to evolve into an ideal social platform, addressing challenges such as cyberbullying, echo chambers, and misinformation. The conclusion emphasizes the importance of prioritizing epistemic justice in social media platforms to achieve a more inclusive and fairer digital public sphere, with Southeast Asia serving as a representative example of a less-than-ideal environment where such platforms could thrive.

This article’s objective is to suggest that epistemic injustice is an important barrier to establishing an open science culture in Thailand. Open science is a movement that aims to remove the barriers between scientists (or scientific researchers) and laypeople, and epistemic injustice refers to unfairness due to aspects of knowledge. In Thailand, many barriers to establishing open science have been identified, including the education system, Thai culture, Thai national policies, and laypeople’s cognitive limitations. However, many barriers conceptually can be called epistemic injustice; therefore, reducing epistemic injustice is an effective way to establish an open science culture in Thailand.

Most epistemologists agree that testimony is an important source of knowledge. However, they fundamentally disagree whether it is a basic source as perception or not. The reductionist standpoint concerning testimony holds that, testimony is not a basic source of knowledge, so hearers cannot justify about what they are told simply on the basis of the testimony of speakers. The justification of testimony comes from other basic sources such as perception, reason and consciousness. However, in this article, I will propose a problem of some reductionist arguments. That is, although the arguments can reject testimony as a basic source of knowledge, other sources which are generally accepted as basic sources of knowledge are rejected as well.