•  17
    Crossmodal Aesthetics: How Music and Dance Can Match
    Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2): 223-240. 2021.
    The relationship between music and dance can sometimes be a ‘match’, a remarkable fit between the audible manifestation that music is and the visual or kinaesthetic manifestation that dance is. A match between two things seems to require a common measure with respect to which the match obtains. What can this be for two so different phenomena as music and dance? I argue that the most promising answer is: movement. This answer will not be satisfactory unless the movement of music and the movement …Read more
  •  15
    Depicting Movement
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1): 34-47. 2021.
    ABSTRACT The paper addresses an underexplored puzzle about pictorial representation, a puzzle about how depiction of movement is possible. One aim is to clarify what the puzzle is. It might seem to concern a conflict between the nature of static surfaces and the dynamic things that they can depict. But the real conflict generating the puzzle is between the pictorial mode of presentation and what can be seen in pictures. A second aim of the paper is to solve the puzzle. While many take it that de…Read more
  •  27
    Depicting Movement
    Tandf: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1-14. forthcoming.
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  •  60
    Spatial aspects of olfactory experience
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (8): 1041-1061. 2019.
    Several theorists argue that one does not experience something as being at or coming from a distance or direction in olfaction. In contrast to this, I suggest that there can be a variety of spatial aspects of both synchronic and diachronic olfactory experiences, including spatial distance and direction. I emphasise, however, that these are not aspects of every olfactory experience. Thus, I suggest renouncing the widespread assumption there is a uniform account of the nature, including the spatia…Read more
  •  75
    Object‐Dependent Thought Without Illusion
    European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1): 68-84. 2017.
    When unknowingly experiencing a perceptual hallucination, a subject can attempt to think specifically about what is, as far as he or she can tell, the perceived object. Is the subject then deceived about his or her cognitive situation? I answer negatively. Moreover, I argue that this answer is compatible with holding that thought specifically about a certain object – singular thought – is object-dependent. By contrast, both critics and advocates of the view that singular thought is object-depend…Read more
  •  94
    Pictures, presence and visibility
    Philosophical Studies 173 (1): 187-203. 2016.
    This paper outlines a ‘perceptual account’ of depiction. It centrally contrasts with experiential accounts of depiction in that seeing something in a picture is understood as a visual experience of something present in the picture, rather than as a visual experience of something absent. The experience of a picture is in this respect akin to a veridical rather than hallucinatory perceptual experience on a perceptual account. Thus, the central selling-point of a perceptual account is that it allow…Read more
  •  60
    Visibility Constraints in Depiction: Objects Experienced versus Objects Depicted
    Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265): 665-679. 2016.
    It is widely accepted that pictures can only depict visible things. The paper criticises this ‘visibility constraint’ on the objects of depiction. The constraint is shown to imply that the range of visibilia is settled prior to an investigation of what can be seen in pictures. By contrast to this, I suggest that settling what can be seen in pictures is relevant to settling the range of visibilia. It is what we experience in pictures, and not the objects of depiction, that is subject to a visibil…Read more