Sonia Maria Pavel

This paper develops a critical normative analysis of charter schools. It categorizes and evaluates the main arguments in defense of charters: market competition, improved learning outcomes, autonomy and innovation, and their potential to function as “counterpublics.”After finding each argument wanting, the paper proposes a tripartite critique of charters based on (i) their deleterious effects on social solidarity, (ii) the procedural injustice involved in access, and (iii) their substantively unjust outcomes. We show how charter schools under-mine social and political solidarity by fragmenting communities into more homogenous subsets. Although they purport to be equally open to all, charters covertly rely on morally arbitrary characteristics such as class, race, and disability in admissions. Finally, we argue that they unfairly reduce the quality of education for some students, thus resulting in substantively unjust outcomes.

The authors argue that from the perspective of distributive justice, school district fragmentation—meaning both the existing reality of hyper-proliferated school districts and the practice of further breaking larger districts into smaller ones—produces three distinct injustices. First, it undermines racial solidarity and the bonds of community. Second, it violates the demands of procedural justice. And third, it leads to substantively unfair outcomes. Taken together, these concerns suggest that to create a more just educational system we ought to resist further fragmentation and push for larger, more consolidated school districts coupled with progressive redistributive funding. To support this central normative argument, the article provides two justifications for conceptualizing education as a fundamental entitlement and its provision as a form of mutual aid.

Most critics of our contemporary meritocratic practices and institutions believe their arguments speak to the defects of the ideal of meritocracy itself. I argue that this is a misguided generalization because meritocracy can take many forms depending on the conception of the good and broader theory of justice to which the distributive principle of merit it is attached. To illustrate, I contrast two radically different forms of meritocracy – a telic or end-oriented model based on Plato’s Kallipolis and a procedural model inherent in our free market of careers open to talents. Far from being a unified ideal, meritocracy is a spectrum of social and political arrangements, ranging between the telic and the procedural poles. Thus, identifying ‘merit’ and ‘meritocracy’ as the main sources of injustice in our contemporary societies further conceals the background conditions and underlying commitments that should be subject to our critical scrutiny.