•  572
    Moral Extremism
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (4): 615-629. 2020.
    The word ‘extremist’ is often used pejoratively, but it’s not clear what, if anything, is wrong with extremism. My project is to give an account of moral extremism as a vice. It consists roughly in having moral convictions so intense that they cause a sort of moral tunnel vision, pushing salient competing considerations out of mind. We should be interested in moral extremism for several reasons: it’s consequential, it’s insidious – we don’t expect immorality to arise from excessive devotion to m…Read more
  •  459
    Small Evils and Live Options
    Philosophia Christi 22 (2): 307-321. 2020.
    Many philosophers have thought that aggregates of small, broadly dispersed evils don’t pose the same sort of challenge to theism that horrendous evils like the Nazi Holocaust do. But there are interesting arguments that purport to show that large enough aggregates of small evils are morally and axiologically equivalent to horrendous evils. Herein lies an intriguing and overlooked strategy for defending theism. In short: small evils, or aggregates of such evils, don’t provide decisive evidence ag…Read more
  •  165
    The Normative Error Theorist Cannot Avoid Self-Defeat
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1): 92-104. 2019.
    Many philosophers have noted that normative error theorists appear to be committed to saying ‘Error theory is true, but I have no reason to believe it’, which seems paradoxical. In defence of error...
  •  160
    From Epistemic to Moral Realism
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (5): 541-562. 2019.
  •  134
    What does it mean to object to a moral theory, such as maximizing consequentialism, on the grounds that it is too demanding? It is apparently to say that its requirements are implausibly stringent. This suggests an obvious response: Modify the theory so that its requirements are no longer as stringent. A consequentialist may do this either by placing the requirement threshold below maximization – thereby arriving at satisficing consequentialism – or, more radically, by dispensing with deontologi…Read more
  •  113
    Political Conviction and Epistemic Injustice
    Philosophia 49 (1): 197-216. 2020.
    Epistemic injustice occurs when we fail to appropriately respect others as epistemic agents. Philosophers building on the work of Miranda Fricker, who introduced the concept, have focused on epistemic injustices involving certain social categories, particularly race and gender. Can there be epistemic injustice attached to political conviction and affiliation? I argue yes: politics can be a salient social category that draws epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustices might also be intersectional, …Read more
  •  81
    Normative Pluralism Worthy of the Name is False
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (1): 1-20. 2016.
    Normative pluralism is the view that practical reason consists in an irreducible plurality of normative domains, that these domains sometimes issue conflicting recommendations and that, when this happens, there is never any one thing that one ought simpliciter to do. Here I argue against this view, noting that normative pluralism must be either unrestricted or restricted. Unrestricted pluralism maintains that all coherent standards are reason-generating normative domains, whereas restricted plur…Read more
  •  68
    A Limited Defense of the Kalām Cosmological Argument
    Res Philosophica 94 (1): 165-175. 2017.
    The kalām cosmological argument proceeds from the claims that everything with a beginning has a cause of its existence, and that the universe has a beginning. It follows that the universe has a cause of its existence. Presumably, this cause is God. Some defenders of the argument contend that, since we don’t see things randomly coming into existence, we know from experience that everything with a beginning has a cause of its existence. Against this, some critics argue that we may not legitimately…Read more
  •  66
    Regina Rini, The Ethics of Microaggression
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (4): 427-430. 2022.
  •  57
    Speech and Morality: on the Metaethical Implications of Speaking (review)
    Tradition and Discovery 42 (1): 59-62. 2015.
  •  29
    Dark Matter of the Mind: the Culturally Articulated Unconscious (review)
    Tradition and Discovery 45 (2): 55-58. 2019.
  •  20
    Micro-Digressions
    The Philosophers' Magazine 96 119-120. 2022.
  •  19
    Vanishing into Things: Knowledge in Chinese Tradition (review)
    Tradition and Discovery 43 (1): 79-83. 2017.