•  131
    Why Reasons Skepticism is Not Self‐Defeating
    European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3): 424-449. 2011.
    : Radical meta-normative skepticism is the view that no standard, norm, or principle has objective authority or normative force. It does not deny that there are norms, standards of correctness, and principles of various kinds that render it possible that we succeed or fail in measuring up to their prerogatives. Rather, it denies that any norm has the status of commanding with objective authority, of giving rise to normative reasons to take seriously and follow its demands. Two powerful transcend…Read more
  •  107
    Against Moral Fictionalism
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1): 80-96. 2014.
    Moral nihilists need an answer: if moral discourse is fatally flawed, how are we to proceed? A popular option is fictionalism, to uphold the flawed discourse in the mode of a fiction. My thesis is that fictionalism is not the best available answer to the nihilist; a better one is revisionism, the proposal to refashion the discourse so as to cure it of all flaws. Should it be possible to revise the discredited practice, by removing what is erroneous while keeping what is beneficial, the twisted a…Read more
  •  73
    Why We are Not Moral Equals
    The Journal of Ethics 21 (4): 375-401. 2017.
    Faith in the universal moral equality of people enjoys close to unanimous consensus in present moral and political philosophy. Yet its philosophical justification remains precarious. The search for the basis of equality encounters insurmountable difficulties. Nothing short of a miracle seems required to stabilize universal equality in moral status amidst a vast space of distinctions sprawling between people. The difficulties of stabilizing equality against differentiation are not specific to any…Read more
  •  21
    David Owens on Normative Interests
    Jurisprudence 6 (2): 371-377. 2015.
  •  6
    Why We (Almost Certainly) are Not Moral Equals
    The Journal of Ethics 21 (4): 375-401. 2017.
    Faith in the universal moral equality of people enjoys close to unanimous consensus in present moral and political philosophy. Yet its philosophical justification remains precarious. The search for the basis of equality encounters insurmountable difficulties. Nothing short of a miracle seems required to stabilize universal equality in moral status amidst a vast space of distinctions sprawling between people. The difficulties of stabilizing equality against differentiation are not specific to any…Read more