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374Faktum der Vernunft oder Faktum der Kultur? Ein Problem für Kants Beweis der FreiheitZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung. forthcoming.This article develops an objection to Kant’s proof of freedom from the Critique of Practical Reason. In his proof — the fact of reason argument — Kant deduces the reality of freedom, understood as the ability to act independently of all inclinations, from our consciousness of the unconditional validity of morality. He calls this consciousness the "fact of reason". After a systematic reconstruction of the argument, I develop an objection that relies on three points: (i) the cultural embeddedness …Read more
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374Actual Guidance Is EnoughJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 24 (1). 2023.In a recent paper, Nate Sharadin and Rob van Someren Greve pull into doubt a seemingly platitudinous idea: deontic evaluation is capable of guiding action (“Capable”). After discussing several arguments for it, the authors conclude that, to the extent to which Capable can be defended, it cannot produce interesting results about the nature of the deontic. My goal is to argue that the authors’ skeptical endeavors are unconvincing. I aim to show that they rely on an implausibly broad understanding…Read more
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371The Indispensability Argument for the Doing/Allowing AsymmetryJournal of Value Inquiry (OpenAccess): 1-24. 2023.In this paper, I propose a solution to a challenge formulated by Judith Jarvis Thomson: We have to explain why the moral asymmetry between doing and allowing harm is a deep feature of our moral thinking. In a nutshell, my solution is this: It could not be otherwise. Accepting the asymmetry is indispensable for the construction and maintenance of stable moral communities. My argument centrally involves mental resource management. Moral communities depend on their members’ commitment to moral norm…Read more
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308Perspective Lost? Nonnaturalism and the Argument from Ethical PhenomenologyDialectica. forthcoming.In this paper, I criticize the most prevalent positive argument for ethical nonnaturalism, the argument from ethical phenomenology. According to it, nonnatural entities are part of the best explanation of the phenomenology of ethical deliberation; therefore, nonnaturalism is true. The argument from ethical phenomenology blinds out the external, empirically informed perspective on ethical deliberation. I argue that this is unwarranted for general methodological reasons: When starting to investiga…Read more
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327 scanlon’s reasons fundamentalismIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 120-146. 2018.
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286 schroeder’s hypotheticalismIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 103-119. 2018.
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26On Promoting the Dead Certain. A Reply to Behrends, DiPaolo, and Sharadin (Discussion Note)Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (3): 1-13. 2017.According to Humean promotionalism about practical reasons, the fact that I have a reason to φ holds in virtue of the fact that φ-ing promotes one or more of my desires. The topic of this discussion note is the question of how best to understand the promotion relation. In particular, I defend a probabilistic understanding of promotion against a line of argument recently brought forth by Jeff Behrends, Joshua DiPaolo, and Nate Sharadin. Roughly, their argument is that probabilistic promotion lead…Read more
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22Still a Misty Mountain: Assessing Parfit’s Non-Realist CognitivismZeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 2 (2): 213-230. 2019.This paper takes stock of Parfit’s latest defence of his meta-ethical view, non-realist cognitivism. In the third volume of On What Matters, Parfit gives his account a new—as I am going to show: conceptual—spin. Also, quite surprisingly, he takes back much of his earlier criticism of rival theories and claims instead that he and his opponents, Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton, are climbing the same meta-ethical mountain on different sides.Mainly focusing on the new spin in Volume III, I argue for…Read more
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1610 an anthropological framework for humeanismIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 160-174. 2018.
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154 stemmer’s Humean theory of oughtnessIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 55-78. 2018.
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1516 the weight of favoringsIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 241-247. 2018.
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158 why humeanism ‘wins’In The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 147-154. 2018.
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1413 promoting desiresIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 195-207. 2018.
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1417 conativism and the morality angleIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 248-265. 2018.
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145 halbig’s value realismIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 79-102. 2018.
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1311 the argument from favored desiresIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 175-184. 2018.
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131 the phenomenon of oughtnessIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 3-25. 2018.
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12BibliographyIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 277-282. 2018.
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1212 the nature of desiringIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 185-194. 2018.
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129 a look aheadIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 157-159. 2018.
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12IndexIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 283-284. 2018.
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1218 the origin of oughtness: A recapitulationIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 266-276. 2018.
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1115 the nature of practical reasonsIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 228-240. 2018.
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112 the grounds for explaining oughtnessIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 26-43. 2018.
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1114 idealization, epistemic error, and autonomyIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 208-227. 2018.
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11Preface and acknowledgmentsIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. 2018.
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10The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical ConativismDe Gruyter. 2018.How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock: One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff she judges essential, but the opponents do not think this to be a major flaw. In an attempt to meet the problem of gridlock head-on, the current investigation approaches oughtness differently. I start with th…Read more
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9Der Metaethische Konativismus: Versuch einer NeubelebungZeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 1 (1): 27-56. 2018.Im Fokus dieses Artikels steht die Vorstellung einer neuen Normativitätstheorie. Ich nenne sie metaethischen Konativismus. Der Konativismus ist der Theorienfamilie des Humeanismus zuzuordnen – er stellt konative Einstellungen in den Mittelpunkt – und ähnelt in seinen Grundzügen den Theorien von Bernard Williams, Mark Schroeder, David Sobel oder Peter Stemmer. Da er sich jedoch, wie ich zeigen werde, in einigen Kernelementen stark von bereits bestehenden Positionen unterscheidet, darf er als eige…Read more
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83 two angles and a dialectical dead endIn The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism, De Gruyter. pp. 44-52. 2018.
Konstanz, BW, Germany
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Anthropology |