Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter

Early modern commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics contain a lively debate on whether experience is ‘rational’, so that it may count as ‘proto-knowledge’, or whether experience is ‘non-rational’, so that experience must be regarded as a primarily perceptual process. If experience is just a repetitive apprehension of sensory contents, the connection of terms in a scientific proposition can be known without any experiential input, as the ‘non-rational’ Scotists state. ‘Rational’ Thomists believe that all principles of scientific knowledge must rely on experiential data, because experience consists in an apprehension of facts rather than objects. And it is only apprehension of facts that can justify knowledge of principles. In this context, the role of mathematical knowledge is special, because it is self-evident. So Thomists must either show that mathematical principles do rely on experience, or that they do not express knowledge claims

The majority of Kant scholars has taken it for granted that for Kant the soul is in some sense present in space and that this assumption is by and large unproblematic. If we read Kant’s texts in the context of debates on this topic within 18th century rationalism and beyond, a more complex picture emerges, leading to the somewhat surprising conclusion that Kant in 1770 can best be characterised as a Cartesian about the mind. The paper first develops a framework for describing the various positions on the place of the soul in space as varieties of ‘localism’, since German philosophers of the 18th century all agreed on the fact that the soul is in some sense present in space. Strong localists (Crusius, Knutzen) maintain that the soul occupies a place that cannot at the same time be occupied by a material substance. The Königsberg Wolffian Christian Gabriel Fischer is an ‘epistemic localist’ defending the view that our knowledge about the presence of the soul in space is limited. Bilfinger holds that the soul only represents itself as being present in space, he is a ‘representational localist’. The Cartesians, including Leonhard Euler and his teacher Samuel Werenfels, assume that the soul is effective in a region of space without truly being present there. They are ‘virtual localists’. Kant’s attitude towards this problem before the 1760s is a bit unclear. But his writings in this period are at least compatible with the strong localism defended by Knutzen. In the Herder transcripts (1762-1764) and other texts after 1760, Kant begins to distance himself from this view, but he does not articulate clearly his own position. This trend culminates in Dreams of a Spirit Seer (1766), where Kant oscillates somewhat uneasily between epistemic and virtual localism and criticises explicitly the Cartesian thesis that the soul’s presence in the body is limited to a determinate region. The dissertation from 1770 marks another radical change in Kant’s views on the place of the soul. Here, he subscribes to virtual localism and its concomitant thesis that the soul itself is, properly speaking, nowhere. Together with the thesis that the soul knows that it belongs to the mundus intelligibilis this makes Kant in 1770 a Cartesian about the mind.

This dataset documents results and code for the paper "Interdisciplinarity in the 17th Century? A Co-Occurrence Analysis of Early Modern German Dissertation Titles" by Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter, forthcoming in *Synthese*. The data to be processed are contained in four files, derived from a larger dataset related to German dissertations and sourced from the national bibliography of 17th century German prints *VD 17* that will be released at a later date. More information can be found in the file `README.md`.

Kant’s Dreams of a Spirit Seer has puzzled most of its readers since its publication in 1766. Herder complained in general terms about the lack of unity and coherence of the book as well as Kant’s dialectical method of presenting both sides of a problem without offering his own solution. Mendelssohn was in doubt about whether Kant wanted to ridicule metaphysics or make a case for Swedenborg’s visions. Another exegetical puzzle has not been noted yet: Dreams discusses not one, but three different versions of a ‘metaphysics of spirits’. All of them are mutually incompatible. In other words, the two versions of a metaphysics of spirits that Kant criticises in the first part of the book are both of them different from Swedenborg’s own claims, as they are discussed in the second part. And the two versions discussed within the first part are not homogeneous, either: the metaphysics discussed in the first chapter of the first part (the ‘tangled knot’) and those that seem to form the foundation for the second chapter of the first part (the ‘fragment of occult philosophy’) are again incompatible. And neither of them fits with what Kant analyses as Swedenborg’s metaphysical position in the second part: The position of the ‘tangled knot’ can tentatively be labelled as ‘crypto-materialist’. Swedenborg’s own position is characterised in the text as ‘idealist’. The ‘fragment of occult philosophy’ in contrast is probably best described as ‘dualist’. If this diagnosis is correct, it reinforces Herder’s complaints about the lack of coherence of Dreams as well as Mendelssohn’s worry about its targets. And it adds the additional challenge to explain how there can be a ‘crypto-materialist’ metaphysics of spirit-seeing. I propose to weaken the impact of these problems by identifying a second target of Kant’s scorn in Dreams – a metaphysical position Kant could be sympathetic with as far as its fundamental intentions are concerned, but that draws his ire because of an equally comprehensive failure in the realisation of these intentions.

Loci personarum, ‘topics for persons’ were used in Latin rhetoric for the description of persons, their external circumstances, physical attributes, or qualities of character. They stood in the way of fusing rhetoric and dialectic, the goal of sixteenth-century ‘humanistic’ logic: the project of a unified theory of invention depends on the exclusion of loci personarum from the domain of dialectic proper. But still they cannot easily be replaced in the class room. Bartholomaeus Keckermann resolved these difficulties: he proposed to abandon the notion that loci personarum could play a role in finding new arguments concerning persons. So they pose no risks for a unified theory of invention, because they can only be used for the exposition of information that we already have. Since loci personarum are concerned with individuals, the knowledge about individuals that is available to us is inescapably circumstantial and contingent, defying the claim of generality or necessity of dialectic made by Keckermann’s sixteenth-century predecessors. However, our thinking about persons is primarily interested in those aspects that we do not share with other members of our species. For Keckermann, persons are therefore logically different from most individuals belonging to other species.

In their debate on whether or not the young should be allowed to study history, Degory Wheare and Gerhardus Vossius quote Bartholomäus Keckermann and state that he wants to exclude the young from studying history, Wheare arguing for Keckermann’s purported position, Vossius opposing it. Their disagreement is part of a larger controversy on the relevance of history for moral instruction in general, contemplating the question whether or not history is best understood as ‘philosophy teaching by example.’ But the interpretation of Keckermann’s position presupposed by both Wheare and Vossius is wrong. Keckermann’s Ramist predecessors argued against a central presupposition of Wheare’s views, i.e., the exclusion of the young from studying moral philosophy. Keckermann’s own position in this regard is not fully clear. But a closer analysis of his distinction between methods for writing and for reading history shows that Keckermann did want the young to study history. If Keckermann had believed that such exclusion were necessary, it could only have been related to reading historical texts, not to writing them: writing texts about historical figures or events does not require moral precepts, but only the application of certain logical tools. A view that implies that writing a historical text should be possible for students, whereas reading such a text would go beyond their capabilities, is absurd. Hence, we can assume that Keckermann expected the young to study both history and moral philosophy.

In 1932 Moritz Schlick, the founder of the Vienna Circle, published an article on "The Future of Philosophy". Schlick's understanding of philosophy helps us to explore some ideas about the future of philosophy in the digital humanities. I distinguish a 'wide' and a 'strict' conception of philosophy in relation to DH, namely as a discipline of the digital humanities that engages with philosophical texts from the perspective of the humanities at large or as an activity that aims to clarify our use of terms through 'operationalisation'. This leads to the possibly surprising conclusion that every digital humanist is engaged in a philosophical activity and therefore a philosopher.

In this paper we examine titles of early modern German dissertations with regard to their ‘interdiscplinarity’, challenging the established consensus that interdisciplinarity evolved only in the 18th century. Based on the construction and analysis of a co-occurrence network of 909 dissertation titles published in the 17thc entury it can be shown that various dimensions of early modern interdisciplinarity should be distinguished. This concerns dissertations that connect philosophical disciplines to the ‘higher’ faculties of the early modern university (theology, jurisprudence, medicine) as well as titles that connect theoretical and practical subdisciplines of philosophy itself. We also observe that the emerging disciplines of historiography and philology seem to play a prominent role in the emergence of early modern interdisciplinarity. On a structural level it seems to be misguided to construe the early modern system of knowledge as a ‘tree’. It rather seems that relations betweeen disciplines in this period exhibit both tree-like and lattice-like features.

How and why did the notion of philosophy as a system evolve in Germany at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries? Otto Casmann’s Modesta Assertio provides new answers to this question. Casmann, Clemens Timpler’s predecessor as professor in Steinfurt refers to other ‘like-minded philosophers’ who believe that philosophy is a ‘structured system of the liberal arts’. Casmann himself states that philosophy is a ‘structured unity of erudite wisdom’. The text is part of the debate between Daniel Hoffmann and the Reformed philosophers about the relation between philosophy and theology. It can be made plausible that Hoffmann himself was Casmann’s target. The paper shows that a ‘structured unity of erudite wisdom’ presupposes harmony between theological insights and the findings of philosophy. Thus the earliest discussions of philosophy as a system were meant to immunise Reformed philosophy against Hoffmann’s attempt to revive Lutheran anti-philosophy. © 2018, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. All rights reserved.

The paper discusses Sellars’s view of philosophy and its relation to the sciences. It argues for three interrelated theses. First, philosophy has no specifi c subject matter. Second, we ask ourselves questions which cannot be answered from a purely scientifi c point of view. Third, philosophical standards are contingent, but this does not mean that philosophy is to be abandoned. Pace Sellars, the specifi c achievement of philosophy consists in «a view of the whole», which enables us to «know our way around» with respect to the different domains of expertise we are familiar with. Philosophy thus refl ects a common sense perspective of ourselves and the world we live in, which rests on the assumption that we are obliged to regard ourselves, as well as those sharing our lives, as persons. This in turn implies that our most basic ways of relating to the world are governed by norms. Getting a view of the whole of man thus means that we must regard ourselves both as participants of a norm-governed «Lebensform» [life form] and as complex biological systems. Philosophy and the sciences complement one another. Science aims at knowledge. This aim cannot be properly understood within science itself, because science does not concern itself with the normative perspective inherent in the very concept of knowledge. Philosophy, in turn, cannot risk ignoring the results of the sciences, because their insights form an essential part of what we must take to be the whole of the world that philosophy has in view. Even though philosophy should not aspire to achieve a complete revolution of the norms and standards governing our attempts to make sense of this world, it is nevertheless indispensable because it shows that these norms themselves are always open to refl ection and revision