Stefano Maso

L’autore delle tragedie è da identificare con lo stesso autore delle Lettere a Lucilio e delle altre opere “filosofiche”. Seneca è convinto che anche l’arte drammatica debba essere capace di produrre effetti etici; al centro egli pone infatti la questione del perfezionamento morale. Ci si può chiedere se la posizione di Seneca si sia allontanata dalla prospettiva della dottrina stoica ortodossa e se si possa definirla come un originale approccio neo-stoico. La questione può esser posta (a) in relazione al modo in cui Seneca interpreta l’intreccio di fatum e di responsabilità soggettiva nell’azione; (b) in relazione alla teoria delle passioni; (c) in relazione al modo in cui sono rappresentati l’ambiente e i vitia della società imperiale.

To his pupil Nero and to Lucilius (friend and, as metonymy, representative of the entire mankind), Seneca testifies to his pedagogic vocation. With conviction he applies himself to demonstrate the perfect correspondence between the Stoic doctrine and the edu¬cational strategy that he proposes. Firstly, the reciprocity of the relationship between educator and pupil appears fundamental; both further their individual knowledge. Secondly, the limitations of an ethical precept that is not anchored in the intensity and concreteness of human life becomes clearly apparent. Furthermore, it brings to question the weakness of a world vision not inspired by an innovative and original path. The starting point is therefore a rigorous examination of conscience to ultimately reach the revolutionary experience of risk in the moment of the last decision. In the name of truth the wise man must have the courage to embrace fate in order to really understand who he is (in a process of oikeiosis both as experience and as target), and he must instil in his pupils the courage to take risks along their own independent journey. In so doing, self-scrutiny and politics can become intertwined. It is herein that the educator’s risk and responsibilities lie.

Seneca sembra rileggere la dottrina stoica delle passioni alla luce dell’interpretazione aristotelica; procedendo nell’ottica del- l’alternativa secca che si deve al monismo della versione crisip- pea, Seneca fa delle passioni qualcosa di esterno e alternativo al soggetto agente. Tuttavia, seguendo poi una dinamica prospetti- va di tipo dualistico, evoca il ruolo decisionale e responsabiliz- zante del soggetto agente, il quale ha il compito di optare per la ragione o per l’opinione30 e quindi di mantenere o meno la propria enkrateia. Da ciò dipende che questa si trasformi o meno in uno strumento nelle mani della passione.

If the ancient Stoics conceived passion as a judgment or the consequence of a judgment referring to external reality, it is correct to define their conception of the psyche as ‘monistic’; it is very different if we consider that passion is due to another faculty independent of reason. In this second case, a scenario opens up in which a realistic and ‘reified’ conception of passion emerges. With reference to this, in theLetter113 Seneca discusses the paradoxical thesis of the ancient Stoic scholars according to whom “the soul is an animal”, just as virtues and passions are. Through a series of close logical arguments, he shows the absurdities that can be reached in this way. By comparing this letter with theDe irawe can define the position of Seneca as a type of practical/operational imaginary dualism: the development of an original coherent form of monism. Not to give in to passion (for example to anger or libido) will not be just or not so much a psychological exercise of reason and will, but certainly a physical experience of resistance.

Plato tries to explain the becoming of the cosmos by referring to the concepts of order and disorder. Scholars have usually focused on the relationship between the cosmos and the demiurge that Plato puts forward to explain the reasonable development. Along these lines, scholarship has examined the providential role played by both the demiurge and the soul of the world. Yet, an interesting prob­lem still remains open: what exactly is the function of disorder? What is the sense of the concept of a perfectly established order if we do not know the manner in which it is achieved, since we have no understand­ing of the conditions that make it possible? Pursuing this line of thought, one may point to a providential role of the disorder given the balance of forces that operates in Plato’s cosmic becoming.

Cicero was not only a great Roman politician, lawyer and orator: he also dealt extensively with philosophy, which he believed constituted the surest foundation for his commitment to civic affairs. Not limiting himself to the translation of previous philosophical thought, he critically addressed central theoretical questions, and thereby made a lasting impact on Roman intellectual life. This book offers a modern guide to interpretations of Cicero's philosophical studies, one that ranges across his numerous philosophical works. Addressed to students and scholars of ancient philosophy, and to interested readers in the humanities more generally, the volume aims to break down the boundaries between the philosophical, literary and linguistic dimensions of Cicero's highly influential oeuvre. Stefano Maso is a full professor in Ancient Philosophy at the University of Ca' Foscari - Venice. Among his books are: Grasp and Dissent: Cicero and Epicurean Philosophy (Brepols 2015); Epicurus on Eidola: Peri Phuseos Book II. Update, Proposals, and Discussions (ed. with F. Masi, Hakkert 2015). He is co-editor of "Lexis. Poetica, retorica e comunicazione nella tradizione classica".

The present study is an analysis of the distinctive characteristics of Cicero’s philosophical training. In particular, and for the first time in Ciceronian scholarship, the Roman philosopher’s relation with Epicurean philosophy is made the focus of a specific, thorough investigation. Cicero’s philosophical competence in the Academic school is well known. What is less acknowledged is Cicero being an expert in Epicurus ’s philosophy. The research presented in this volume will, as somewhat expected, prove that Cicero is a fierce opponent of Epicureanism – an intelligent adversary, capable of studiose dicere contra Epicurum. In understanding and criticizing Epicurus, however, Cicero also offers an acute and insightful rendering of the opposing party’s thought.

This volume presents the results of the ESAP-HYELE conference on "Aristotle, Physics 7.3: What is Alteration?", which took place in Vitznau, Switzerland, 12–15 February 2007. The contributors are part of a team of Aristotelian scholars who came together for the first time in 1995, and have since been meeting every spring. The purpose of their gatherings is to read and interpret line by line a short, but important chapter of Aristotle's works. In this way, attention is focussed on key texts of particular exegetic and theoretical interest. Each session starts with the presentation of a translation and a first analysis of the main problems; these then become the subject of an intense debate which illustrates the different schools of thought and methodological approaches. Over the years, the confrontation of these different points of view has had a beneficiary effect on scholarship and has stimulated research activity worldwide. On the occasion of the Vitznau meeting in 2007, it was decided for the first time to publish the results of the meeting in order to make them accessible to a wider public of scholars and students. The present volume is the fruit of this common effort

I Dissoi Logoi sono presentati in un nuova edizione criticamente rivista, accompagnata da introduzione e commento linguistico e storico-filosofico. Inoltre: Il tentativo di definire che cosa siano i Dissoi Logoi, e di collocarli all'interno di un quadro di sviluppo storico filosofico affidabile, è davvero arduo, poiché oggettivamente poggia su una serie di variabili che purtroppo sono interdipendenti. Nulla da cui partire appare con sicurezza assodato, se si esclude il fatto che lo scritto è anonimo, che è in dialetto dorico e che è incompleto. questa nuova edizione tiene conto di tutti i progressi effettuati negli ultimi cento anni dalla critica filosofica e dalla filologia.