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9Mirror self-recognition and symbol-mindednessBiology and Philosophy 28 (4): 657-673. 2013.The view that mirror self-recognition (MSR) is a definitive demonstration of self-awareness is far from universally accepted, and those who do support the view need a more robust argument than the mere assumption that self-recognition implies a self-concept (e.g. Gallup in Socioecology and Psychology of Primates, Mouton, Hague, 1975 ; Gallup and Suarez in Psychological Perspectives on the Self, vol 3, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, 1986 ). In this paper I offer a new argument in favour of the view that MSR…Read more
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41Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts, by Sainsbury, R. M. and Michael Tye: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 208. £25.00 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4): 830-831. 2013.No abstract
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80Mirror self-recognition and symbol-mindednessBiology and Philosophy. 2012.Abstract The view that mirror self-recognition (MSR) is a definitive demonstration of self-awareness is far from universally accepted, and those who do support the view need a more robust argument than the mere assumption that self-recognition implies a self-concept (e.g. Gallup in Socioecology and Psychology of Primates, Mouton, Hague, 1975 ; Gallup and Suarez in Psychological Perspectives on the Self, vol 3, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, 1986 ). In this paper I offer a new argument in favour of the vi…Read more
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40The concept possession hypothesis of self-consciousnessConsciousness and Cognition 21 (2): 713-720. 2012.This paper presents the hypothesis that concept possession is sufficient and necessary for self-consciousness. If this is true it provides a yardstick for gauging the validity of different research paradigms in which claims for self-consciousness in animals or human infants are made: a convincing demonstration of concept possession in a research subject, such as a display of inferential reasoning, may be taken as conclusive evidence of self-consciousness. Intuitively, there appears to be a corre…Read more
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300Can Rats Reason?Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 2 (4): 404-429. 2015.Since at least the mid-1980s claims have been made for rationality in rats. For example, that rats are capable of inferential reasoning (Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006; Bunsey & Eichenbaum, 1996), or that they can make adaptive decisions about future behavior (Foote & Crystal, 2007), or that they are capable of knowledge in propositional-like form (Dickinson, 1985). The stakes are rather high, because these capacities imply concept possession and on some views (e.g., Rödl, 2007; Sava…Read more
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32A response to Dow’s and Musholt’s commentaries on the concept possession hypothesis of self-consciousnessConsciousness and Cognition 21 (2): 725-726. 2012.In this short piece I defend my position on self-consciousness against the objections raised by Dow and Musholt to a paper in the same issue. These are that (1) Bermudez’s (1998) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness broadly supports the CP Hypothesis; (2) the self-concept requires no further complexity than knowledge of one’s own existence and capacity to take deliberate action; (3) understanding the idea of a perceiver requires understanding the concept of an agent that performs the action of perc…Read more
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Macquarie UniversitySenior Research Officer (Part-time)
Macquarie University
PhD, 2013
Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |