•  62
    Zeno on Plurality
    Phronesis 27 (3): 223-238. 1982.
  •  8
    Aristotle on Modality, I
    with Nicholas Denyer
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1): 143-161. 2000.
    Aristotle draws two sets of distinctions in Metaphysics 9.2, first between non-rational and rational capacities, and second between one way and two way capacities. He then argues for three claims: [A] if a capacity is rational, then it is a two way capacity [B] if a capacity is non-rational, then it is a one way capacity [C] a two way capacity is not indifferently related to the opposed outcomes to which it can give rise I provide explanations of Aristotle's terminology, and of how [A]-[C] shoul…Read more
  •  10
    Aristotle on Modality, I
    with Nicholas Denyer
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1): 143-161. 2000.
    [Stephen Makin] Aristotle draws two sets of distinctions in Metaphysics 9.2, first between non-rational and rational capacities, and second between one way and two way capacities. He then argues for three claims: [A] if a capacity is rational, then it is a two way capacity [B] if a capacity is non-rational, then it is a one way capacity [C] a two way capacity is not indifferently related to the opposed outcomes to which it can give rise I provide explanations of Aristotle's terminology, and of h…Read more
  •  51
    Stephen Makin presents a clear and accurate new translation of an influential and much-discussed part of Aristotle's philosophical system, accompanied by an analytical and critical commentary focusing on philosophical issues. In Book Theta of the Metaphysics Aristotle introduces the concepts of actuality and potentiality---which were to remain central to philosophical analysis into the modern era---and explores the distinction between the actual and the potential.
  •  18
    No Title available: New Books (review)
    Philosophy 64 (248): 271-272. 1989.
  •  14
    Socratic Questions
    Philosophical Books 34 (4): 223-224. 1993.
  •  45
    The Indivisibility of the Atom
    Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 71 (2): 125-149. 1989.
  • (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2006.
  •  44
    VIII*—An Ancient Principle about Causation
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1): 135-152. 1991.
    Stephen Makin; VIII*—An Ancient Principle about Causation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 135–152, https://doi.
  •  13
    Indifference arguments
    Blackwell. 1993.
    Stephen Makin offers an account of indifference arguments and the pre-Socratic atomism underpinned by this sort of reasoning. Used by Parmenides, Democritus, Plato, Aristotle and Leibniz, as well as some contemporary philosophers, indifference arguments start from claims about a balance of reasons or an absence of asymmetries. While some provide plausible support for strong conclusion, others produce no conviction.
  •  45
    About time for Aristotle (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227). 2007.
  •  60
    The Ontological Argument
    Philosophy 63 (243). 1988.
    I will offer a defence of Anselm's Ontological Argument, building on some suggestions made by Prior. The defence offered avoids one of the objections commonly levelled against the Ontological Argument. I will not consider whether the use of this objection involves a misinterpretation of the argument as put forward by Anselm. It might, for example, be held that the argument of Proslogion 2 is programmatic, and points forward to Prosiogion 3, and arguments given by Anselm in his Reply to Gaunilo. …Read more
  •  71
    Megarian possibilities
    Philosophical Studies 83 (3). 1996.
  •  35
    Causality and derivativeness
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 46 59-. 2000.
    This paper is a reflection on some of Elizabeth Anscombe's influential work on causation, in particular on some comments in her Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge, published as ‘Causality and Determination’. One of Anscombe's major concerns in that paper is the relation between causation and necessitation, and she critically discusses the cast of mind which links causality with some kind of necessary connection or with exceptionless generalisation. In place of a semi-technical analysis of causation,…Read more
  •  40
    Aquinas, Natural Tendencies and Natural Kinds
    New Scholasticism 63 (3): 253-274. 1989.
  •  8
    What does Aristotle mean by priority in substance?
    Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 24 209-238. 2003.
  •  27
    I_– _Stephen Makin
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1): 143-161. 2000.
  •  45
    Aristotle's Two Modal Theses Again
    Phronesis 44 (2): 114-126. 1999.
    This paper offers an interpretation of the arguments Aristotle offers in "Metaphysics" 9.4, 1047b14-30, for the two modal theses [1] if (if A is the case then B is the case) then (if A is possible then B is possible) [2] if (if A is possible then B is possible) then (if A is the case then B is the case) Aristotle's arguments for these theses have not typically impressed commentators. I offer two arguments which are relatively faithful to Aristotle's text. The arguments rest on the following pair…Read more
  •  4
  •  71
    Energeia and dunamis
    In Christopher Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle, Oup Usa. pp. 400. 2012.
    Modalities enter into practically every area of contemporary philosophy. Great progress has been made in understanding the variety of differences between what is possible, what is actual, and what is necessary. But things were not always so clear. We owe a great debt in this area, as in so many others, to Aristotle, who had a lot to say on the topic, part of which comprises his discussion and use of the actuality/potentiality distinction. One important task in understanding his discussion of act…Read more
  •  193
    Aristotle on Modality: Stephen Makin
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1): 143-161. 2000.
    [Stephen Makin] Aristotle draws two sets of distinctions in Metaphysics 9.2, first between non-rational and rational capacities, and second between one way and two way capacities. He then argues for three claims: [A] if a capacity is rational, then it is a two way capacity [B] if a capacity is non-rational, then it is a one way capacity [C] a two way capacity is not indifferently related to the opposed outcomes to which it can give rise I provide explanations of Aristotle's terminology, and of h…Read more
  •  45
    II—Stephen Makin: Ethics, Fixity and Flux
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1): 169-183. 2014.
    This paper engages with the idea at the core of my co‐symposiast's paper ‘Ethics of Substance’ : that the Aristotelian concept of substantial being has ethical implications, and an alternative understanding of existence in terms of affecting and being affected will help us more easily to accommodate relational values, which are thought to sit uneasily within the Aristotelian framework.I focus on two questions. First, is there really is a tension between an Aristotelian metaphysics of substance a…Read more