Stephen Boydstun

Boydstun argues that Rand's measurement-omission analysis of concepts implies a distinctive magnitude structure for metaphysics. This is structure beyond logical structure, constraint on possibility beyond logical constraint. Yet, it is structure ranging as widely as logical structure through all the sciences and common experience. Boydstun uncovers this distinctive magnitude structure, characterizing it by its automorphisms, by its location among the mathematical categories, and by the types of measurement it affords. He uncovers a structure to universals implicit in Rand's theory that is additional to recurrence structure

STEPHEN BOYDSTUN argues that Rand's measurement-omission analysis of concepts implies a distinctive magnitude structure for metaphysics. This is structure beyond logical structure, constraint on possibility beyond logical constraint. Yet, it is structure ranging as widely as logical structure through all the sciences and common experience. Boydstun uncovers this distinctive magnitude structure, characterizing it by its automorphisms, by its location among the mathematical categories, and by the types of measurement it affords. He uncovers a structure to universals implicit in Rand's theory that is additional to recurrence structure.