University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1972
CV
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
  • Virtue Ethics
    Wiley. 2002.
    Virtue Ethics collects, for the first time, the main classical sources and the central contemporary expressions of virtue ethics approach to normative ethical theory. Edited and introduced by Stephen Darwall, these readings are essential for anyone interested in normative theory. Introduced by Stephen Darwall, this collection brings together classic and contemporary readings which define and advance the literature on virtue ethics. Includes six essays which respond to the classic sources. Includ…Read more
  •  2
    Introduction
    Law and Philosophy 14. 1995.
    Peer Reviewed.
  •  30
    Recognition, second-personal authority, and nonideal theory
    European Journal of Philosophy 29 (3): 562-574. 2021.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
  •  14
    Reply to Honneth
    European Journal of Philosophy 29 (3): 592-596. 2021.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
  •  31
    PLACE: PRESENCE AS SECOND-PERSONAL SPACE
    Journal of Ethical Reflections 1 (4): 7-16. 2021.
    The concept of place is ultimately a matter of ethical significance—of where something fits in a nexus or structure of meaning. Often this meaning is quite personal, involving a sense of presence we associate with a place. This essay investigates this connection through a study of Wordsworth’s poem, “Tintern Abbey.” It argues that the notion of a presence-infused place is ultimately that of a second-personal space. Presence is a matter of second-personal openness. Therefore, when presence i…Read more
  • Moral Obligation and Accountability
    In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii, Clarendon Press. 2007.
  • Having Reasons (review)
    Philosophical Review 97 (1): 111-114. 1988.
  • Smith über die Gleichheit der Würde und den Standpunkt der 2. Person
    In Hans-Peter Schütt & Christel Fricke (eds.), Adam Smith Als Moralphilosoph, Berlin/new York. pp. 178-189. 2005.
  •  8
    From Morality to Virtue
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3): 695-701. 1994.
  •  21
    An adequate moral psychology of obligation must bear in mind that although the “sense of obligation” is psychological, what it is a sense of, moral obligation itself, is not. It is irreducibly normative. I argue, therefore, that the “we” whose demands the sense of obligation presupposes must be an ideal rather than an actual “we.”
  •  15
    Harm to Others
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4): 691-694. 1987.
  •  2
    Morality, Authority, and Law
    Oxford University Press UK. 2013.
    Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore the Second-Person Standpoint --an argument which advances an analysis of central moral concepts as irreducibly second personal in the sense of entailing mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He illustrates the power of the second-personal framework to illuminate a wide variety of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy. Section I concerns morality: for example, its distinctiveness among normative concepts, th…Read more
  • How should ethics relate to (the rest of ) philosophy?
    In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore, Clarendon Press. 2006.
  •  3
    III-Moral Obligation: Form and Substance
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1): 31-46. 2010.
  •  72
    “Second-personal morality” and morality
    Philosophical Psychology 31 (5): 804-816. 2018.
  •  84
    Eine Antwort auf Monika Betzier, Sebastian Rödl und Peter Schaber
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1): 173-179. 2009.
  •  2
    Joseph Butler: Five Sermons (edited book)
    Hackett Publishing Company. 1983.
    _CONTENTS:__ Introduction Selected Bibliography Five Sermons:_ The Preface_ Sermon I - Upon Human Nature Sermon II - Upon Human Nature Sermon III - Upon Human Nature Sermon IV - Upon The Love Of Our Neighbor Sermon V - Upon The Love Of Our Neighbor A dissertation upon the Nature of Virtue_
  •  15
    Impartial Reason
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (3): 507-515. 1989.
  •  4
    Impartial Reason
    Ethics 96 (3): 604-619. 1983.
  •  2
    Rational Agent, Rational Act
    Philosophical Topics 14 (2): 33-57. 1986.
  •  7
    Human Morality’s Authority
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4): 941-948. 1995.
    A central theme of Samuel Scheffler’s impressive Human Morality is that “a considered view of the relation between morality and the individual” requires distinguishing frequently confused issues concerning morality’s content, scope, authority, and deliberative role, and appreciating interrelations among these. He suggests a nice example of the latter. Some are inclined to believe morality lacks the overriding authority others claim it to have because they assume that morality’s content is string…Read more
  •  26
    Introduction
    Law and Philosophy 14 (1): 1-3. 1995.
  • Reason, Self-Regard, and Morality
    Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. 1972.
  •  1
    Ethics and Morality
    In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 552-566. 2017.
  •  86
    Sidgwick, Concern, and the Good
    Utilitas 12 (3): 291. 2000.
    Sidgwick maintains, plausibly, that the concept of a person's good is a normative one and takes for granted that it is normative for the agent's own choice and action. I argue that the normativity of a person's good must be understood in relation to concern for someone for that person's own sake. A person's good, I suggest, is what one should want for that person in so far as one cares about him, or what one should want for him for his sake. I examine Sidgwick's defence of the axioms of rational…Read more
  •  1
    New model publishing
    with J. David Velleman
    The Philosophers' Magazine 14 11-12. 2001.
  •  25
    Scheffler on Morality and Ideals of the Person
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (2). 1982.
    Scheffler's paper divides into two parts. In the first, he argues that Parfit's argument from the complex view of personal identity neither can, nor is intended to, establish any moral theory; in particular, it cannot establish utilitarianism. Rather, Parfit's aim must have been simply to weaken our attachment to non-utilitarian theories. In discovering that the only philosophically respectable view of personal identity holds it to consist simply in bodily or psychological continuities and conne…Read more