•  72
    When I see a mountain to be far away, there is non-reflective awareness of myself as that from which distance is measured. Likewise, there is self-awareness when I see a tree as offering shade or a hiding place. In such cases, how can the self I am aware of be the same as I who am aware of it? Can the perceived be its perceiver? Mobilizing infancy research, I offer the following thesis as to how one can be aware of oneself, at a single stroke, as perceiver and as embodied entity. During face-to-…Read more
  •  1122
    Heidegger and the infant: A second-person alternative to the Dasein-analysis
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 34 (4): 257-274. 2014.
    Heidegger’s analysis of human existence has long been criticized for ignoring the full possibilities of human encounter. This article finds a basis for the criticism in recent infancy research. It presents evidence for a second-person structure in our earliest encounters: An infant first becomes present to herself as the focal center of a caregiver’s gazing, smiling, or vocalization. The exchange in which the self thus appears is termed a You–I event. Such an event, it is held, cannot be assimil…Read more
  •  695
    The You-I event: on the genesis of self-awareness
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4): 769-790. 2013.
    I present empirical evidence suggesting that an infant first becomes aware of herself as the focal center of a caregiver's attending. Yet that does not account for her awareness of herself as agent. To address this question, I bring in research on neonatal imitation, as well as studies demonstrating the existence of a neural system in which parts of the same brain areas are activated when observing another's action and when executing a similar one. Applying these findings, I consider gestural ex…Read more
  •  25
    The interactive Now: A second-person approach to time-consciousness
    Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 47 (2): 156-182. 2016.
    Husserl offers insight into the constituting of the self-aware ego through time-consciousness. Yet his account does not satisfactorily explain how this ego can experience itself as presently acting. Furthermore, although he acknowledges that the Now is not a knife-edge present, he does not show what determines its duration. These shortfalls and others are overcome through a change of starting point. Citing empirical evidence, I take it as a basic given that when a caregiver frontally engages an …Read more