Stephen Laumakis

Recent scholarship has begun to shed some light on the social, cultural, historical, and intellectual contexts in and from which the Buddha and Buddhism arose. This chapter discusses some fundamental problems with the practice of Buddhism. It provides an account of Siddhattha Gotama's intellectual biography by analyzing the philosophical context in and from which his thought and teachings emerged. The idea of rebirth and the idea of karma seem to have been among the most basic insights of the “Indian way” of understanding reality. In fact, they provided the foundation for Gotama's philosophical reflections. Ancient Indians offer three distinct conceptual frameworks or “views” of reality. The first “view” is the understanding of the Dasyus, or the pre‐Aryan or “pre‐Vedic view” of things. The second Indian “view” is the understanding of the Aryans and the Vedas. The third and final “view” is the post‐Vedic understanding of reality.

Although some philosophers are still influenced by Hume's atomistic view of sense impressions, most acknowledge that we are aware not merely of isolated disparate sense data, but of concrete individual sensible things, which on the sensible plane are wholes composed of many sensible aspects. One of many philosophical problems faced by philosophers is to explain precisely how these diverse simultaneously presented sensible aspects are objectively and subjectively cognized as belonging to the same individual sensible thing. The traditional Thomistic response to the question of which sense power is responsible for these acts of unification is the sensus communis or common sense. Recently, however, the validity of that response and its support by textual evidence has been called into question. As a result, in this study I am concerned with two questions: What exactly did St. Thomas think about the nature and role of the sensus communis? and Has any philosophically significant aspect of St. Thomas' account of the sensus communis been overlooked by either the commentary tradition or its critics? ;The first chapter is a comparative and chronological exegesis of the pertinent Thomistic texts on the sensus communis in order to reconstruct his authentic teaching on the matter. The second chapter then evaluates the relative fidelity and truth of the claims of the commentary tradition and its critics. In the third chapter I focus on clarifying the overlooked notion of subjective unification and show that it is precisely this activity that constitutes the most important and fundamental epistemological act of the sensus communis because of the relation it establishes between the knower and the known. In the final two chapters I locate the insights of the preceding chapter within the broader context of St. Thomas' thought in psychology/epistemolgy, metaphysics, and philosophical theology, and explore both the preliminaries and consequences to establishing a dialogue between the thought of St. Thomas and some contemporary philosophical issues and questions

Although some philosophers accept an atomistic view of sense impressions, most acknowledge that we are aware not merely of isolated disparate sense data, but of concrete sensible wholes. One of many philosophical problems faced by these philosophers, however, is to explain how these distinct simultaneously presented sensible aspects are subjectively and objectively cognized as belonging to the same particular object. The traditional Thomistic solution is the sensus communis. Recently, however, the validity of that response has been called into question. As a result, the purpose of this paper is to sketch the positions involved in the debate, present St. Thomas’s account of the sensus communis, and argue that both the commentary tradition and a recent critic have overlooked an important aspect of that account.

John Laumakis has offered a thought-provoking, but ultimately unpersuasive argument in favor of playing to your opponent’s strength instead of playing to their weakness. In the course of this reply, we hope to show that the idea of PTS not only undermines the real goal of athletic competition, but it also rests upon a confusion between matters of morality and the aims of sports, as well as equivocations on the kind of ‘excellence’ one pursues, and the nature of the ‘challenge’ involved in sport. We also plan to raise a serious objection against the logical consistency of PTS and note its incompatibility with real-world game smarts and tactics. Finally, we offer our own explanation for why ‘it is improbable that many coaches and athletes will shift their strategy from PTW to PTS.’

In this clearly written undergraduate textbook, Stephen Laumakis explains the origin and development of Buddhist ideas and concepts, focusing on the philosophical ideas and arguments presented and defended by selected thinkers and sutras from various traditions. He starts with a sketch of the Buddha and the Dharma, and highlights the origins of Buddhism in India. He then considers specific details of the Dharma with special attention to Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology, and examines the development of Buddhism in China, Japan, and Tibet, concluding with the ideas of the Dalai Lama and Thich Nhat Hanh. In each chapter he includes explanations of key terms and teachings, excerpts from primary source materials, and presentations of the arguments for each position. His book will be an invaluable guide for all who are interested in this rich and vibrant philosophy.