Stephen Lester Thompson

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 703 thing," and "doing, acting [having.] priority over intellectual understanding and reasoning " (92). But are such "analogies" really the crux of the "religious point of view" in terms of which Wittgenstein said that he could "not help seeing every problem"? When we recall that Wittgenstein's later philosophy was a proibund attack upon what he regarded as the idolatry of science, logic, and mathematics (an idolatry of which he himself, in the Tractatt~,, was partly guilty), and that he was also bent on undermining the accompanying subjectivized and privatized view of the human mind, as well as the scientistic reading of religious beliefs and primitive religions, we may be inclined to see his philosophy as clearing the way for the simple noninstitutionalized Tolstoian faith which he himself accepted. Philosophy and religion were on the same track in his mind (and not merely related by "analogies") when he wrote: "All that philosophy can do is to destroy idols. And that means not creating a new one--for instance, as in the 'absence of an idol' " (MS 213, 89). Peter Winch's Responseor Discussion(both words are used as titles) suggests that the pervasiveness of Wittgenstein's "religious point of view" can be seen in his question to Russell: "How can I be a logician before I am a human being?" (which certainly also extends to "How can I be a philosopher before I am a human being?"). With this goes the realization, expressed in the Preface to the PhilosophicalRemarks, that he will not be able to make his book more free of the "impurities" of vanity than he himself is free of them. We sense the religious point of view of Wittgenstein in his utter seriousness (so often compared to Augustine, Pascal, and Kierkegaard) as well as in his conviction that there is a good lying beyond the world which puts every human being, and above all himself, under an obligation to place it ahead of self. When he said that he could not help seeing every problem this way, he meant that he could not help seeing it as having an importance that went beyond facts and theories and circumstances and even beyond the world itself. And the demonstration that this was indeed his point of view he knew would inevitably be, as indeed it was, in every line he wrote. H. L. FINCH Hunter College,CUNY Johnny Washington. A Journey into the Philosophyof Alain Locke. Contributions in AfroAmerican and African Studies. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994. Pp. viii + ~2o. Cloth, $59.95. Alain Locke (1886-1954), a secondary figure in American pragmatism, wrote on problems of value in cultural analysis; he is noted for his vigorous relativism. As this century's most distinguished African American philosopher--a Rhodes Scholar educated at Harvard and Oxford--Locke played twin roles, mentoring artists of the Harlem Renaissance and chairing the philosophy department at Howard University. Josiah Royce's influence on his thought is evident, as is that of social scientists W. E. B. Du Bois and Franz Boas. In Locke's most recognized works, such as "Values 704 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER 1995 and Imperatives" (1935) and "The New Negro" (19~5), as well as his lesser-read "Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy" (1942), he warrants note for two key contributors to the history of ideas. First, he analyzes "race" and "culture" relativistically, showing how nineteenth-century discussions (say, on "racial uplift") may continue without problematic ontological baggage. Second, by appealing to functionalism, he defends the relative equivalence of elements which characterize cultures. He thus undergirds arguments in social philosophy about the sufficiency of values and norms in social practices. Four decades after his death there exist only two book-length studies of Locke's philosophy, both authored byJohnny Washington. Washington deserves a great deal of credit for his part in initiating a fast-growing critical--and distinctively philosophical-literature on Locke. Indeed, no serious student of Locke's philosophy can proceed without contending with Washington's work. While this study merits praise for its thoroughness and care in treating unpublished essays by Locke, it suffers somewhat from its style of exposition. Washington's "narrate-and...

Attempts within sociolinguistics to model the African American speech community require a sound account of what a competent participant knows when they give correct interpretations of utterances made within such a community, a phenomenon any larger theory of language use ought to address. To provide this account, I reconstruct a line of argument from the philosophical history of discussions on African American speech communities. I give this history in terms of pragmatic arguments, that is, in terms of the ability of vernacular speakers to manage the "slip" between speaker meaning and conventional meaning so as to effectively communicate, and thus be interpretable to competent auditors. ;In the writings of African American philosophers Alexander Crummell and Alain Locke especially, the general pragmatic strategy is to take the regulative background of speech acts to play a central role in vernacular interpretation, particularly as it relates language use to patterns of interpretation available to a speech community and to communicative aspects of the socialization of members of that community . In terms of meaning, interpretation is seen by Crummell as a function of publicly accessible meaning; he endorses the claim that the content which a word expresses is an idea in the mind of a speaker--what I call the Semantic Identity Thesis. Locke's insight, however, that cognitive meaning and content-bearing linguistic vehicles can be assessed independently provides him with the leverage to treat speaker meaning and symbol meaning as distinct components of a speaker's competence to successfully interpret utterances--what I call the Semantic Distance Thesis. ;Using these accounts to model inferences in communication, I argue that a complete account of interpretation will show how a speaker accesses inferential, conventional and social knowledge. These sorts of knowledge are tied to the prevailing norms emerging from a regulative background for communication within the language use of a speech community. In this way, the slip between conventional meaning and speaker meaning can be understood as structuring the communicative context of vernacular speech, in that social knowledge plays a central role in effective interpretive inference