Stephen Kekoa Miller

We live at a time when many aspects of our educational culture are declared to be in crisis. Increasingly, the STEM movement dominates initiatives at the same time that there is less agreement about what constitutes a Humanities or liberal arts education. Relatively broad consensus indicates that it should make students somehow “better”. Within the field of pre-college normative ethics surveys, a survey of textbooks shows that most agree on what a course like this should look like. In evaluating the effects of an ethics curriculum, however, most show diffidence to claim moral transformation in their students. At least part of this problem seems to stem from mainstream philosophy’s longtime bias against and misunderstanding of emotions. A closer look at emotions and how they might be educated offers a very different picture how a successful ethics curriculum could look. A typical ethics curriculum of any level presumes that a course neutral in regards to which, if any, of the normative ethical theories covered is true. However, any such course begins with a host of implied values that might not necessarily be shared with the students. If it’s the case, as contemporary moral psychology suggests that at the very least, our rational minds inform our behavior and moral judgments far less than we might have thought, then a course in normative ethics needs to engage emotions far more effectively. Martha Nussbaum’s recent work Political Emotions suggests some important ways that desirable emotions like civic love and undesirable emotions like disgust might relate to a curriculum. With the right approach, perhaps we can begin to claim that a moral philosophy course might make someone more moral.

Plato claims that “philosophy begins in wonder”. To genuinely question the unquestioned opens a hole in the floor of certainty. This feeling is the prerequisite to true philosophical thinking. However, paradoxically, it is often the absence of irreverence that prevents true awe. In order to provoke moral seriousness in students, it is common to inadvertently “flatten” the moral world by injecting seriousness into everything; however, when everything is serious, nothing is serious. This paper explores the role of conceptual and tonal irreverence, and situates this topic more generally within the role of humor in pedagogy. Finally, the presentation demonstrates connections to social justice and the ways that educational reform, in flattening the moral world, have omitted the opportunity to generate wonder and reverence. Platon tvrdi da “filozofija počinje s čuđenjem”. Istinsko preispitivanje neispitanoga izaziva nesigurnost. Taj osjećaj preduvjet je istinskom filozofskom mišljenju. Međutim, paradoksalno, često je upravo nedostatak humora ono što sprječava istinsko čuđenje. Kako bi se izazvala moralna ozbiljnost u studenata uobičajeno je da se nehotice moralni svijet predstavi dosadnijim nego što uistinu jest, dajući svemu ozbiljan predznak; no ništa nije ozbiljno kada je sve ozbiljno. Ovaj rad istražuje ulogu konceptualnog i tonalnog humora te ovu temu općenitije pozicionira u sferu uloge humora u pedagogiji. U konačnici, prezentacija prikazuje veze s društvenom pravdom i načinima na koje je obrazovna reforma, putem prikaza morala kao ozbiljne teme, propustila priliku za stvaranje čuđenja i poštivanja.

Recent events around the world point to the dire need to counter harmful unconscious bias. Reams of evidence now exists that literal pre-judgement in regards to race, sex, ethnicity, age and religion among other categories strongly affects our behaviour in ways that when we consciously contemplate it, we would condemn. Using Community of Inquiry methods in developing critical reasoning and empathy offer some possible remedies but also hold pitfalls. The dilemma concerns the fact that if harmful unconscious connotative representations are unconscious, then it’s terribly hard to spot and correct them. We need a better way of exploring our own poorly-arrived at beliefs: we need other people. Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of dialogic understanding allows meaning to be created through the process of discussion. It gets particularly interesting when this idea combines with the notion of a “floating signifier.” This suggests that a discussion could then also alter the connotative value of words, signs and concepts through making what had been hidden overt. This paper explores the ways that the dilemma of damaging discourse could be altered and strategies for interrupting this, including the format of a Community of Inquiry. The promise offered by a Community of Inquiry is that connotative meanings can be made explicit. It also points to the challenge: unveiling hidden bias only becomes possible in a setting of great diversity. In the end, while a Community of Inquiry may not be able to solve the problem of unconscious bias, it may help combat the consequences.

Recent events around the world point to the dire need to counter harmful unconscious bias. Reams of evidence now exists that literal pre-judgement in regards to race, sex, ethnicity, age and religion among other categories strongly affects our behaviour in ways that when we consciously contemplate it, we would condemn. Using Community of Inquiry methods in developing critical reasoning and empathy offer some possible remedies but also hold pitfalls. The dilemma concerns the fact that if harmful unconscious connotative representations are unconscious, then it’s terribly hard to spot and correct them. We need a better way of exploring our own poorly-arrived at beliefs: we need other people. Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of dialogic understanding allows meaning to be created through the process of discussion. It gets particularly interesting when this idea combines with the notion of a “floating signifier.” This suggests that a discussion could then also alter the connotative value of words, signs and concepts through making what had been hidden overt. This paper explores the ways that the dilemma of damaging discourse could be altered and strategies for interrupting this, including the format of a Community of Inquiry. The promise offered by a Community of Inquiry is that connotative meanings can be made explicit. It also points to the challenge: unveiling hidden bias only becomes possible in a setting of great diversity. In the end, while a Community of Inquiry may not be able to solve the problem of unconscious bias, it may help combat the consequences.

This chapter comes out of a number of years consulting with elementary, middle school and high school teacher and administrators interested in beginning philosophy programs. Here, I share some of these, give some perspectives on them and finally share resources for those who might now be considering philosophy programs in their institutions. This chapter also serves to give context the following eight chapters which describe some of the creative and exciting things being done in pre-college philosophy across the country.

Plato claims that “philosophy begins in wonder”. To genuinely question the unquestioned opens a hole in the floor of certainty. This feeling is the prerequisite to true philosophical thinking. However, paradoxically, it is often the absence of irreverence that prevents true awe. In order to provoke moral seriousness in students, it is common to inadvertently “flatten” the moral world by injecting seriousness into everything; however, when everything is serious, nothing is serious. This paper explores the role of conceptual and tonal irreverence, and situates this topic more generally within the role of humor in pedagogy. Finally, the presentation demonstrates connections to social justice and the ways that educational reform, in flattening the moral world, have omitted the opportunity to generate wonder and reverence. Platon tvrdi da “filozofija počinje s čuđenjem”. Istinsko preispitivanje neispitanoga izaziva nesigurnost. Taj osjećaj preduvjet je istinskom filozofskom mišljenju. Međutim, paradoksalno, često je upravo nedostatak humora ono što sprječava istinsko čuđenje. Kako bi se izazvala moralna ozbiljnost u studenata uobičajeno je da se nehotice moralni svijet predstavi dosadnijim nego što uistinu jest, dajući svemu ozbiljan predznak; no ništa nije ozbiljno kada je sve ozbiljno. Ovaj rad istražuje ulogu konceptualnog i tonalnog humora te ovu temu općenitije pozicionira u sferu uloge humora u pedagogiji. U konačnici, prezentacija prikazuje veze s društvenom pravdom i načinima na koje je obrazovna reforma, putem prikaza morala kao ozbiljne teme, propustila priliku za stvaranje čuđenja i poštivanja.

Platon tvrdi da “filozofija počinje s čuđenjem”. Istinsko preispitivanje neispitanoga izaziva nesigurnost. Taj osjećaj preduvjet je istinskom filozofskom mišljenju. Međutim, paradoksalno, često je upravo nedostatak humora ono što sprječava istinsko čuđenje. Kako bi se izazvala moralna ozbiljnost u studenata uobičajeno je da se nehotice moralni svijet predstavi dosadnijim nego što uistinu jest, dajući svemu ozbiljan predznak; no ništa nije ozbiljno kada je sve ozbiljno. Ovaj rad istražuje ulogu konceptualnog i tonalnog humora te ovu temu općenitije pozicionira u sferu uloge humora u pedagogiji. U konačnici, prezentacija prikazuje veze s društvenom pravdom i načinima na koje je obrazovna reforma, putem prikaza morala kao ozbiljne teme, propustila priliku za stvaranje čuđenja i poštivanja.

I’d like to talk about the value of unlearning, of undoing, of disruption. Especially in the early aporetic dialogues of Plato, Socrates famously takes his interlocutors on a journey that at least initially appears to end in failure: at the dialogue’s conclusion, there seems to be no answer to the questions that inspired the conversation. There has been a lot of recent debate about the so-called Socratic method and accusations that it may be deflating, resulting in less, rather than more original thought in students. In particular, the much-discussed work of Jacques Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, suggests that this method in fact masks a move of the teacher to subordinate rather than liberate the student. Adding to this the contemporary trends towards emphasis on content over critical reasoning in education and understandings of critical reasoning as consisting of categories to be memorized, and the use of questioning as an educational tool and as an end point can seem problematic indeed. How can one answer the question of what philosophy actually teaches? It is precisely because of its problematic, risky and disruptive nature that Socratic aporia works so well both in a particular class and over the course of a whole course.