S. O. Peprah

It is widely accepted that ruling is the sole prerogative of Plato’s philosopher-rulers because they alone possess knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). This knowledge is knowledge of the Good, taken to be the only knowledge there is in Kallipolis. Let us call this the sufficiency condition thesis (the SCT). In this paper, I challenge this consensus. I cast doubt on the adequacy of the SCT, arguing that part of the training and education of the philosopher-rulers involves their gaining practical wisdom (φρόνησις) and experience (ἐμπειρία). To succeed in this, I have two main aims. First, I argue that the philosopher-rulers must attain optimum cognitive success in these three modes of cognition to function efficiently in ruling. This involves showing that Plato, for his political project, appeals to other senses of cognitive successes besides his strictly metaphysical epistemology. Second, I attempt to demonstrate how these three modes of cognition coalesce or coincide in ruling the perceptible world, especially in the judgement and determination of concrete perceptible matters.

In this paper, I argue that in the Republic Plato justifies the political authority of the guardians in light of the principle of partnership — a principle which fits coherently with other Platonic principles which undergird his political theory, including optimum functionality, social justice and power. Therefore, I argue that, by their respective professions, there is a cooperative interaction between the guardians and the producers as partners within the political structure of the ideal polis towards attaining the eudaemonistic goals of both the individual and the polis. I contrast this with the orthodox interpretation that Plato justifies political authority using the idea of the Good — an interpretation which holds that since the citizens cannot grasp the Good, they assume an insignificant political position, including the allegations that they are cogs, slaves, morally obtuse, and politically inept.

Scholars have made several attempts to understand the ‘compulsion problem’ in the Republic, namely, why Plato compels the philosopher-rulers to descend into the cave to rule. These attempts, however, fail to properly incorporate two other main instances of compulsion in the dialogue into the discussion: first, the compulsion in Plato’s concept of philosophical rulership, which requires that one can be a ruler in Kallipolis if and only if one is a product of the coincidence of philosophy and politics; second, the instances of compulsion in the future philosopher-rulers’ education. My main aim in this paper is to re-examine the ‘compulsion problem’. I argue that the just law that compels the philosopher-rulers to rule corroborates Plato’s concept of education to achieve the product of his concept of philosophical rulership, i.e. rulers who despise ruling.