Stephen Schmid

_Climbing - Philosophy for Everyone_ presents a collection of intellectually stimulating new essays that address the philosophical issues relating to risk, ethics, and other aspects of climbing that are of interest to everyone from novice climbers to seasoned mountaineers. Represents the first collection of essays to exclusively address the many philosophical aspects of climbing Includes essays that challenge commonly accepted views of climbing and climbing ethics Written accessibly, this book will appeal to everyone from novice climbers to seasoned mountaineers Includes a foreword written by Hans Florine Shortlisted for the Boardman Tasker Prize for Mountain Literature, 2010

In the Philosophy of Sport literature, play has been widely conceived, in whole or part, as an autotelic activity; that is, an activity pursued for intrinsic factors. I examine several versions of the conception of play as an autotelic activity. Given these different accounts, I raise the question whether the concept of autotelic play is tenable. I examine three possibilities: (i) accept the concept of autotelic play and reject the possibility of satisfying the conditions for play activities; (ii) accept the concept and acknowledge that play refers to a range of activities ranging from the purely autotelic to something less; and, (iii) reject the definition of play as an autotelic activity and redefine play. I argue that the third option is the best avenue for constructing a viable account of play. In defending this third option, I argue that play activities are value laden, that the value of play is an empirical matter, and that the effect of motivating reasons on behavior is the basis for determining which motivating reasons count as intrinsic or extrinsic. I conclude that the weight of the arguments suggest we would be well-served to redefine and move beyond the notion of autotelic play

Climbing - Philosophy for Everyone presents a collection of intellectually stimulating new essays that address the philosophical issues relating to risk, ethics, and other aspects of climbing that are of interest to everyone from novice climbers to seasoned mountaineers. Represents the first collection of essays to exclusively address the many philosophical aspects of climbing Includes essays that challenge commonly accepted views of climbing and climbing ethics Written accessibly, this book will appeal to everyone from novice climbers to seasoned mountaineers Includes a foreword written by Hans Florine Shortlisted for the Boardman Tasker Prize for Mountain Literature, 2010.

Color theories share a similar goal---each attempts to specify the nature of color. Many color theories attempt to specify the nature of colors through a reductive analysis. The assumption underlying each of the predominant reductive color theories is that there is an unambiguous and determinate account of colors. ;I argue that a determinate account of color cannot be given for each of the major reductive color theories. The reason is that each theory faces the problem of disjunctive indeterminacy. For any one color, there is a disjunctively indeterminate set of properties realizing that color. This disjunctive indeterminacy takes two forms. First, there is the problem of different kinds instantiating colors. This form of disjunctive indeterminacy is akin to the multiple realizability problem. Second, there is the problem of open-ended sets of homogeneous kinds. Based on empirical evidence, I argue that one is unable to close this disjunctive set. The inability to close the disjunctive set entails the failure to specify the nature of colors. I argue that this indeterminacy arises for Hilbert's surface spectral reflectance objectivism, Hardin's neurophysiological subjectivism, and Thompson's ecological colors, to name a few. ;I argue that a relational theory holds the most promise. But, facts about color vision and chromatic processes suggest that the only way to escape the indeterminacy is through a non-reductive, token-identify account of colors. I sketch a dispositional account in which colors are individually contextualized and where one specifies colors in terms of their functional role for a perceiver. The result is a theory in which it is a contingent and empirical matter in each manifestation as to the categorical base present during that manifestation. Also, colors share a common dispositional property, but not necessarily a common categorical property